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INTRODUCTION

Effective January 1, 2006, the South Carolina General Assembly enacted
the South Carolina Trust Code (SCTC), which includes a section authorizing
a court to award attorney's fees and costs to any party in a judicial proceeding
involving the administration of a trust "as justice and equity may require."'
Similarly, effective January 1, 2014, the General Assembly revised the
existing South Carolina Probate Code (SCPC) to include a parallel provision
authorizing courts to award attorney's fees and costs to any party in a formal
proceeding commenced in the probate court "as justice and equity may
require." 2 Lastly, effective January 1, 2019, the General Assembly added to

and revised individual provisions of the SCPC that deal specifically with
formal proceedings involving "protected persons," such as minors or
incapacitated persons, so as to better authorize a court to award attorney's fees
3
and costs "as justice and equity may require."
These statutes provide little guidance in determining when "justice and
equity may require" an award of fees and costs. 4 Although scant case law
1.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1004 (2009). The entire section provides: "In a judicial
proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the court, as justice and equity may require,
may award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, to any party, to be paid by
another party or from the trust that is the subject of the controversy." Id.
2. Id. § 62-1-111; id. rptr.'s cmt. (referring to § 62-7-1004 as a "similar provision").
Section 62-1-111 states: "In a formal proceeding, the court, as justice and equity may require,
may award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, to any party, to be paid by
another party or from the estate that is the subject of the controversy."
3. Id. § 62-5-105; id. rptr.'scmt.; id. § 62-5-105(A) ("In a formal proceeding, the court,
as justice and equity may require, may award costs and expenses, including reasonable
attorney's fees, to any party, to be paid by another party or from the assets of the ward or
protected person who is the subject of the controversy."). The statute further mandates that
certain court-appointed personnel (guardians ad litem and designated examiners), as well as
counsel for the alleged incapacitated person or minor, "are entitled to reasonable compensation"
unless "otherwise compensated for services rendered." Id. § 62-5-105(B). The statute also
creates a default rule or presumption that "petitioners [in such proceedings] are responsible for
their own attorney's fees and costs, as well as the other costs and expenses of the action[,]"
unless "the court issues an order stating otherwise." Id. § 62-5-105(C). The Reporter's
Comments to this section explicate that "[t]his section, consistent with South Carolina case law,
clarifies that the petitioner is responsible for his own fees and costs in an action, unless there is
a contractual agreement dictating who pays or there is a court order stating who is responsible
for payment." Id. § 62-5-105 rptr.'s cmt.
4.
See id. § 62-7-1004.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss1/8

2

Blanchard: Attorney's Fees in Judicial Proceedings Involving Trusts, Estates
2020]

ATTORNEY'S FEES IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

147

exists in South Carolina interpreting or applying these provisions, all three are
patterned after

§ 1004 of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC).' UTC § 1004 is an

exception to the well-known "American Rule," which provides that parties
are generally responsible for payment of their own attorney's fees, regardless
of the outcome of the litigation. 6 The Comment to § 1004 notes that the
provision is based on Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 215, § 45 (§ 45),
which traces back to 1783 and "codifies the court's historic authority to award
costs and fees, including reasonable attorney's fees, in judicial proceedings
grounded in equity."?

The "justice and equity" standard clearly grants courts considerable
discretion and flexibility in addressing the issue of attorney's fees and costs."
However, because the standard is amorphous, this Article observes that
uncertainty and misapprehension exist among the South Carolina bench and
bar regarding the circumstances in which courts may or should award
attorney's fees and costs under these statutes.
Fortunately, numerous states outside of South Carolina have adopted
UTC § 1004 either verbatim or with slight modifications. The SCPC and
SCTC both mandate that courts shall construe these statutes to promote
uniformity of the law among the various jurisdictions that have enacted the
uniform provisions.9 As a result, decisions from other states that have adopted
UTC

§ 1004 are especially persuasive.' 0 Because a considerable body of case

5.
UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018) ("Ina judicial proceeding involving
the administration of a trust, the court, as justice and equity may require, may award costs and
expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, to any party, to be paid by another party or from
the trust that is the subject of the controversy.").
6.
Alyeska Pipeline Sewv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); see
Dowaliby v. Chambless, 344 S.C. 558, 563, 544 S.E.2d 646, 648 (Ct. App. 2001).
7.
UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018). Because the drafters' intent
of a uniform law becomes the legislative intent upon enactment, courts may resort to the
Reporter's Notes to aid in interpreting the state law. See In re Butler, 552 N.W.2d 226, 231
(Minn. 1996); Hodges v. Johnson, 177 A.3d 86, 93 (N.H. 2017); Atlanta Skin & Cancer Clinic,
P.C. v. Hallmark Gen. Partners, Inc., 320 S.C. 113, 120 n.7, 463 S.E.2d 600, 604 n.7 (1995);
Lite House, Inc. v. J.C. Roy Co., Inc., 309 S.C. 50, 53, 419 S.E.2d 817, 819 (Ct. App. 1992).
8.
See UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
9.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-102(a), (b)(5) (2009); id. § 62-7-1101.
10. See In re Est. of Zimmerman, 633 N.W.2d 594, 599 (N.D. 2001) ("We interpret
uniform laws in a uniform manner, and we may seek guidance from decisions in other states
which have interpreted similar provisions in a uniform law. We also may look to the Editorial
Board Comments of the Uniform Probate Code to interpret its provisions."); Savig v. First Nat'l
Bank of Omaha, 781 N.W.2d 335, 346 (Minn. 2010) ("If possible, we should construe the
Minnesota . . [statute] consistently with courts from otherjurisdictions that have faced the same
issue under the Uniform Probate Code. . . . '[W]e give great weight to other states'
interpretations of a uniform law."' (quoting Johnson v. Murray, 648 N.W.2d 664, 670 (Minn.
2002))); see also Hoover v. Hoover, 271 S.C. 177, 182, 246 S.E.2d 179, 181 (1978) (finding
"[i]n accord with the directive [in the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act that it]
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law has developed in states with statutes nearly identical to South Carolina's
provisions," these decisions provide useful guidance to courts and
practitioners grappling with requests for attorney's fees and costs under the
SCTC and SCPC. Additionally, given the fact that UTC § 1004 is the
offspring of § 45, nearly 250 years of judicial decisions interpreting the timetested Massachusetts statute provide another source of guidance in applying

the SCPC and SCTC provisions.12
II. NECESSITY OF A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING

As a threshold consideration, § 62-7-1004 of the South Carolina Code
expressly applies to a "judicial proceeding involving the administration of a
trust" and

§§ 62-5-105 and 62-1-111 expressly apply to a "formal proceeding"

commenced in the probate court.1 3 Therefore, an application for attorney's
fees and costs must originate in a judicial proceeding. As such, the terms
"costs," "expenses," and "reasonable attorney's fees" must be incurred or
generated in this context."
The SCTC does not define a judicial proceeding "involving the
administration of a trust."' 5 A Utah district court in In re Peeples addressed
this question while applying a Utah statute nearly identical to § 62-7-1004.16
In the absence of a statutory definition of the phrase "trust administration,"
the court resorted to a dictionary definition stating: "'Administration' is
variously defined as 'the management and disposal under court authority of

'be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of
those states which enact it,"' the South Carolina Supreme Court "follow[ed] the courts of our
sister states" in interpreting the statute).
11. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.10-1004 (West, Westlaw through 2020 1st
Extraordinary Sess. of 100th General Assemb.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-1004(1) (West,
Westlaw through 2020 5th Spec. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-795 (West, Westlaw through
end of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
12. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215, § 45 (West, Westlaw through ch. 129 of the
2020 2d Ann. Sess.); see also UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
13. A "formal proceeding" for purposes of the SCPC means an "action[] commenced by
the filing of a summons and petition with the probate court and service of the summons and
petition upon the interested persons." S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-201(17) (2009).
14. Atwood v. Atwood, 25 P.3d 936, 947 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001).
15. Section 62-7-1004 of the SCTC presupposes the existence of a "trust," thus its
provisions do not apply if no trust is involved. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1004; In re Lazarevic,
No. 11-10585, 2013 WL 3934010, at *21 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. July 29, 2013).
16. 566 B.R. 68, 78 (D. Utah 2017) (citing O'Keefe v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 956 P.2d 279,
281 (Utah 1998)), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. 880 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir.
2018).
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the estate of a deceased person,' 'the management of an estate,' and 'the
management of assets held in a trust. "'17
In Warren v. Yarborough, the South Carolina Court of Appeals likewise

held that the probate court properly ordered one party to personally pay the
other parties' attorney's fees and costs pursuant to

§ 62-7-1004.18 This

determination was due to the first party's "breaches of trust" involving a
testamentary trust created under a will, and thus such a proceeding was
deemed a "judicial proceeding involving the administration of a trust."19
However, judicial proceedings involving the administration of a trust are not
limited to claims alleging a breach of trust. 20
Courts have also held that a "judicial proceeding involving the
administration of a trust" encompasses, among other claims: a trustee's action
for instructions regarding any trust administration matter; 21 a suit seeking an
order directing trustees to pay income from a trust;22 an action to set aside

trust amendments; 23 a petition to remove trustees and to obtain an
accounting; 24 an action to approve trust accountings or to resolve beneficiary
objections thereto; 25 a suit challenging the conveyance of real property to a

beneficiary co-trustee; 26 a suit seeking the construction of a trust instrument; 27
trust beneficiaries' claims challenging a trustee's right to resign; 28 an action
to determine whether a bank designated as successor trustee accepted the
trusteeship and should be required to perform an accounting;29 trust
beneficiaries' claims against a trustee for breaches of its duty of loyalty and
fiduciary duty; 30 a trust beneficiary's suit alleging violation of trust terms and
17. Id. at 78; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 271 cmt. a,
272 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1971) (discussing what are considered matters of trust administration).
18. No. 2012-UP-401, 2012 WL 10860503, at *2 (S.C. Ct. App. July 11, 2012).
19. Id.; see also Kuttenv. Bank of Am., N.A., Civ Nos. 4:04-0244, 4:06-0927, 2008 WL
4838152, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2008) (alleging a corporate trustee's self-dealing involving
the transfer of trust assets "clearly involve[ed] the administration of a trust").
20. Corr v. Smith, 178 P.3d 859, 865 (Okla. 2008), abrogatedby Russell v. Chase Inv.
Servs. Corp., 212 P.3d 1178 (Okla. 2009); see Margaret Blair Tr. v. Blair, 378 P.3d 65, 80 (Okla.
Ct. App. 2016).
21. See Taylor v. Woods, 282 S.W.3d 285, 295 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008).
22. Garwood v. Garwood, 233 P.3d 977, 985 (Wyo. 2010).
23. See Corr, 178 P.3d at 863.
24. In re Rayola A. Banfield Irrevocable Tr., Nos. 321204, 325422, 325423, 2016 WL
3020798, at *15 (Mich. Ct. App. May 24, 2016).
25. Burns v. Bums Rhine, No. 15-CV-02329, 2016 WL 6679807, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
14, 2016); In re Thomas H. Gentry Revocable Tr., No. 29727, 2013 WL 376083, at *7 (Haw.
Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2013).
26. Calvert v. Est. of Calvert, 259 S.W.3d 456, 458 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007).
27. Taylor v. Woods, 282 S.W.3d 285, 295 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008).
28. SunTrust Bank v. Little, No. 2015 LIT 000019, 2018 WL 9963694, at *4 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Apr. 24, 2018).
29. In re Hamilton Living Tr., 471 S.W.3d 203, 209 (Ark. 2015).
30. Little, 2018 WL 9963694, at *4.
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misappropriation of trust assets; 3' and a trust beneficiary's declaratory
judgment action to determine the scope and effect of an in terrorem provision
in a trust agreement and whether certain claims trigger or violate the
provision. 32

In holding that the former fiduciary of James Brown's estate and
irrevocable trust was not entitled to attorney's fees and costs under § 62-71004, the trial judge in Bauknight v. Pope was "not persuaded" that the breach
of fiduciary claims filed by alleged beneficiaries against the former fiduciary
for her "alleged actions or inactions . . during her period of administration"
or the counterclaims filed by the former fiduciary constituted "a judicial
proceeding involving the administration of a trust." 33 The trial judge held that
"the action ha[d] nothing to do with the actual administration of a trust" and
"[n]o decision in th[e] action [would] effect, change, or guide the
administration of the Brown Trust and Estate." 34 Apparently, the judge based
his ruling on the fee applicant's status. 35 The court previously removed the

fiduciary from her positions for cause; thus, she was a former personal
representative and former trustee. 36 In light of the fact that the litigation
concerned the propriety of a former fiduciary's conduct during her period of
administration, the Bauknight case took an unduly narrow view of when
exactly judicial proceedings involve the administration of the trust. 37
III. TRIPARTITE INQUIRY

Courts have observed that the "highly subjective phrase 'justice and
equity' does not state specific guidelines or criteria for use by a trial court or
for use by a reviewing court[,]" and the "phrase connotes fairness and invites

31. Reed v. Smith, 551 S.W.3d 407, 412 (Ark. 2018).
32. State ex rel. Bank of Am. N.A. v. Kanatzar, 413 S.W.3d 22, 27-28 (Mo. Ct. App.
2013).
33. No. 2010CP4004900, 2017 WL 4100144, at *8 (S.C. Ct. C.P. July 8, 2017).
34. Id.
35. See id. (noting Mrs. Pope's actions or inactions during her period of administration
has nothing to do with the actual administration of a trust).
36. Id.
37. See generally id. Courts have held that a trustee can be entitled to reimbursement or
indemnification from the trust for attorney's fees and expenses which the trustee incurred in
defending their administration of the trust even though the trustee was no longer a trustee by the
time the lawsuit was brought against them or the award was made. See Morrison v. Watkins,
889 P.2d 140, 150 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) ("A trustee should be able to recover expenses
regardless of whether the trustee was sitting at the time the suit was instigated as long as the
reason for the suit was an action which occurred while the trustee was a trustee."); Ladd v.
Stockham, 209 So. 3d 457, 474 (Ala. 2016); Kasperbauerv. Fairfield, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494, 499
(Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting the argument that trust assets cannot be used to compensate a trustee's
attorneys after the trustee is discharged).
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flexibility in order to arrive at what is fair on a case by case basis." 38 The fee
statutes based on UTC

§ 1004 are discretionary statutes-they involve a

permissive rather than mandatory statutory right.39 Therefore, the statutory
right to payment or reimbursement of fees and costs is equitable in nature and
not absolute; in exercising its discretion, a court "need not adhere to a rigid
analysis." 40
Many courts outline the "justice and equity" standard as encompassing
two separate determinations: the initial determination of whether a party is
entitled to recover fees and expenses and, if so, the secondary determination
of the size of the award. 41 Thus, those courts typically employ a two-part
inquiry. 42 First, the court must look to the statute itself to determine whether
a party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs. 43 Second, if an
award of fees and costs is statutorily justified, the court must determine a
reasonable amount.44 The role of "justice and equity" in the first phase of the
inquiry is distinct from its role in the second phase. 45
Although courts have mostly described the "justice and equity" analysis
as a two-step process, it is more accurate to say it includes a third step. 46

Specifically, if an award of fees and costs is statutorily justified and the
amount is deemed reasonable, the court must also decide who or what should
bear the burden of paying the attorney's fees and costs-one or more of the
38. Atwood v. Atwood, 25 P.3d 936, 947 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001); see also In re Est. of
Philip Roseman, No. M2019-00218-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 5078722, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Oct. 10, 2019) ("The determination of what constitutes justice and equity is a case-by-case
determination, based on the facts and presentation of evidence.").
39. Lehmann v. Bank of Am., N.A., 427 S.W.3d 315, 324 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014); Peppers
Cemetery Found. v. McKinney, 455 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015); Copeland v.
Kramarck, No. 294-N, 2006 WL 3740617, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2006); Berlinsky v.
Berlinsky, Nos. 2019-CP-10-1235, 2013-GC-10-0150, 2019 WL 7212469, at *8 (S.C. Ct. C.P.
Dec. 20, 2019); see also Barboza v. McLeod, 853 N.E.2d 192, 199 n.6 (Mass. 2006) (holding
that an award of attorney's fees under MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215, § 45 (West, Westlaw
through ch. 129 of the 2020 2d Ann. Sess.) is a matter of discretion, not a matter of right).
40. Jelletichv. Pawlaksi, No. 5:14-CV-00017, 2015 WL 1249673, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Mar.
18, 2015); Young v. Young, No. CA08-212, 2008 WL 5176763, at *8 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 10,
2008) (citing Meyer v. CDI Contractors, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 530 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008)); Fisher v.
Fisher, 221 P.3d 845, 852 (Utah Ct. App. 2009).
41. See, e.g., In re Tr. No. T-1 of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474, 491 (Iowa 2013) (citing
Atwood, 25 P.3d at 940, 945-47); see also Atwood, 25 P.3d at 947; Cooper v. Jordan, No. 140157, 2015 WL 1815996, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2015) (citing Trimble, 826 N.W.2d at
491); Skyline Potato Co., Inc. v. Hi-Land Potato Co., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1152 (D.N.M.
2016).
42. See, e.g., Trimble, 826 N.W.2d at 491 (citingAtwood, 25 P.3d at 940, 945-47).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Atwood, 25 P.3d at 947.
46. See Yerian v. Houska, No. 2016 CV 073, 2018 WL 3879071, at *4 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
July 24, 2018).
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parties to the litigation, the trust or estate that is the subject of the controversy,
or some combination of both.47 The source of the payment can often be a
critical consideration because its resolution not only affects the immediate
parties to the proceeding but also individuals who may not have participated
in the litigation but who otherwise have interests in the trust or estate, such as
current and future beneficiaries. 48
These separate steps in the tripartite analysis-(1)

entitlement, (2)

amount, and (3) source of payment-are discussed in detail in the succeeding
sections of this Article.
A.

Determining Entitlement

Statutes based on UTC § 1004 grant the court "broad discretion" 49 to
determine whether "any party" to the judicial proceeding is entitled to
attorney's fees and costs. 50 These statutes do not provide "specific guidelines
or criteria" for trial courts to use in making awards of fees and costs."
In Atwood v. Atwood, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals applied an
Oklahoma statute substantially similar to § 62-7-100452 and distilled general
criteria from other cases to identify five non-exclusive or non-exhaustive

47. See infra Part II.C; see also Yerian, 2018 WL 3879071, at *3 ("The Court must first
decide whether . . an award of fees should be made to [the trust beneficiaries] pursuant to
[Ohio's version of § 1004]. Next, if an award is to be made to [the beneficiaries], the amount of
fees to be awarded, and finally whether fees should be assessed against [the trustee] or the
trust."); Kevin M. Henry, Attorney Fee Awards in Litigation Between Trustees and
Beneficiaries, 39 VT. BAR J. 19, 20 n.17 (Summer 2013) (noting that the justice and equity
analysis also includes "the question of who pays the trust or the parties").
48. See Cohen v. Minneapolis Jewish Fed'n, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1287 (W.D. Wis.
2018) ("The bigger dispute is over the source of the funds for paying the fees."), aff'd, 776 F.
App'x 912 (7th Cir. 2019).
49. See In re Caswell Silver Family Tr., No. CV 10-934, 2012 WL 13013061, at *3
(D.N.M. Jan. 5, 2012).
50. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-111, -5-105, -7-1004 (2009). The terms of the statutes make
clear that the award is made to the party, not to their lawyer. Id.; see also Jackson v. Speed, 326
S.C. 289, 307, 486 S.E.2d 750, 759 (1997) ("The award of attorney's fees is made to the party,
not his lawyer." (citing Prevatte v. Asbury Arms, 302 S.C. 413, 396 S.E.2d 642 (Ct. App.
1990))).
51. See Ragsdale v. FisHler, No. 20180993, 2020 WL 4519160, at *11 (Utah Aug. 5,
2020) (quoting Shurtleff v. United Effort Plan Tr., 289 P.3d 408, 415 (Utah 2012)).
52. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.57(D) (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2020 of the
2d Reg. Sess. of 57th Leg. (2020)) ("In a judicial proceeding involving a trust, the court may in
its discretion, as justice and equity may require, award costs and expenses, including reasonable
attorney's fees, to any party, to be paid by another party or from the trust which is the subject of
the controversy.").
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factors that help resolve the first part of the tripartite inquiry. 53 These criteria,
which case law often refers to as the "Atwood factors," include: (1)
reasonableness of the parties' claims, contentions, or defenses; (2)
unnecessarily prolonging litigation; (3) relative ability to bear the financial
burden; (4) result obtained by the litigation and prevailing party concepts; and
(5) whether a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons in the bringing or conduct of the litigation.54
Following Atwood, numerous other courts have adopted these nonexclusive factors when applying fee statutes based on UTC

§ 1004.55 In

applying the last factor, at least one court has expanded the analysis to
consider a party's "behavior both before and during the litigation."5 6 These
factors are used only in determining the first prong of the three-part analysisi.e., the entitlement prong. 57
53. Atwood v. Atwood, 25 P.3d 936, 947 (Okla. Ct. App. 2001) ("Ina judicial proceeding
involving a trust, the court may in its discretion, as justice and equity may require, award costs
and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, to any party, to be paid by another party or
from the trust which is the subject of the controversy.").
54. Id.
55. In re Tr. No. T-1 of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474, 491 (Iowa 2013) (adopting Atwood
criteria); Skyline Potato Co., Inc. v. Hi-Land Potato Co., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1152 (D.N.M.
2016) (citing Atwood, 25 P.3d at 947); Cooper v. Jordan, No. 14-0157, 2015 WL 1815996, at
*4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2015) (citing Atwood, 25 P.3d at 947); Shriners Hosps. for Child. v.
FirstN. Bank of Wyo., 373 P.3d 392, 418 (Wyo. 2016) (citingAtwood, 25 P.3d at 947); Garwood
v. Garwood, 233 P.3d 977, 986 (Wyo. 2010) (citing Atwood, 25 P.3d at 947); Shurtleff v. United
Effort Plan Tr., 289 P.3d 408, 415-16 (Utah 2012) (citingAtwood, 25 P.3d at 947); Kerrv. UMB
Bank, N.A., No. CIV-06-95-C, 2008 WL 822055, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 26, 2008) (citing
Atwood, 25 P.3d at 947); Busse v. Busse, No. LACV083022, 2017 WL 8314911, at *5 (Iowa
Dist. Ct. Sept. 6, 2017) (citing Atwood, 25 P.3d at 947); Slezakv. Matherly, No. LACL138325,
2020 WL 1275561, at *22 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Feb. 7, 2020) (citing Atwood, 25 P.3d at 947); In re
Est. of Blackburn v. Richards, 299 So. 3d 781, 792 (Miss. Aug. 13, 2020) (citing Atwood, 25
P.3d at 947); see also Ragsdale, 2020 WL 4519160 at *10-11 (holding Atwood factors should
apply when evaluating fee requests under any statute that provides discretion to award fees but
no guidance on how to do so). See generally Henry, supra note 47, at 20 (observing that the
Atwood factors have been well received and appear to be the preferred criteria to apply in
§ 1004's justice and equity analysis). But see Hodges v. Johnson, No. 2019-0319, 2020 WL
5648573, at *11 (N.H. Sept. 23, 2020) (declining to adopt the Atwood factors in the absence of
legislative direction to do so because the court did not want to "cabin the broad discretion the
statute grants trial courts by requiring them to consider pre-determined factors to decide 'what
is fair' in any particular case." (citations omitted)).
56. See, e.g., In re Alice Stedman 1989 Tr. 2013 Restatement, No. 2017-0288, 2018 WL
3862925, at *3 (N.H. Aug. 15, 2018).
57. See W.A.K., II ex rel. Karo v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 3:09CV575, 2010 WL
3074393, at *6 n.2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2010) ("W.A.K. argues that the amount of fees recoverable
from the Trust can be set using equitable considerations, focusing on statute's use of the phrase
'as justice and equity may require.' The Court finds that under a plain reading of the statute,
equity is only a factor as to whether fees are awarded from a trust. If awarded, the amount of
fees recoverable is guided by a reasonableness determination."); Shurtleff, 289 P.3d at 416
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In addition to the Atwood factors, courts have also considered whether an
award of fees and costs would deter misconduct or minimize access to the
courts. 58 The court in In re Estate of Forgey, for example, still ordered a

prevailing trustee to pay the beneficiaries' fees and costs because he failed to
timely report and inform the beneficiaries about the trust's administration
until litigation was filed against him. 59 The court explained: "[I]f we do not
impose a penalty such as attorney fees in the instant case, then future trustees
may believe that the statutory requirement to report has no significance." 60
However, the fact that a party has violated some trust or estate obligation does
not impose "strict liability" for the other party's attorney's fees. 61 The court's
discretion in awarding fees is also not limited to instances where such a
"penalty" or punishment is warranted. 62
In Hemphill v. Shore, a trust beneficiary unsuccessfully sued the trustee

for committing constructive fraud in liquidating a family trust and distributing
the assets to himself 63 In reversing an award of attorney's fees against the
beneficiary under Kansas's version of UTC

§ 1004, the Kansas Court of

Appeals noted that because the beneficiary's lawsuit was not frivolous,
awarding fees under the circumstances of the case "would have a chilling
effect on those persons seeking access to the courts to seek a legal remedy to

("[Non-exclusive factors] refer only to the analysis of what is considered just and equitable, as
opposed to the separate analysis regarding the amount of fees awarded.").
58. See, e.g., Hemphill v. Shore, 342 P.3d 2, 6 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015).
59. 906 N.W.2d 618, 640 (Neb. 2018).
60 Id. at 639; see also In re Rolf H. Brennemann Testamentary Tr., 849 N.W.2d 458,
468 (Neb. 2014) (remanding to trial court the issue of whether beneficiary was entitled to award
of attorney's fees when for decades trustees had breached their duty to inform and report and
were unable to properly account to beneficiary because they failed to properly maintain trust
records; even though the trustees' conduct ultimately did not harm the beneficiary or the trust,
that became clear only after litigation was made necessary by the trustees' breach of their duties);
In re Hamilton Living Tr., 471 S.W.3d 203, 209 (Ark. 2015) (affirming award of attorney's fees
and costs against a corporate trustee and observing that "[h]ad the [trustee] performed the
accounting, no fees would be necessary"); Ughetta v. Cist, No. 7885-MA, 2015 WL 3430094,
at *13 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2015), adoptedsub nom. Ughetta v. Mary Harding Cist, No. 7885MA, 2016 WL 4129059 (Del. Ch. Aug. 3, 2016) (declining to require trust beneficiary to pay
trustee's attorney's fees and costs despite rejection of beneficiary's request for accounting and
removal of the trustee when trustee had excluded the beneficiary from numerous meetings,
discussions, and correspondence concerning the trust); Kerr, 2008 WL 822055, at *2 (repeating
failure by corporate trustee to respond to plaintiffs' remainder beneficiaries' requests for
information about distributions to income beneficiary, although justified, was reason to require
trusts, rather than plaintiffs in unsuccessful lawsuit challenging distributions, to pay trustee's
attorney's fees when failure to respond had "boxed Plaintiffs into the proverbial corner" and
precipitated the lawsuit).
61. Fisher v. Fisher, 221 P.3d 845, 852 (Utah Ct. App. 2009).
62. Peppers Cemetery Found. v. McKinney, 455 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015)
(quoting Rounerv. Wise, 446 S.W.3d 242, 260 (Mo. 2014)).
63. No. 110,166, 2015 WL 423795, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2015).
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justifiable claims." 64 Similarly, in a Connecticut case, the trial court
considered whether the refusal to award attorney's fees to the trust beneficiary
would discourage other parties from defending or pursuing declaratory
remedy actions adjudicating their rights. 65
Strictly speaking, fee statutes based on UTC § 1004 are not "prevailing
party" statutes. 66 In fact, South Carolina's statutes based on UTC § 1004

expressly grant courts the discretion to award or deny fees and costs "to any
party."6 7 The words "prevailing party" do not appear in the statutes. 68 The

mere fact that a party prevailed in a judicial proceeding covered by the statutes
does not per se entitle the party to an award of fees and costs. 69 Conversely, a
party does not have to be a "prevailing party" in order to recover under these
statutes. 70

Nonetheless, in deciding whether to award fees, courts have given
"considerable weight" to the outcome of the litigation. 7' The court's primary
concern is determining which party, if any, prevailed on the merits of the case
64. Id. at *6; see also Ragsdale v. Fishier, No. 20180993, 2020 WL 4519160, at *11 (Utah
Aug. 5, 2020) (stating that in making an award of statutory fees utilizing the Atwood factors
courts "should pause before awarding a respondent fees when a petition has some merit" because
"[t]his may chill future petitions an outcome that strikes us as contrary to the statute's
purpose").
65. Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, No. MMXCV116006351, 2014 WL 3397927, at *5 (Conn.
Super. Ct. June 5, 2014).
66. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-111, -5-105, -7-1004 (2009).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Skyline Potato Co., Inc. v. Hi-Land Potato Co., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1161 (D.N.M.
2016) ("[Claimants'] status as prevailing parties does not, alone, entitle them to the award of
attorney's fees."). In affirming the denial of a trustee's request for an award of attorney's fees
and costs incurred against the trust settlor's estate's suit to terminate or modify the trust and to
set aside a transfer of real estate from the settlor to the trust, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
emphasized the trial court's discretion under a statute identical to § 62-7-1004. In re Est. of
Philip Roseman, No. M2019-00218-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 5078722, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Oct. 10, 2019). The court further rejected the trustee's arguments that the trust should not be
diminished in value because the trustee was required to defend against the estate's lawsuits "that
yielded the same results that would have occurred had the lawsuits not be[en] filed," despite the
trustee's assertion that "it would be an injustice to the beneficiaries of the Trust to assess the
fees to the Trust." Id.
70. See In re Gene Wild Revocable Tr., 299 S.W.3d 767, 783 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); see
also Hachar v. Hachar, 153 S.W.3d 138, 142 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that recovery of
attorney's fees and costs based on a provision in Texas Trust Code similar to UTC § 1004, which
allows for "attorney's fees as may seem equitable and just," is not dependent on a finding that a
party "substantially prevailed" in the action); GEORGE G. BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT'S THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 970 (June 2020) (observing that UTC § 1004 grants the court
discretion to award attorney's fees to trust beneficiary even when the beneficiary did not prevail
in the proceeding).
71. Eg., Kerr v. UMB Bank, N.A., No. CIV-06-95-C, 2008 WL 822055, at *2 (W.D.
Okla. Mar. 26, 2008) ("The Court understands Atwood as affording considerable weight on the
outcome of the litigation in deciding whether to award fees.").
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as a whole.72 It should be uncommon for a court to find that justice and equity
require an award in favor of a party who did not achieve at least some degree
of success on the merits, even though the same set of facts may not compel an
award of fees and costs against such a party.73 Rather than completely hinging
on prevailing party concepts, the dispositive inquiry is whether there is a

reason grounded in equity that justifies an award of fees. 74 This analysis
extends beyond simply tallying which party won or lost on the merits. 75
The decision in In re Gene Wild Revocable Trust is illustrative. 76 There,

two colleges were beneficiaries of a trust that filed competing petitions to
determine (1) whether certain amendments to the trust documents made by
the grantor were proper and (2) whether the grantor had sufficient mental
capacity to execute the amendments.77 One of the colleges argued that the
grantor's amendments were invalid because they purported to amend a
version of the trust which had since been restated and revoked or,
alternatively, because the grantor lacked capacity. 78 After a trial, the probate
court found the amendments valid and entered judgment in favor of the other
college. 79 Pursuant to a Missouri statute identical to

§ 62-7-1004, the probate

court further ordered that both the prevailing college's attorney's fees in the
amount of $316,497.67 and the losing college's attorney's fees in the amount
of $381,680.20 be paid from the trust assets.80 The Missouri Court of Appeals

later rejected the prevailing college's argument that the probate court erred by
ordering the losing college's fees be paid from the trust. 8' The court
concluded: "The probate court here reasoned that this litigation was brought
and defended in good faith and there were issues raised which could only have
72. Taylor v. Woods, 282 S.W.3d 285, 295-96 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Perry v.
Baptist Health, 243 S.W.3d 310 (2006)).
73. See Evans v. Moyer, 282 P.3d 1203, 1214 (Wyo. 2012); In re Tr. No. T-1 of Trimble,
826 N.W.2d 474, 493-94 (Iowa 2013); In re Est. of Frye, No. 13-1170, 2014 WL 3511827, at
*14 (Iowa Ct. App. July 16, 2014); cf Hardtv. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242,
255 (2010) (interpreting a federal statute granting discretion to courts to award reasonable
attorney's fees and costs to either party, rejecting the argument that the statute limits the
availability of attorney's fees to a prevailing party, and holding that a party seeking such an
award must show some degree of success on the merits).
74. Shelton v. Tamposi, 62 A.3d 741, 751 (N.H. 2013).
75. See In re Caswell Silver Family Tr., Civ. No. 10-934, 2012 WL 13013061, at *3
(D.N.M. Jan. 5, 2012) ("[Ilt appears [§ 46A-10-1004 of the New Mexico Statutes Annotated]
would grant the Court authority to award attorney's fees to any party, payable by any party or
by the trust, as might be just and equitable, and the Court will not be limited by a simple
determination as to who should prevail on the merits.").
76. See 299 S.W.3d 767 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
77. Id. at 770.
78. Id. at 781.
79. Id. at 773.
80. Id. at 782.
81. Id. at 784.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss1/8

12

Blanchard: Attorney's Fees in Judicial Proceedings Involving Trusts, Estates
2020]

ATTORNEY'S FEES IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

157

been settled via judicial determination.... The probate court did not abuse its
discretion in making such an award."8 2 Under the statute, "the probate court
could[,] within its discretion[,] award attorney's fees 'to any party' regardless
of whether that party prevailed in the lawsuit."8 3

In view of the Atwood factors, courts have generally been averse to
holding that "justice and equity" require trustees acting in the exercise of their
official duties to personally pay the attorney's fees of beneficiaries incurred
in litigation relating to the administration of the trust.84 Courts have also been
reluctant to subject beneficiaries to the burden of personally paying the
trustees' legal fees under statutes based on UTC

§ 1004. This is true even

when the court rejects the beneficiaries' claims outright or otherwise has to
strain to find their merit.85 Instead, courts are more receptive to mandating
that trust assets be used to reimburse the attorney's fees of trustees or
beneficiaries who prevailed in the litigation.86 For example, the Kansas Court
of Appeals recently ruled in Schmitendorfv. Taylor that a trial judge did not

abuse his discretion by ordering that a trustee's attorney's fees and costs be
paid directly from the trust assets, rather than by the unsuccessful
beneficiary. 87 This was held despite the trial judge "express[ing] doubt" as to
the truthfulness of the beneficiary's assertions.88
In Kutten v. Bank ofAmerica, N.A., however, a Missouri court applied an

identical statute to find that justice and equity required the beneficiaries to pay

&

82. Id. at 783 (citing Scott v. Blue Springs Ford Sales, Inc., 215 S.W.3d 145, 170 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2006)).
83. Id. Likewise, § 45 has been applied to support an award of attorney's fees against
parties "regardless of the outcome." Hurley v. Noone, 196 N.E.2d 905, 910 (Mass. 1964); see
also Conley v. Fenelon, 165 N.E. 382, 384 (Mass. 1929) ("Under [§ 45,] the probate court has
jurisdiction to award expenses and counsel fees incurred by those named as executors who have
been defeated in their petition to establish the will."); Greene v. Cronin, 50 N.E.2d 36, 40-41
(Mass. 1943) (award of fees to unsuccessful will contestant was upheld).
84. See, e.g., Klinkerfuss v. Cronin, 289 S.W.3d 607, 617-18 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009);
Shurtleff v. United Effort Plan Tr., 289 P.3d 408, 416 (Utah 2012); Shelton v. Tamposi, 62 A.3d
741, 751 (N.H. 2013); Evans v. Moyer, 282 P.3d 1203, 1214 (Wyo. 2012); In re Tr. No. T-1 of
Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474, 493 (Iowa 2013); Damas v. Damas, No. L-10-1125, 2011 WL
6153123, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2011).
85. See, e.g., Morrow v. SunTrust Bank, No. W2010-01547-COA-R3CV, 2011 WL
334507, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2011); In re Est. of Philip Roseman, No.
M201900218COAR3CV, 2019 WL 5078722, at *4-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2019). But see
In re Conservatorship of Annette H. Cross, No. W201801179COAR3CV, 2020 WL 6018759,
at *13-14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2020) (requiring the trust remainder beneficiary, instead of
the trust, to reimburse a trustee's legal fees incurred in successfully defending against the
remainder beneficiary's claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the trustee).
86. See, e.g., Damas, 2011 WL 6153123, at *8; Diallo v. Suntrust Bank Found.
Endowments, No. CV 16-1312, 2017 WL 2840038, at *5 (D. Md. June 29, 2017).
87. No. 120,865, 2020 WL 3393526 at *1-2 (Kan. Ct. App. June 19, 2020).
88. Id.
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the trustee's attorney's fees after they engaged in persistent forum shopping. 89
Additionally, in Shurtleff v. United Effort Plan Trust, which involved a

charitable trust, a Utah court held that justice and equity mandated the State
to pay the attorney's fees and costs of a special fiduciary appointed by the
state attorney general when the attorney general "substantially altered" his
position with respect to the trust and later took positions to undermine the
special fiduciary in the litigation. 90 Another court similarly ruled that justice
and equity required one beneficiary to pay another beneficiary's fees and costs
because the express language of the testamentary trust and applicable law
"directly refuted" the losing beneficiary's position. 91
1.

Bad Faith or Egregious Conduct Not Necessary

The Reporter's Comments to UTC

§ 1004 and § 62-7-1004 allude to the

old common law rule allowing for the recovery of attorney's fees in cases of
egregious conduct, such as bad faith or fraud. 92 This cryptic reference has led
some courts to mistakenly conclude that a showing of bad faith or egregious
conduct is a prerequisite to the recovery of attorney's fees. 93 However, the
Comments do not indicate the uniform provision was intended to limit
recovery to the same standard applied under the common law rule. 94 Instead,
the uniform provision departs from the common law rule and implements a
more liberal, expansive standard for the recovery of attorney's fees. 95
89. No. CIV. 4:04-0244, 2008 WL 4838152, at *3 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
90. 289 P.3d 408, 416 (Utah 2012).
91. In re Edwin Meissner Testamentary Tr., 497 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
92. UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018) ("Generally, litigation
expenses were at common law chargeable against another party only in the case of egregious
conduct such as bad faith or fraud."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1004 rptr. 's cmt. (2009). The "bad
faith exception" is not restricted to cases where the action is filed in bad faith, but may be found,
not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation. Roadway
Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (citing Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973)); see
also Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing a court's "inherent
powers" to award sanctions in the form of attorney's fees against a party or counsel who acts in
bad faith).
93. See, e.g., Roadway Exp., 447 U.S. at 766; Copeland v. Kramarck, No. CIV.A. 294-N,
2006 WL 3740617, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2006).
94. Kutten v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CIV. 4:04-0244, 2008 WL 4838152, at *3 (E.D.
Mo. 2008) ("Plaintiffs contend that the [C]omment to [UTC § 1004] on which [the Missouri
statute] is based makes clear that this section applies only in the case of bad faith or egregious
conduct. They cite no Missouri case (or case from any other jurisdiction) so restricting the
reading of this section, however, and the Court finds no reason to interpret the section
restrictively.").
95. This was the observation of law professor David M. English, the Reporter to and
principal drafter of the UTC. See DAVID M. ENGLISH ET AL., CASE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM

TRUST CODE THROUGH 2014,

at 1

(Jan.
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§ 1004

have specifically rejected the argument that attorney's fees and costs can be
awarded only if bad faith, egregious conduct, or intentional misconduct is
shown. 96 Although the presence or absence of this conduct is a factor to be
considered, it is not necessary to justify an award of attorney's fees and costs
under the uniform provision. 97 Rather, the provision merely requires a reason,

grounded in equity, as to why fees should be awarded. 98
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reached the same result in In
re Estate ofKing by applying

§ 45.99 In this case, some of the decedent's heirs

filed an action in the probate court challenging the validity of his will.1'00 After

6/UTC_Case_SummariesThrough 2014.pdf
[https://penna.cc/8QNR-W5A3]
("Another
significant change [to traditional trust law] is a result of UTC [§] 1004 ... .This will in some
states expand the power of the court, sitting in equity, to award attorney fees outside of the
traditional exceptions to the American rule in trust cases for vexatious conduct and common
benefit."); see also Henry, supra note 47, at 23-24 ("[T]he Trust Code is departing from
common law and setting a lower bar to justify a fee award from one party to another. Thus, while
it codifies the common law with respect to the authority to award fees, it seems to contemplate
a different standard for doing so."); Cohen v. Minneapolis Jewish Fed'n, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1274,
1287 (W.D. Wis. 2018), aff'd, 776 F. App'x 912 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) ("The
Trustees start off on the wrong foot by contending that an award of fees is appropriate only if
the court finds bad faith. But that is the standard under common law, not [Wisconsin's version
of UTC § 1004], which took effect in 2014.").
96. See, e.g., Kutten, 2008 WL 4838152, at *3; Shelton v. Tamposi, 62 A.3d 741, 75152 (N.H. 2013); In re Alice Stedman 1989 Tr. 2013 Restatement, No. 2017-0288, 2018 WL
3862925, at *2 (N.H. Aug. 15, 2018); O'Riley v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 412 S.W.3d 400, 419 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2013); Klinkerfuss v. Cronin, 289 S.W.3d 607, 617 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); In re Osorio
Irrevocable Tr., 337 P.3d 87, 90 (Mont. 2014); Yerianv. Houska, No. 2016 CV 073, 2018 WL
3879071, at *3 (Ohio Ct. C.P. July 24,2018); Kerrv. UMB Bank, N.A., No. CIV-06-95-C, 2008
WL 822055, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 26, 2008); Warnerv. Warner, 319 P.3d 711,727 n.18 (Utah
2014); Garwoodv. Garwood, 233 P.3d 977, 986 (Wyo. 2010); see also In re Mayette E. Hoffman
Living Tr. U/A Dated Aug. 4, 1997, 812 S.E.2d 401, 403-04 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (rejecting
the claim that North Carolina statute, which deviates from uniform provision in significant
respects, constrains the court's discretion to award attorney's fees and costs to those instances
where there is egregious conduct, such as bad faith or fraud); Busse v. Busse, No. LACV083022,
2017 WL 8314911, at *6 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Sept. 6, 2017) (affirming award of attorney's fees
against trust beneficiaries under Iowa's version of UTC § 1004 even though they did not act in
bad faith and applying § 633A.4507 of the Code of Iowa).
97. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
98. Shelton, 62 A.3d at 751.
99. 920 N.E.2d 820 (Mass. 2010). Section 45 provides that "[i]n contested cases before a
probate court orbefore the supreme judicial court on appeal, costs and expenses in the discretion
of the court may be awarded to either party, to be paid by the other, or may be awarded to either
or both parties to be paid out of the estate which is the subject of the controversy, as justice and
equity may require." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215, § 45 (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d
Ann. Sess.). Courts in Massachusetts have long construed the term "expenses" in this statute as
including "counsel fees as well as other obligations incurred outside strictly taxable costs."
Conley v. Fenelon, 165 N.E. 382, 384 (Mass. 1929); see Coles v. Goldie, 167 N.E.2d 761, 764
(Mass. 1960).
100. King, 920 N.E.2d at 821-22.
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the executor prevailed, she moved under the statute for an award of attorney's
fees against the will contestants.101 The contestants argued the fees could not
be awarded because there was no finding of bad faith or egregious litigation
conduct. 0 2 However, in rejecting this assertion, the court held that § 45's
language allowing for an award of attorney's fees and costs "as justice and
equity may require" establishes "a broad standard, one that certainly reaches
beyond bad faith or wrongful conduct."1 03 Instead, the statute simply
"require[s] a reason, grounded in equity, why an award shifting fees should
be made."1 04
In DeborahDereede Living Trust dated December 18, 2013 v. Karp, the

South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld an award of attorney's fees and costs
in favor of trust beneficiaries under

§ 62-7-1004.105 This award was ordered

subsequent to a finding that the trustee breached her fiduciary duties by failing
to make timely trust distributions, even though "[t]here [was] no evidence [the
trustee] acted in bad faith.1 06 It does not appear the trustee argued an award of
fees and costs under the statute would be improper absent a showing of bad
faith, and thus the court did not directly address that question in affirming the
fee award.1 07

Delaware and Vermont are notable outlier states in construing-although
sometimes not consistently-their versions of UTC

§ 1004 to require a

101. Id. at 822.
102. Id. at 825.
103. Id. at 827 (emphasis added); see also Shelton v. Tamposi, 62 A.3d 741,751-52 (N.H.
2013) ("We agree with the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts [in King] that the words
'as justice and equity may require . . establish a broad standard, one that certainly reaches
beyond bad faith or wrongful conduct."' (quoting King, 920 N.E.2d at 827)); In re Alice
Stedman 1989 Tr. 2013 Restatement, No. 2017-0288, 2018 WL 3862925, at *2 (N.H. Aug. 15,
2018) ("Given our holding in Shelton that the statutory standard reaches beyond bad faith and
wrongful conduct, we conclude that the trial court did not err in awarding attorney's fees-even
in the absence of a finding that [a trustee] acted in bad faith or that she engaged in oppressive
conduct."); Miller-Gray v. Charette, No. 12-P-1799, 2014 WL 775002, at *3 n.1 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2014) ("Charette contends a fee award must be based on a finding of bad faith Bad faith,
however, is not a prerequisite of an attorney fee award pursuant to [§ 45]."); Ferri v. PowellFerri, 165 A.3d 1137, 1146 (Conn. 2017) ("[T]he probate court has discretion . . to shift fees
and costs . . . even if the claims and defenses of the losing party were not wholly insubstantial
and frivolous").
104. King, 920 N.E.2d at 827; see Brady v. Citizens Union Sav. Bank (Brady1), 38 N.E.3d
301, 307 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (citing King, 920 N.E.2d at 830).
105. 427 S.C. 336, 346-47, 831 S.E.2d 435, 441-42 (Ct. App. 2019).
106. Id. at 344, 831 S.E.2d at 439. Similarly, a Utah district court awarded attorney's fees
and costs in favor of a trust beneficiary against the trustee under a Utah statute nearly identical
to § 62-7-1004 even though the court found the trustee's "defenses were brought in good faith"
and the trustee "appropriately attempted to defend her management of the trust funds based on
her understanding and the advice of professionals." Counsell v. Colfack, No. 040400326, 2007
WL 3237069 (Utah Dist. Ct. June 22, 2007).
107. See Dereede, 427 S.C. at 336, 831 S.E.2d at 435.
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showing of bad faith or other egregious conduct.1 08 Additionally, despite
contrary rulings from both a Missouri state appellate court and a Missouri
federal trial court, a state trial court therein held that an award of fees and
costs is improper under the state's version of § 1004 "without a showing of
egregious or vexatious conduct." 09
B.

DeterminingAmount

Once the court determines that justice and equity require an award of
attorney's fees and costs, the next step is to determine the specific amount of

108. The Delaware Court of Chancery has applied Delaware's version of UTC § 1004 and
requires a showing of "bad faith" for the recovery of fees under the statute. Copeland v.
Kramarck, No. CIV.A. 294-N, 2006 WL 3740617, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2006); see also In
re Olympic Mills Corp. Coachman Inc., No. 01-13021, 2010 WL 3810784, at *6 (Bankr. D.P.R.
Sept. 27, 2010), aff'd sub nom. In re Olympic Mills Corp., No. CIV. 11-1064CCC, 2012 WL
4667598 (D.P.R. Sept. 28, 2012) (applying Delaware law and following Copeland). As support
for its holding, the Copeland court cited to Rice v. Herrigan-Ferro,No. 401-S, 2004 WL
1587563, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2004), which applied the common law rule that an exception
exists to the American Rule when "a party, or its counsel, has proceeded in bad faith, has acted
vexatiously, or has relied on misrepresentations of fact or law in connection with advancing a
claim in litigation." Id.
Delaware case law is not consistent on this question. See In re The Hawk Mountain Tr.,
No. CV 7334, 2015 WL 5243328, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2015) (construing § 3584 as not
requiring a showing of bad faith as generally would be necessary under the American Rule);
Merrill Lynch Tr. Co., FSB v. Campbell, C.A. No. 1803, 2009 WL 2913893, at *14 n.95 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 2, 2009) (holding that § 3584 sets a standard that is "more relaxed" than that of the
American Rule, "but its application, nonetheless, should be informed by the precepts underlying
the American Rule" and noting that the court "has the discretion to shift fees in circumstances
where the exacting requirements of the American Rule might not otherwise allow").
The Vermont Supreme Court has held that "[t]he question of whether attorney's fees should
be awarded under [Vermont's version of UTC § 1004] 'as justice and equity may require' is
'largely indistinguishable' from the question of whether attorney's fees should be awarded for
'reasons of justice' under the common law." Pawlick v. Apgar, No. 2018-195, 2019 WL
2005780, at *4 (Vt. May 6, 2019). The Pawlick court cited to its prior decision in Curran v.
Building Fund of United Church of Ludlow, 88 A.3d 1204, 1211 (Vt. 2013), where the court
ruled that the analysis under title 14A, § 1004 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated is "largely
indistinguishable" from the analysis under the common law rule.
109. Morriss v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12SL-PR03035, 2016 WL 7732583, at *22
(Mo. Cir. Ct. Jan. 26, 2016). The Morriss court inexplicably failed to acknowledge the holdings
in O Riley v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 412 S.W.3d 400, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), and Kutten v. Bank of
America, NA., No. CIV. 4:04-0244, 2008 WL 4838152, at *3 (E.D. Mo. 2008), in which those
courts expressly rejected the argument that attorney's fees and costs can be awarded under the
Missouri statute only if bad faith, egregious conduct, or intentional misconduct is shown.
Morriss, 2016 WL 7732583, at *22; see also Klinkerfuss v. Cronin, 289 S.W.3d 607, 617 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2009) (noting that § 456.10-1004 is not limited to cases of bad faith or egregious
conduct).
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fees and costs to be awarded." 0 This determination is guided by a
reasonableness standard."' South Carolina's appellate courts have utilized the
"lodestar" approach in determining what constitutes a "reasonable fee"
pursuant to fee-shifting statutes that were not based on UTC

§ 1004.112

Likewise, courts in other jurisdictions have utilized the lodestar approach in
reviewing awards of fees and costs under their versions of UTC § 1004.113
The lodestar figure "is designed to reflect the reasonable time and effort
involved in litigating a case[] and is calculated by multiplying a reasonable
hourly rate by the reasonable time expended."" 4 Using the lodestar figure "as
a starting point for reasonableness, a court may consider other factors
justifying an enhancement [or reduction] of the lodestar figure with a
'multiplier' before arriving at a final amount."" 5

In Dereede, although the South Carolina Court of Appeals applied the
first part of the lodestar approach, the court did not apply the entire
approach."1 6 Rather, the court calculated the base lodestar figure and
subsequently omitted consideration of whether a multiplier should enhance or
reduce the base figure to reflect any exceptional circumstances of the case." 7
Thus, uncertainty persists as to whether South Carolina courts should apply
the entire lodestar approach or simply the first part of the analysis when
deciding fee requests made under the statutes derived from UTC § 1004.118
110. See Klinkerfuss, 289 S.W.3d at 615; SunTrst Bank v. Little, No. 2015 LIT 000019,
2018 WL 9963694, at *7 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2018).
111. Little, 2018 WL 9963694, at *7; see Klinkerfuss, 289 S.W.3d at 615.
112. Layman v. State, 376 S.C. 434, 452, 658 S.E.2d 320, 329-30 (2008); Maybank v.
BB&T Corp., 416 S.C. 541, 580-81, 787 S.E.2d 498, 518-19 (2016); Dick Dyer & Assocs., Inc.
v. Moore's Cars, LLC, No. 2016-002466,2017 WL 6032650, at *1 (S.C. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2017).
113. See, e.g., Vander Boeghv. Bank of Okla., N.A., No. 2016-CA-001307-MR, 2019 WL
1495712, at *10 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2019); Shriners Hosps. for Children v. First N. Bank of
Wyo., No. CV-2012-0071, 2015 WL 10323195, at *1 (D. Wyo. Sept. 10, 2015); Yerian v.
Houska, No. 2016 CV 073, 2018 WL 3879071, at *2 (Ohio Ct. C.P. July 24, 2018); W.A.K., II
ex rel. Karo v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 3:09CV575, 2010 WL 3074393, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug.
5,2010); cf Jo Ann Howard & Assocs., P.C. v. Cassity, No. 4:09-CV-01252, 2020 WL 870987,
at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 21, 2020) (holding that the lodestar approach applies to state versions of
UTC § 1004, but the statute did not apply to the case before the court based on retroactivity
grounds).
114. Layman, 376 S.C. at 457, 658 S.E.2d at 332.
115. Id. In deeming the formulaic two-level approach of lodestar and adjustments to be
"unnecessarily complex," courts in Massachusetts streamline the analysis as follows: "[Flair
market rates for time reasonably spent should be the basic measure of reasonable fees, and
should govern unless there are special reasons to depart from them." Stratos v. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 439 N.E.2d 778, 786 (Mass. 1982).
116. 427 S.C. 336, 346, 831 S.E.2d 435, 441 (Ct. App. 2019); see also infra notes 183184 and accompanying text.
117. Dereede, 427 S.C. at 336, 831 S.E.2d at 441.
118. But see Layman, 376 S.C. at 434, 658 S.E.2d at 332 (applying the entire lodestar

approach to decide the fee request).
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Base Lodestar Amount

When determining the reasonable time and hourly rate for attorney's fees
(the base lodestar figure), South Carolina courts historically look to six
common law factors.119 These factors include: "(1) the nature, extent, and
difficulty of the case; (2) the time necessarily devoted to the case; (3)
professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5)
beneficial results obtained; and (6) customary legal fees for similar
services."120 In comparison, Fourth Circuit courts look to twelve factors to
calculate the figure.121 These factors are: "(1) the time and labor expended;
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to
properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity

costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6)
the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time
limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in
controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability
of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community
in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in
similar cases."1

22

The fee claimant bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence of the
reasonable hours worked and the reasonable hourly rate-i.e., the base
lodestar figure.1 23 If fee claimants seek an enhancement, they must produce
specific evidence showing that a higher amount is necessary to achieve a
reasonable fee award.1 24 Conversely, if fee opponents seek a reduction of the
lodestar figure, they bear the burden of providing specific evidence to
overcome the presumptive reasonableness of the base lodestar figure.1 25

119. Maybank v. BB&T Corp., 416 S.C. 541, 581, 787 S.E.2d 498, 518-19 (2016).
120. Jackson v. Speed, 326 S.C. 289, 308, 486 S.E.2d 750, 760 (1997); Layman, 376 S.C.
at 458, 658 S.E.2d at 333; Baron Data Sys., Inc. v. Loter, 297 S.C. 382, 384, 377 S.E.2d 296,
297 (1989); Blumberg v. Nealco, Inc., 310 S.C. 492, 494, 427 S.E.2d 659, 660 (1993); CT & T
EV Sales, Inc. v. 2AM Grp., LLC, No. CA 7:11-1532, 2012 WL 3010911, at *2 (D.S.C. July
13, 2012).
121. See, e.g., Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)); Reed v. Big Water
Resort, LLC, No. 2:14-CV-01583, 2016 WL 7438449, at *9 (D.S.C. May 26, 2016).
122. Barber, 577 F.2d at 226 n.28; see Sonoco Prod. Co. v. Guven, No. 4:12-CV-00790,
2015 WL 127990, at *12 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2015).
123. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984); Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273,
277 (4th Cir. 1990); Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 484
(Tex. 2019).
124. Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 501.
125. Id.
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A reasonable hourly rate should reflect the "prevailing market rates in the
relevant community."1 26 What constitutes a reasonable hourly rate varies
according to geographic area and the attorney's experience, reputation,

practice, qualifications, and customary charge.1 27 In addition to the attorney's
billings, charges for the services of paralegals or other legal assistants are also
recoverable as "attorney's fees."1 28
In determining a reasonable fee, "the contract between the client and his
counsel does not control the determination of a reasonable hourly rate."1 29
However, when an attorney has performed work for a client in the past and
when the client has previously paid the same customary rates charged by the
attorney, this evidence weighs in favor of a finding that the fees sought are
reasonable.1 30
The fact that an attorney was hired on a contingency fee basis is also not
controlling of a reasonable fee but instead "constitute[s] one factor in a
constellation of factors for the court's consideration."131 In setting a
reasonable fee, courts should account for the greater risk of nonpayment for
attorneys who take contingency fee cases, in comparison to attorneys who bill
and are paid on an hourly basis, as they normally obtain assurances they will
receive payment.1 32 In GlobalProtection Corp. v. Halbersberg,for example,

which involved an award of attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff under a
fee-shifting statute, the court considered that the plaintiff had a modified
contingency contract with its attorneys providing for a $5,000 retainer and
forty percent of any recovery obtained against the defendant.' 33 The trial court

126. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895.
127. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Emp. Res. Mgmt., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 510, 532-33
(D.S.C. 2001) (citing Alexander S. ex rel. Bowers v. Boyd, 929 F. Supp. 925, 936 (D.S.C. 1995))
(explaining that a reasonable hourly rate is determined by assessing the experience and skill of
the prevailing parties' attorneys and comparing their rates to the rates prevailing in the
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and
reputation).
128. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1989); Alaya v. Quinn's 1776, LLC, No.
1:19-CV-0888-TSE, 2020 WL 1949621, at *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2020).
129. Jackson v. Speed, 326 S.C. 289, 308, 486 S.E.2d 750, 759 (1997).
130. Liberty Mut., 176 F. Supp. 2d at 538; Sonoco Prod. Co. v. Guven, No. 4:12-CV00790-BHH, 2015 WL 127990, at *14 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2015).
131. S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. Revels, 411 S.C. 1, 11, 766 S.E.2d 700, 705 (2014). "[A]
contingency fee agreement is part of the determination of reasonableness as it reflects the 'basis'
for the fee charged; however, it is neither the sole basis for the award nor the controlling factor
in the determination." Id. at 14, 766 S.E.2d at 706; see also Sauders v. S.C. Pub. Sewv. Auth.,
No. C.A. 2:03-0934-23, 2011 WL 1236163, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2011).
132. O'Connell v. WynnLas Vegas, LLC, 429 P.3d 664, 671 (Nev. Ct. App. 2018).
133. 332 S.C. 149, 160, 503 S.E.2d 483, 489 (Ct. App. 1998).
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considered the lodestar factors and awarded the plaintiff an attorney's fee
equaling one-third of the total damages awarded against the defendant.13 4
Neither the time spent nor any other single factor is necessarily decisive
of what is a fair and reasonable charge for such services.1'35 Although no one
factor is controlling, the "most critical factor" or lucida in the constellation of
factors to be considered is the "results obtained."1 3 6 Nonetheless, South
Carolina courts have traditionally upheld awards of attorney's fees exceeding
the monetary judgment obtained.1 37 There is no requirement that an attorney's
fee be less than or comparable to a party's monetary judgment.1 38
Other courts applying versions of UTC § 1004 have reached similar
holdings.1 39 In rejecting the argument that an amount of attorney's fees must
be proportionate to the amount of compensatory damages awarded, the Ohio
Court of Appeals explained that "a rule of proportionality in trust cases would
make it difficult for beneficiaries with meritorious claims against the trustee,
but with relatively small potential damage claims, to seek redress in court."1

In applying

40

§ 45, Massachusetts courts have also identified other factors

to consider, including, inter alia: (1) the extent to which duplicate or

redundant effort was involved or the case was otherwise "over-lawyered;"141
(2) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the
controversy;1 42 (3) the requested fee in relation to the size of the trust or
134. Id. at 160-61, 503 S.E.2d at 489 (affirming actual damages of $311,819.19 that were
trebled to $935,457.57; to this amount was added $2,174.62 in costs and $311,819.19 in
attorney's fees).
135. Cummings v. Nat'l Shawmut Bank of Bos., 188 N.E. 489, 492 (Mass. 1934).
136. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983).
137. Baron Data Sys., Inc. v. Loter, 297 S.C. 382, 383-85, 377 S.E.2d 296, 296-98 (1989)
(awarding damages of $16,161; $26,000 in attorney's fees; and $3,252 in costs); Laser Supply
& Servs., Inc. v. Orchard Park Assocs., 382 S.C. 326, 333, 676 S.E.2d 139, 143 (Ct. App. 2009)
(issuing a verdict of $36,795 in damages and $86,923.87 in attorney's fees and costs).
138. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Emp. Res. Mgmt., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 510, 531 (D.S.C.
2001) (quoting Taylorv. Medenica, 331 S.C. 575, 582, 503 S.E.2d 458, 462 (1998)).
139. See, e.g., infra note 140.
140. McHenry v. McHenry, 88 N.E.3d 1222, 1232 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017); see also Yerian
v. Houska, No. 2016 CV 073, 2018 WL 3879071, at *4 (Ohio Ct. C.P. July 24, 2018) ("The
award of fees need not be proportional to the judgment obtained. A simple ratio of successful
claims to unsuccessful claims is not to be the sole basis for determining the amount of fees.");
Isle v. Brady, 288 P.3d 259, 266 (Okla. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming award of attorney's fees to
court-appointed trustee even though the amount was not proportionate to the value of trust estate
when the trustee had been required to spend substantial time to accomplish the tasks for which
she was appointed).
141. In re Est. of King, 920 N.E.2d 820, 829 (Mass. 2010); Munroe v. Nystedt, No. 07-P944, 2008 WL 4778297, at *3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008); see also Drisko v. Drisko, No. 104,177,
2011 WL 4716348, at *9 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
142. Cummings v. Nat'l Shawmut Bank of Bos., 188 N.E. 489, 492 (Mass. 1934); see
Clymer v. Mayo, 473 N.E.2d 1084, 1096 (Mass. 1985) ("An important factor in assessing the
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probate estate;1 43 (4) whether the refusal to shift the fees and costs of the
prevailing party to the other side would end up distorting the decedent's estate
plan; 4 4 (5) whether the conduct of the party requesting the fees contributed to
higher fees;1 45 and (6) the availability of collateral sources (such as insurance
coverage) that paid or could pay for the fees and costs.1 46 Courts applying
versions of UTC § 1004 have also considered the financial impact that the
award will have on the overall trust or estate plan and the ability to carry out
the purposes of that trust or estate plan.1 47

reasonableness of fees awarded in probate cases is the size of the estate. . . . An excessive fee
award may itself defeat the decedent's intent by depleting her estate.").
143. Brady v. Citizens Union Sav. Bank (BradyII), 71 N.E.3d 925, 928 (Mass. App. Ct.
2017) ("[W]e see no reason why a particular set percentage of trust assets should serve as an
absolute cap on the amount of a reasonable fee incurred in defense of litigation. [Instead], a
comparison of the amount of the fee award to the value of trust assets is but one factor to be
weighed by the judge in evaluating the reasonableness of the fee."); cf In re Osorio Irrevocable
Tr., 337 P.3d 87, 90 (Mont. 2014) (awarding attorney's fees to trustee in appeal filed by trust
beneficiary when the trust was without adequate corpus and the award would serve to protect
trust assets from being depleted by the litigation); In re IMO the Last Will & Testament of
Kittila, No. CV 8024-ML, 2015 WL 5897877, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015) (reducing
petitioners' fee reimbursement because the dollar value of the fees sought was disproportionate
to the size of the estate in dispute).
144. King, 920 N.E.2d at 827.
145. See Alves v. Snow, 40 N.E.3d 1056, at *2, *3 n.7 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (upholding
partial reduction of requested legal fees when parties' conduct in the litigation specifically, the
parties' failure to respond to the other party's repeated settlement attempts over an eighteenmonth period had significantly contributed to the high legal fees that resulted).
146. Brady v. Citizens Union Sav. Bank (Brady 1), 38 N.E.3d 301, 305 (Mass. App. Ct.
2015) ("We do not agree that the trustees' insurance coverage bars the plaintiffs from recovering
for the expenses incurred in the trustees' defense of the prior action. However, the insurance
coverage is yet another factor the judge should consider on remand in awarding fees and costs
'in [her] discretion as justice and equity may require."'); Brady II, 71 N.E.3d at 929. The
decisions in Brady I and Brady II necessarily imply the "collateral source rule" does not bar
consideration of available insurance coverage to reduce or defeat an award of attorney's fees
and costs, but by the same token the availability of insurance does not necessarily bar recovery
of fees and costs. See Brady I, 38 N.E.3d at 420; Brady II, 71 N.E.3d at 929. In Brady I, the
court noted that "[o]ther jurisdictions also hold that when a party entitled to recover attorney's
fees has insurance coverage for those fees, this fact does not bar recovery." 38 N.E.3d at 421
(first citing Ed A. Wilson, Inc. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 126 F.3d 1406, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
and then citing Worsham v. Greenfield, 78 A.3d 358, 371 (Md. 2013)).
147. Drisko v. Drisko, No. 104,177, 2011 WL 4716348, at *8-10 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 7,
2011) (affirming attorney's fee award of $50,000 to trust beneficiary who originally sought fees
and expenses of over $1.3 million from an estate worth from $4 million to $5.9 million and in
which the beneficiary had a 1/5 interest because the court noted honoring the request would
unreasonably diminish the estate's value for the beneficiaries); Osorio, 337 P.3d at 90 (awarding
attorney's fees to a party in her capacity as trustee when the award served to protect trust assets
from being depleted by the litigation and evidence showed the trust would run out of funds to
support the co-settlor within two to three months without liquidation of real estate owned by the

trust).
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A trial court may not simply "rubber stamp" a request for attorney's
fees.1 48 After the court has ascertained an entitlement to attorney's fees, it then

should determine a reasonable fee award.1 49 The court must scrutinize the fees
to ensure the hourly rates are reasonable and that all claimed hours, costs, and
expenses were reasonably incurred.1 50 It is essential for the court to evaluate
these pertinent factors in the context of the attorney's description of the
services actually provided, the hours spent, and the hourly rate charged.15'
To enable the court to perform this task, a party seeking an award of fees
must detail its attorneys' work and time spent on the matter, which is typically
accomplished by submitting affidavits from the attorneys involved with
copies of their invoices, timesheets, or billing records attached as exhibits.1 5 2
A party risks the non-recovery of attorney's fees if its counsel fails to keep
contemporaneous time records.1 53 When a party contests the reasonableness
of the attorney's fees sought by an adversary, the court can order "reciprocal
discovery" under which the contesting party must produce its own billing
records; this can be a useful indicator of what reasonable rates are and what
activities were reasonable in the proceeding.1 54
To avoid the disclosure of potentially privileged information to the
opposing party or parties, some courts allow the party seeking an award to file

redacted copies of the attorney's invoices and to submit unredacted copies of

148. Donahue v. Donahue, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 731 (Ct. App. 2010).
149. SunTrustBankv. Little, No. 2015 LIT 000019, 2018 WL 9963694, at *7 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Apr. 24, 2018); see Monster Daddy v. Monster Cable Prod., Inc., No. CIV.A. 6:10-1170,
2014 WL 2780331, at *10 (D.S.C. June 19, 2014) ("In making this determination, 'the court
should not simply accept as reasonable the number of hours reported by counsel."' (quoting
Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. 5, No. 8:04-1866, 2007 WL
1302692, at *2 (D.S.C. May 2, 2007))).
150. Little, 2018 WL 9963694, at *7.
151. In re Est. of King, 920 N.E.2d 820, 829 (Mass. 2010).
152. See Vander Boegh v. Bank of Okla., N.A., No. 2016-CA-001307-MR, 2019 WL
1495712, at *10 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2019); see also Berlinsky v. Berlinsky, No. 2013-GC-100150, 2019 WL 7212469, at *5 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Dec. 20, 2019) (denying party's request for
attorney's fees under § 62-5-105 and noting the party had failed to file any sworn affidavit from
her attorneys, but had simply submitted her attorneys' billing invoices). In In re Estate of
Ashlock, No. F076941, 2019 WL 1975342, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. May 3, 2019), the court held
that law firms' billing records submitted in support of a motion for attorney's fees were
admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Id.
153. In Cutaiav. Wells FargoBank NM, the court declined to penalize the plaintiffs for
their attorney's error in failing to keep concurrent time records, but ultimately tempered its
award by granting fees for only seventy-five of the four hundred total attorney's hours that were
requested. No. CIV-06-326 BB/WPL, 2008 WL 11335127, at *2 (D.N.M. Sept. 3, 2008).
154. Avaya Inc. v. Telecom Labs, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 231, 231-32 (D.N.J. 2016); see In
re Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d 1065, 1090 n.22 (11th Cir. 2019) ("[C]ourts can take into account
the opposing party's billing to determine reasonable fees.").
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the invoices for in camera review. 55 However, other courts have emphatically
rejected this approach, holding it is impermissible for the court to award fees
based on an in camera review of timesheets and billing records because the
information is not available to the opposing party for an opportunity to
respond. 5 6 Based on the principle that privileges cannot be used as both sword

and shield, courts have also held that a party puts its attorney's billing records
"at issue" by moving for an award of fees and necessarily waives any
privileges relating to the billing records. 57 It is presently unclear whether
South Carolina follows this waiver rule.15 8
Courts have found fee submissions unreasonable when they evidence
redundant billing or duplicative efforts or involve fees for multiple counsel to
attend depositions or hearings. 5 9 The court may award fees and costs for work
that contributes to the prosecution of the action, even if such fees were
incurred prior to the filing date of the action, such as time spent on conferences
with clients, drafting the complaint or petition, and other "reasonable efforts
directed toward the filing of the litigation."1 60
The fact that specific activities did not result in the production of evidence
that was ultimately presented during trial does not mean those activities were

155. Boegh, 2019 WL 1495712 at *12; Tacke v. Energy W., Inc., 227 P.3d 601, 610 (Mont.
2010); see also Monster Daddy v. Monster Cable Prod., Inc., No. CIV.A. 6:10-1170-MGL, 2014
WL 2780331, at *11 (D.S.C. June 19, 2014) (noting that the court reviewed law firms' detailed
invoices and summary charts which were submitted in camera to aid in the determination of the
reasonable amount of attorney's fees and costs). In 224 Westlake, LLC v. Engstrom Props., LLC,
in remanding the fee request to the trial court for creation of a publicly available record supported
by a more detailed summary of the law firm's billings, the appellate court stated the trial court
could review the fee records in camera if necessary, but it was "a practice we do not encourage."
281 P.3d 693, 715 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
156. Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 40, 53 (Ct. App. 2014).
157. See Avaya, Inc., 2016 WL 223696, at *6; Dulcich, Inc. v. USI Ins. Sewvs. Nat'l, Inc.,
No. 3:18-cv-01089-YY, 2019 WL 1500701, at *3, *5 n.3 (D. Or. Apr. 5, 2019).
158. Compare First Union Nat. Bank of S.C. v. Soden, 333 S.C. 554, 570, 511 S.E.2d 372,
380 (Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting party's argument that she was entitled to the "work product" of
the trustee's counsel so she might scrutinize the time that counsel necessarily expended on the
issues in the litigation and holding that production of a detailed attorney's fee statement was
sufficient), with Cardenv. MasonL. Firm, P.A., No. 02-CP-10-1363, 2003 WL 25460538 (S.C.
Ct. C.P. Sept. 24, 2003) (reserving ruling as to whether plaintiffs waived attomey-client
privilege and ordering production of unredacted copies of plaintiffs' legal bills in legal
malpractice lawsuit seeking as damages plaintiffs' attorney's fees paid to other law firms).
159. See Donahue v. Donahue, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 732 (Ct. App. 2010); Shula v. Bank
of Am., N.A., No. 4:07-CV-00922, 2010 WL 348256, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 22, 2010).
160. Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 269 F.3d 974, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2001); see
Hedley-Whyte v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CIV. A. 94-11731, 1996 WL 208492, at *4,
*7 n.5 (D. Mass. Mar. 6, 1996); Watkins v. M Class Mining Health Prot. Plan, No. 5-18-0138,
2020 WL 2216744, at *17 (Ill. App. Ct. May 7, 2020).
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unreasonable or that reimbursement for them should be disallowed.161 In

ascertaining whether a party's expenditures on its defense were reasonable,
the court must be mindful of the exposure that the party faced as it was
conducting its defense.1 62 The examining court must consider whether a
reasonable and zealous advocate would have conducted the activities to either
search for relevant evidence or be prepared to adequately respond to any piece
of evidence the opposing side may present at trial.1 63 A specific activity is

reasonable if a reasonable attorney might have also done the same thing in the
course of representing the client.1 64
Some courts applying statutes based on UTC

§ 1004 have required fee

claimants to apportion fees and costs to allow for their subtraction in two
situations: (1) to reflect effort spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to
successful ones1 65 and (2) when claims covered by the fee statute are joined
with claims that were not covered by the statute.1 66 However, the unpublished
decision of at least one court has held that a New Mexico statute based on
UTC

§ 1004 does not require segregation of fees by claim.1 67

161. See Regions Bank v. Lowrey, 154 So. 3d 101, 111 (Ala. 2014) ("[T]he reasonableness
of an attorney's preparation for a case cannot be determined solely by whether a specific activity
produced evidence that was ultimately presented during a trial.").
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Patrick v. BOKF, N.A., No. 117,539, 2018 WL 1353286, at *6 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2018); SunTrst Bank v. Little, No. 2015 LIT 000019, 2018 WL 9963694, at *7 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2018); see also Hardaway Concrete Co. v. Hall Contracting Corp., 374 S.C.
216, 232-33, 647 S.E.2d 488, 496 (Ct. App. 2007) (overturning the portion of the trial court's
award of attorney's fees related to an unsuccessful motion for sanctions pursued in the trial
court); cf Charleston Lumber Co. v. Miller Hous. Corp., 318 S.C. 471, 483-84,458 S.E.2d 431,
438-39 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that trial court's award of attorney's fees in suit on promissory
note was not erroneous even though it included some fees that were attributable to defending
counterclaims and not collection on the note because the facts and issues surrounding the note
were intertwined with those of the counterclaims).
166. See, e.g., In re Olympic Mills Corp. Coachman Inc., No. 01-13021, 2010 WL
3810784, at *3 (Bankr. D.P.R. Sept. 27, 2010), aff'd sub nom, In re Olympic Mills Corp., No.
CIV. 11-1064CCC, 2012 WL 4667598, at *1 (D.P.R. Sept. 28, 2012) (finding that only the fees
directly related to trustee's breach of trust should be reimbursed under Delaware statute based
on UTC § 1004); see also Brown v. Pope, No. 3:08CV00014, 2014 WL 12622445, at *7-8
(D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2014) (denying special administrators' requests for attorney's fees under § 627-1004 when most of the time and expense related to separate state court proceedings involving
the estate, rather than the present lawsuit).
167. Martinez v. Preciliana Martinez Revocable Tr., No. A-1-CA-36009, 2018 WL
6584144, at *6 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2018) (holding that fee statute and the equitable
principles underlying it do not require the segregation of fees by claim).
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2.

Lodestar Multiplier

The lodestar fee may be unreasonably high or unreasonably low, thus an
upward or downward adjustment may be appropriate.1 68 For example, by
using the lodestar calculation as the "starting point" for a reasonable fee, a
court may enhance the lodestar figure with a "multiplier" before arriving at a
final amount to reflect any "exceptional circumstances" of the case.1 69
In the context of applying federal fee-shifting statutes, the United States
Supreme Court held not only that a "strong presumption" exists that the base
lodestar figure is reasonable but also "that [the] presumption may be
overcome [only] in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not
adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in
determining a reasonable fee." 7 0 These adjustments can account for various
factors, including: (1) when the method used in determining the hourly rate
employed in the lodestar calculation does not adequately measure the
attorney's true market value; (2) if the attorney's performance includes an
extraordinary outlay of expenses and the litigation is exceptionally protracted;
7

'

or (3) there is an exceptional delay in the payment of fees.'

The Supreme Court also cautioned that an enhancement must not be based
on the consideration of a factor that is already "subsumed" in the lodestar
calculation.1 72 In Blum v.

Stenson, for example,

the Supreme Court

specifically held that the "novelty and complexity of the issues," "the special
skill and experience of counsel," the "quality of representation," and the
"results obtained" from the litigation are presumptively reflected in the
lodestar amount and thus cannot serve as an independent basis for an upward
adjustment to the basic fee award. 7 3 A few years later, in City of Burlington
v. Dague, the Supreme Court disapproved a contingency enhancement to

reflect the risk of nonpayment because such an enhancement would duplicate
factors already subsumed in the lodestar. 7 4 Writing for the majority, Justice

Scalia argued that "[t]aking account of [risk of loss] again through lodestar
enhancement amounts to double counting."

7 5

168. See Atwood v. Atwood, 25 P.3d 936, 951 (Okla. Ct. App. 2001).
169. Layman v. State, 376 S.C. 434, 460-61, 658 S.E.2d 320, 334 (2008) (applying
multiplier of 1.25 to the lodestar calculation to reflect the exceptional circumstances of the case);
see also Maybankv. BB&T Corp., 416 S.C. 541, 581, 787 S.E.2d 498, 518-19 (2016) (holding
a 1.5 multiplier was justified because of the exceptional success in the case).
170. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 554 (2010).
171. Id. at 554-56.
172. Id. at 553.
173. 465 U.S. 886, 898-900 (1984).
174. 505 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1992).
175. Id.
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Some state courts adhere to the Supreme Court's rationale in applying
their own state fee-shifting statutes. 7 6 Because South Carolina's historical
lodestar factors take into account the difficulty of the case, beneficial results
obtained, and contingency of compensation, 77 it would seem that an
enhancement based on any of these factors is improper if the Supreme Court
cases are followed. However, other state courts applying their iterations of the
lodestar methodology have explicitly rejected the Supreme Court's rationale
in favor of retaining the trial court's discretion regarding the award of
attorney's fees.' 7 8 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's contrary
conclusions, several state courts have allowed upward adjustments to the
lodestar amount to reflect the actual risk that the attorney will receive no
payment at all if the suit fails. '9
South Carolina's appellate courts have not yet addressed this issue
directly.180 Prior state decisions have upheld multipliers or enhancements to
the lodestar figure based on considerations that were, arguably, subsumed in
the lodestar calculation, including the results obtained and the complexity or
difficulty of the litigation."i" These cases reflect at least a tacit departure from
the rationale of the Supreme Court. i2
In Dereede, the South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
order requiring the trustee to personally pay the trust beneficiaries' attorney's

176. See, e.g., State by Comm'r of Transp. v. Krause, 925 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn. 2019);
Phoenix Lighting Grp., L.L.C. v. Genlyte Thomas Grp., L.L.C., No. 2018-1076, 2020 WL
1445428, at *6 (Ohio Mar. 25, 2020); Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578
S.W.3d 469, 493-502 (Tex. 2019).
177. Glob. Prot. Corp. v. Halbersberg, 332 S.C. 149, 160, 503 S.E.2d 483, 489 (Ct. App.
1998).
178. See Adkins v. Collens, 444 P.3d 187, 200 (Alaska 2019); Berry v. Volkswagen Grp.
of Am., Inc., 397 S.W.3d 425, 432 n.6 (Mo. 2013); Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson, 371 P.3d
120, 132 (Wyo. 2016).
179. See, e.g., Adkins, 444 P.3d at 200; Joyce v. Federated Nat'l Ins. Co., 228 So. 3d 1122,
1132-33 (Fla. 2017); Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 32 P.3d 52, 96 (Haw. 2001);
Rendine v. Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202, 1228 (N.J. 1995); see also Kaleikini v. Yoshioka, 304 P.3d
252, 272 (Haw. 2013) (noting that courts should be given discretion to enhance the lodestar fee
when an attorney has been retained on a contingent fee basis).
180. See, e.g., Glob. Prot. Corp. v. Halbersberg, 332 S.C. 149, 160-62, 503 S.E.2d 483,
489 (Ct. App. 1998) (not addressing adjustments to the lodestar amount).
181. See, e.g., Layman v. State, 376 S.C. 434, 461, 658 S.E.2d 320, 334-35 (2008)
(holding that enhancement was justified based on several considerations, including the wholly
successful recovery in the case and the extraordinary sum of money returned to the class
members); Maybank v. BB&T Corp., 416 S.C. 541, 581, 787 S.E.2d 498, 519 (2016) (affirming
an enhancement to the lodestarfigure, the court cited to the difficulty, complexity, and protracted
nature of the litigation as well as the beneficial results obtained); see also Sauders v. S.C. Pub.
Serv. Auth., No. C.A. 2:03-0934-23, 2011 WL 1236163, at *11 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2011)
(enhancing the lodestar fee through a multiplier of 1.25 given that the litigation lasted over 17
years, there were several appeals, and in light of the successful result in the case).
182. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562-64 (1992).
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fees and costs, totaling $67,944.39.183 This calculation was based only on the
trial court's application of the six common law factors.18 4 Stated differently,
the court upheld the calculation of the base lodestar figure.1 85 However,
neither the appellate court nor the trial court discussed whether a multiplier
should enhance or reduce the base lodestar figure to reflect any exceptional
circumstances of the case.1 86 It appears this was because the beneficiaries did
not seek an enhancement and the trustee did not seek a reduction or dispute
the reasonableness of the fees sought but merely argued that fees should not
have been awarded at all. 187
3.

Massachusetts's Strictly Conservative Principles

As a final consideration, it must be noted that Massachusetts courts have
added another peculiar twist to the determination of a "reasonable fee" when
deciding fee requests under § 45. Specifically, according to these cases:
Where payments are to be made out of the property of litigants to or
for the benefit of counsel who may not have been employed by those
whose estates are thus diminished, the standard is not the same as that
applied in an action by an attorney against a client with whom he has
voluntary contractual relations.""'
Instead, when the situation involves a "non-voluntary" or "forced
relationship" in which fees are to be paid by the losing party or out of a
common fund (such as an estate or a trust), the courts apply "strictly
conservative principles."1 89 In such cases, "[c]onservative criteria are in
183. 427 S.C. 336, 346, 831 S.E.2d 435, 441 (Ct. App. 2019) (first citing Blumberg v.
Nealco, Inc., 310 S.C. 492, 494, 427 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1993); and then citing Baron Data Sys. v.
Loter, 297 S.C. 382, 384-85, 377 S.E.2d 296, 297 (1989)), aff'g Dereede v. Feeley-Karp, No.
2015CP4601409, 2016 WL 11620551, at *1 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Nov. 8, 2016).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See id.; Feeley-Karp, 2016 WL 11620551, at *2.
187. Feeley-Karp, 2016 WL 11620551, at *2.
188. Hayden v. Hayden, 96 N.E.2d 136, 142 (Mass. 1950); see also MIF Realty, L.P. v.
Fineberg, 989 F. Supp. 400, 401 (D. Mass. 1998) (explaining that there are two lines of cases in
Massachusetts law concerning awards of attorney's fees and different standards apply to each:
the first line of cases is when the dispute is between an attorney and the client who hired that
attorney, and the second involves the situation where there is a nonvoluntary relationship
between the attorney and the party from whom fees are sought).
189. In re Est. of Rosen, 23 N.E.3d 116, 123 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014); Lewis v. Nat'l
Shawmut Bank, 21 N.E.2d 254, 256-57 (Mass. 1939). In Estate ofKing, discussed supra notes
99-104 and accompanying text, even though the trial judge's "decision expressly recognize[d]
that 'conservative principles' are to govern where the fees being awarded are to be paid by the
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order[-]in fairness to beneficiaries who have not hired the lawyer and to
avoid an erosion of public respect for the administration of justice."1 90
Under these "strictly conservative principles," courts "are not so generous
as they would be in suits by attorneys against clients"191 and "the full amount
charged by counsel to his client is not necessarily . . . allowed."1 92 The
standard referred to in such cases "as a general guide is the compensation paid
to public officers for services of a similar character."1 93 "This
reference . . . leaves room for the exercise of discretion as to each case, a
discretion which shall take into consideration, among other things, the amount
in controversy[] and which will prevent the fund from being either entirely or

in great part absorbed by counsel fees."1 94 The court must consider the size of

adversary," the appellate court still held the judge "did not actually follow a conservative
approach" and remanded the case for the judge to "undertake a more specific and searching
analysis of the actual requests for fees and costs submitted than the record suggests took place,
keeping in mind the need to examine the requests through a conservative lens." 920 N.E.2d 820,
830 (Mass. 2010).
190. Grimes v. Perkins Sch. for the Blind, 494 N.E.2d 406, 407 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986). As
expressed in Grimes, "[w]hen fee awards appear excessive and the public hears what has been
called the soft thud of mutual backpatting, respect for the administration of justice must suffer."
Id. (quoting Robbins v. Robbins, 476 N.E.2d 230, 234 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)); see also Lewis,
21 N.E.2d at 257 ("It is difficult to conceive of anything more likely to undermine public respect
for the administration of justice than a wide spread suspicion that the courts are aligned in aiding
the distribution among counsel of excessive proportions of the funds of those who are
unfortunate enough to become involved in controversy.").
191. Hutchinson v. William C. Barry, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 292, 298 (D. Mass. 1943).
192. Boynton v. Tarbell, 172 N.E. 340, 341 (Mass. 1930). Because the conservative
principles under the statute involve a different standard than that applied in an action by an
attorney against a client with whom the attorney has voluntarily entered a contract, courts have
held that the amount of reasonable attorney's fees assessed by the probate court against another
party or the trust or estate under the statute does not preclude or limit on res judicata grounds
the damages recoverable by the attorney in a contract action against a client for services rendered
in accordance with their fee agreement. See Campbell v. Toner, No. 9808, 2003 WL 297588, at
*2-3 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Feb. 6, 2003); Berke v. Gorgone, No. 9282, 1994 WL 593911, at *2-3
(Mass. Dist. Ct. Oct. 24, 1994).
193. Frost v. Inhabitants of Belmont, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 152, 165 (1863); see Hayden, 96
N.E.2d at 142; Lewis, 21 N.E.2d at 257. But see PATRICIA M. ANNINO, 21 MASS. PRAC.,
PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE § 18:3 (3d ed. 2020) ("If the '... compensation paid to public
officers for services of a similar character' has not kept pace with what are reasonable fees trial
and appellate court judges should say so and award fair compensation to counsel."); Hess v.
Toledo, 744 N.E.2d 1236, 1241 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting the argument that attorney's
fees should be paid based on the hourly pay rate because that amount did not include amounts
paid for retirement, vacation leave, sick leave, medical or life insurance, and overhead costs for
running the office).
194. Frost, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) at 165; Strand v. Hubbard, 576 N.E.2d 688, 690 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1991) ("Nevertheless, it is altogether appropriate that the person who, in doubtful
circumstances, unleashes the dogs of war should bear the heavier burden of legal costs.").
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the estate in determining the reasonableness of the fee request to prevent the
estate from being wiped out by counsel fees.1 95
Thus far, no court has explicitly engrafted these "strictly conservative
principles" onto the criteria for analyzing fee requests under UTC § 1004.196
However, given that UTC § 1004 is derived from § 45,197 it does not seem an
unreasonable leap that these principles may apply.
4.

Recoverable Costs and Expenses

Courts have reached differing conclusions as to whether the "costs" or
"expenses" under statutes based on UTC § 1004 are limited to those expenses
normally taxable as court costs.1 98 In Cooper v. Jordan, the Iowa Court of

Appeals disallowed the recovery of deposition expenses where the depositions
were not used at trial because such expenses are generally not taxable costs.1 99
The Cooper court rejected the argument that the statutory fee provision
allowing for reimbursement of costs and expenses is "broader than" what is
ordinarily allowable as taxable costs under the court's rules. 200
In contrast, in Honsinger v. UMB Bank, N.A., a Missouri federal court

held that the costs and expenses recoverable under Missouri's version of UTC
§ 1004 "permit[] recovery of other costs of litigation." 20 ' Similarly, in Atwood
v. Atwood, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals interpreted the word "expenses"
as used in the fee statute to include expert witness fees (which ordinarily
cannot be recovered as costs in litigation), yet it disallowed recovery of
Westlaw charges and certain reproduction costs on the grounds those
expenses were part of the attorney's overhead rather than litigation
"expenses."202

195. See Hubbard, 576 N.E.2d at 599-600.
196. See e.g., Deborah Dereede Living Tr. Dated Dec. 18, 2013 v. Karp, 427 S.C. 336,
346, 831 S.E.2d 435, 441 (Ct. App. 2019) (first citing Blumberg v. Nealco, Inc., 310 S.C. 492,
494, 427 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1993); and then citing Baron Data Systems v. Loter, 297 S.C. 382,
384-85, 377 S.E.2d 296, 297 (1989)).
197. UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
198. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 54(d)-(e) (describing taxable court costs).
199. No. 14-0157, 2015 WL 1815996, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2015).
200. Id. The court saw "no textual basis or other reason unique to [Iowa's version of UTC
§ 1004] to deviate from the [court's] past practice." Id.
201. No. 06-0018-CV-W, 2009 WL 10704888, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 2009).
202. Atwoodv. Atwood, 25 P.3d 936, 949 (Okla. Ct. App. 2001). InArnold OilProperties,
L.L. C. v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., the court rejected the Atwood court's conclusion that
the expense for computer-assisted legal research cannot be recovered under the fee statute
because it is part of the attorney's overhead. No. CIV-08-1361-D, 2011 WL 3652560, at *4 n.7
(W.D. Okla. Aug. 19, 2011), aff'd, 508 F. App'x 715 (10th Cir. 2013). The record reflected that
attorneys in the local legal community routinely billed clients for this type of expense. Id at *4.
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In the context of applying fee statutes not based on UTC § 1004, the rule
followed by most courts is that the recoverable "costs" or "expenses" are not
limited to those items normally taxable as court costs. 20 3 Instead, they include
reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney which are
normally charged to a fee paying client in the course of providing legal
services. 20 4 It appears South Carolina will follow this majority rule in applying
its statutes based on UTC § 1004. In Dereede, which is discussed above, the

South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court order under § 62-71004, requiring a trustee to personally pay the trust beneficiaries' litigation
costs totaling $21,129.89.205 This fee included the beneficiaries' expert
witness fees, incurred prior to and at trial, totaling $17,400.00.206 The court
necessarily construed § 62-7-1004 as not being limited to those expenses

ordinarily taxable as court costs under Rule 54 of the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure because prior case law interpreted the rule as disallowing the
recovery of expert witness fees. 20 7
C.

Determining the Source of Payment

As part of the three-pronged "justice and equity" analysis, the court must
decide who or what should bear the burden of attorney's fees and costs.
Sections 62-1-111, 62-5-105, and 62-7-1004 provide that the court may award

a party its own fees and costs from the trust, estate, or assets of the ward or
protected person, respectively. 208 Alternatively, or in combination with such
an award, the court may also charge a party's costs and fees directly against
another party to the litigation. 209 The court can further award attorney's fees
and costs against a party to the proceeding even if the party has no beneficial
interest in the trust or estate that is the subject of the controversy. 210 In addition

203. See, e.g., Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Hous. Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 529 (5th Cir.
2001); Sturgill v. United Parcel Sev., Inc., 512 F.3d 1024, 1036 (8th Cir. 2008); Grove v. Wells
Fargo Fin. Cal., Inc., 606 F.3d 577, 580-81 (9th Cir. 2010).
204. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Kansas City, 598 S.W3d 888, 897 (Mo. 2020) (en banc);
Maybank v. BB&T Corp., 416 S.C. 541, 581, 787 S.E.2d 498, 519 (2016).
205. 427 S.C. 336, 346, 831 S.E.2d 435, 441 (Ct. App. 2019), aff'g Dereede v. FeeleyKarp, No. 2015CP4601409, 2016 WL 11620551, at *1 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Nov. 8, 2016).
206. Id.
207. See Black v. Roche Biomedical Labs., a Div. of Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 315 S.C.
223, 230, 433 S.E.2d 21, 25 (Ct. App. 1993).
208. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-111, -5-105(A), -7-1004, -7-1004 cmt. (2009).
209. Id. § 7-1004 cmt.; see Feeley v. Feeley, No. 64896, 2016 WL 276452, at *5 (Nev. Ct.
App. Jan. 20, 2016) ("[The statute is] ratherbroad, providing the court with discretion to award
fees, either directly from a party or from the trust, 'as justice and equity may require."').
210. See Rex v. Rex, No. 2016CA00088, 2016 WL 4732389, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
12, 2016).
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to requiring payment directly to another party, 21' the court can satisfy its
attorney's fee award by surcharging, reducing, or denying compensation or

reimbursement to a fiduciary 212 and by surcharging, offsetting, or reducing a
beneficiary's distributions from the trust or estate. 213

These statutes afford the trial court ample room and elasticity to fashion
creative orders for achieving a just and equitable result under the particular
circumstances of the case. In a Virginia lawsuit, for instance, in which the
trustees, life beneficiaries, and remainder beneficiaries of a testamentary trust
sought advice and guidance from the court involving the trust's
administration, the court agreed "with the principle that [the remainder
beneficiary of the trust, who ultimately prevailed in the action,] should not be
held indirectly responsible for payment of part of the award made in its
favor."21 4 To avoid such a result, the court allocated payment of one-half of
the remainder beneficiary's attorney's fees and costs to be made from the
income currently distributable to the life beneficiaries and the other one-half
to be made from the trust assets payable to the other remainder beneficiary
upon the death of the last remaining life beneficiary. 215
211. Nat'l Acad. of Scis. v. Cambridge Tr. Co., 329 N.E.2d 144, 148-49 (Mass. App. Ct.
1975) (requiring corporate trustee to use its own funds to pay counsel fees and expenses of trust
beneficiary when the lawsuit was necessitated by trustee's own neglect in the administration of
the trust).
212. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1001(b)(3), (8) (2009) (providing the remedies for trustee's
breach of trust); id. § 62-7-1010(d) ("The question of liability as between the trust estate and the
trustee individually may be determined in a proceeding for accounting, surcharge, or
indemnification or other appropriate proceeding."); id. § 62-3-808(d) ("Issues of liability as
between the estate and the personal representative individually may be determined in a
proceeding for accounting, surcharge, or indemnification or other appropriate proceeding.").
The Reporter's Comment to § 62-7-1001 states "[t]he reference to payment of money in
subsection (b)(3) includes liability that might be characterized as damages, restitution, or
surcharge." Id. § 62-7-1001 rptr.'s cmt.; see also In re Elizabeth C. Massie Tr., Appeal No.
2015AP318, 2017 WL 218284, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. 2017) (surcharging trustee-beneficiary's
share of the trust in the amount of other beneficiaries' attorney's fees in suit against trusteebeneficiary for mishandling of trust assets).
213. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-903 (2009) (allowing personal representative of the estate to
withhold the amount of any debt of an heir or devisee from the interest to be distributed to such
heir or devisee); Powers v. Prescott, No. 11-P-169, 2012 WL 4867394, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct.
Oct. 16, 2012) (assessing legal fees against beneficiary's portion of the estate); Brown v. BrownThill, 543 S.W.3d 620, 636 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018) (satisfying an award of attorney's fees by
offsetting the amount against the trust beneficiary's interest in assets distributed from trusts);
O'Riley v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 412 S.W.3d 400, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (charging trustee's
attorney's fees and expenses against trust beneficiaries and their distributive share in trust); In
re Gene Wild Revocable Tr., 299 S.W.3d 767, 784 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (ordering that attorney's
fees of winning and losing parties in trust litigation be paid from trust assets prior to dividing
and distributing the residue); In re Est. of Hohler, 915 N.W.2d 730, at *2-3 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018)
(surcharging a trust beneficiary's interest).
214. Newlin v. Hart, No. 05-235, 2014 WL 12892858, at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 7, 2014).
215. Id. at *5.
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Issues often arise in determining whether an award of fees and costs
should be made to or against a person in their individual or representative
capacities. For instance, in Shelton v. Tamposi, the New Hampshire Supreme

Court decided whether the trustee of a family trust could be held personally
liable for attorney's fees based on actions taken in her official capacity. 2 16 The
Court observed that a trustee acting in the proper exercise of her official duties
ordinarily should not be held personally liable under the uniform statute for
attorney's fees incurred by any party. 217 However, because the statute's "use
of the word 'any' conveys broad authority upon the trial court to award
attorney's fees to any party 'to be paid by another party' 'as justice and equity

may require,"' the court concluded the statute "may, under certain
circumstances, authorize the award of attorney's fees against a trustee
personally." 218 In Shelton, the court held that justice and equity required that
the trustee, rather than the innocent beneficiaries of the trust, personally bear
the burden of paying attorney's fees to the other parties based on a finding
that the trustee's litigation constituted a breach of her fiduciary duties and bad
faith. 219

In Dereede, a South Carolina trial judge rejected the trustee-beneficiary's
argument that she should not be held personally liable for damages or
attorney's fees to the other beneficiaries "since her actions were taken in her
[representative] role as trustee under the Trust." 220 The judge said that while
he only found the trustee "liable for actions as trustee, that does not insulate
her from personal liability [for damages], or limit recovery to whatever
amount she may be entitled to as a trust beneficiary" and that "[t]his
determination applies to the statutory provision for the award of attorney's
fees and costs." 22 1 The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed this ruling,

although it focused on the statutory section making a trustee liable to the
beneficiaries for a breach of trust and did not specifically address § 62-71004.222
In Regions Bank v. Davis, a corporate trustee of a trust (who was the sole

beneficiary of a decedent's estate) sued the personal representative of the
216. 62 A.3d 741, 751 (N.H. 2013).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 751-52.
219. Id. at 752. Following the adverse decision in Shelton, the trustee in that case
commenced a legal malpractice lawsuit against her former legal counsel and their law firm based
on the claim they had failed to properly advise her of the risks of personal liability for the
beneficiaries' attorney's fees in the initial litigation. See Tamposi v. Denby, 136 F. Supp. 3d 77
(D. Mass. 2015).
220. Dereede v. Feeley-Karp, No. 2015CP4601409, 2016 WL 11620552, at *3 (S.C. Ct.
C.P. Sept. 13, 2016), aff'd in part, Deborah Dereede Living Tr. dated Dec. 18, 2013 v. Karp,
427 S.C. 336, 346, 831 S.E.2d 435, 441 (Ct. App. 2019).
221. Feeley-Karp, 2016 WL 11620552, at *3-4.
222. Dereede, 427 S.C. at 345-46, 831 S.E.2d at 440-41.
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estate first for a judicial determination that certain annuity proceeds belonged
to the trust and second to remove the personal representative from his position
for wrongfully interfering with the administration of the trust.223 While the

personal representative was not a beneficiary of the trust or the decedent's
will, the court held he was a "party" for purposes of a Missouri statute
identical to § 62-7-1004 and ordered him, individually, to pay the trust's
attorney's fees. 224
In Reineck v. Lemen, however, the Virginia Supreme Court held the

uniform statute did not authorize an award of attorney's fees against a curator
of an estate personally when the curator appeared in the case only in his
representative capacity. 225 The curator, Reineck, sued the co-trustees of the
decedent's trust and the executors of the decedent's will, alleging breaches of
their fiduciary duties. 226 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor

of the defendants and awarded attorney's fees against the curator personally
under a Virginia statute identical to

§ 62-7-1004.227 The award of attorney's

fees was later reversed on appeal.228 Although the appellate court
acknowledged that the statute permits an award of attorney's fees against a
"party," the court held "[t]he party to the suit was Reineck as curator, not
Reineck personally." 229 Thus, it was erroneous to award fees against him
personally because he was not before the court in his personal capacity but
appeared only in his representative capacity. 23 0
In Brown v. Brown, the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected a trust

beneficiary's argument that the trial court erred by awarding attorney's fees
under that state's version of UTC § 1004 to a defending party in her capacity
223. See 521 S.W.3d 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
224. Id. at 287-88.
225. 792 S.E.2d 269, 276 (Va. 2016).
226. Id. at 272.
227. Id. at 274.
228. Id. at 276.
229. Id.
230. Id. The court dropped a footnote in which it "express[ed] no opinion concerning what
other avenues may be available for sanctions and attorney's fees when a party in a representative
capacity has filed a frivolous suit or one for vindictive or harassing purposes." Id. at 276 n.4.
Notably, there was no claim in that case that the curator had breached his obligations in
prosecuting the action against the co-trustees and executors. The lesson of Reineck is that when
the opposing party to the judicial proceeding is a fiduciary appearing solely in their
representative capacity, the prudent course of action is to also make or join him or her as a party
to the proceeding in his or her personal or individual capacity and to include a claim or
counterclaim for attorney's fees and costs against him or her in that capacity pursuant to the
statute. See id.; cf Wellin v. Wellin, 427 S.C. 15, 25, 828 S.E.2d 767, 772 (Ct. App. 2019)
(reversing probate court's $50 million judgment against children who had filed a
conservatorship action for their father in their individual capacities, while the probate court's
order had granted relief against them in their capacities as trustees of a trust created by their
father).
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as trustee, even though the party filed her counterclaim for such fees solely in
her individual capacity. 23' The beneficiary argued that any award of attorney's
fees to the trustee in her individual capacity would be erroneous because the
trustee already paid her fees, meaning she personally had no damages. 23 2 In
rejecting this argument and affirming an award of fees against the beneficiary,
the court pointed to the fact that the beneficiary sued the trustee in her capacity
as a trustee-not just in her individual capacity-and she was therefore a
"party" to the proceedings as a defendant-trustee and within the statute's
coverage in that capacity. 233 Further, the court could not find any Missouri
case law or other authority allowing a court to make an award of attorney's
fees to a party in her capacity as a trustee unless she requested such an award
specifically in that capacity. 234
In Rudd v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., a federal district court initially

held it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order requiring that the assets of a trust
be paid over to aformer trustee under Alabama's version of UTC § 709 when
the currenttrustees were not parties to the action. 235 The court initially found
that all of the current trustees were indispensable parties. 236 However,
following a motion for reconsideration, the court re-evaluated its position and
ultimately held that the former trustee could recover fees and expenses from
the trust property pursuant to the statute. 237
IV. CONFLICT BETWEEN TRUST TERMS AND FEE STATUTE

Following the format of the UTC, the SCTC consists of "default" rules
that apply only if the trust agreement fails to address or sufficiently cover a
particular issue. 238 The settlor is generally free to override these rules in the
trust agreement and to prescribe the conditions under which the trust is to be

231. See 530 S.W.3d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
232. Id. at 47.
233. Id. at 48.
234. Id.
235. See No. 2:13-cv -02016, 2016 WL 7209727, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2016); see also
French v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 06-C-869, 2011 WL 5008337, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 20,
2011), aff'd sub nom. French v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 722 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir. 2013)
(recognizing that, while beneficiaries had unsuccessfully sued former trustee for breach of
fiduciary duty, fees could not be awarded to the former trustee from out of the trust estate
because the successor trustee was not a party to the action).
236. Rudd v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 2:13-CV-02016, 2019 WL 3082585, at *2
(N.D. Ala. July 15, 2019).
237. Rudd, 2016 WL 7209727, at *4.
238. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-105 rptr.'s cmt. (2009). The opening sentences of the
General Comment to the UTC acknowledge that it "is primarily a default statute" and "[m]ost
of [its] provisions can be overridden in the terms of the trust." UNIF. TR. CODE art. 1 general
cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
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administered, including the duties and powers of a trustee and the rights and
interests of the beneficiaries. 239 Freedom of disposition is fundamental in
South Carolina law, and courts will generally honor and protect the settlor's
intent.240 However, the SCTC also enumerates twelve "mandatory" rules that
apply regardless of a settlor's intent to the contrary.241
As one of these mandatory rules, the SCTC adopts § 105(b)(13) of the
UTC, which provides that "[t]he terms of a trust prevail over any provision of
[the SCTC] except . . the power of the court to take such action and exercise
such jurisdiction as may be necessary in the interests of justice." 242 This
provision authorizes a court to review a trustee's decision "if the court
believes it is in the best interest of justice." 243 The Reporter's Comments to
the section give little guidance as to the particular circumstances under which
a court is authorized to exercise this broad power.244 They merely reiterate the
mandatory rule itself and state that it requires a trustee to furnish a bond. 245
This provision may simply be a confirmation of the court's inherent power to
exercise jurisdiction over trust estates, to supervise their administration, and
to make all orders necessary to preserve the trust estate from waste or
destruction.246

A question arises as to whether the SCTC authorizes the settlor to override
the statutes involving recovery of attorney's fees by drafting contrary
provisions in the trust instrument. In Dereede v. Feeley-Karp, the trial judge

answered this question in the negative and expressly held that "[t]he award of
fees under [§ 62-7-1004] is not limited by the terms or conditions of the

Trust[] and can be made in favor of any party, not simply to the beneficiaries
of the Trust, and against any party." 247 As support for this statement, the judge
239. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-105(a) rptr.'s cmt.
240. In re Eleanor McCarthy Lenahan Tr. under agreement Dated July 12, 2001, 428 S.C.
598, 604-05, 836 S.E.2d 793, 797 (Ct. App. 2019).
241. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-105(b)(1)-(12).
242. Id. § 62-7-105(b)(11) (adopting UNIF. TR. CODE § 105(b)(13) (UNIF. L. COMM'N
2018)).
243. Rafalko v. Georgiadis, 777 S.E.2d 870, 876 n.3 (Va. 2015).
244. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-105 rptr.'scmt.
245. See id.; In re Reuter, 499 B.R. 655, 679 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2013) ("The only reference
to [the section] in the UTC Comment is this: 'The terms of a trust may not deny a court authority
to take such action as necessary in the interests of justice, including requiring that a trustee
furnish bond."').
246. See Wannamakerv. S.C. State Bank, 176 S.C. 133, 179 S.E. 896, 899 (1935); Floyd
v. Floyd, 365 S.C. 56, 94, 615 S.E.2d 465, 485 (Ct. App. 2005); Frye v. Cmty. Chest of
Birmingham & Jefferson Cnty., 4 So. 2d 140, 148 (Ala. 1941); First-Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. v.
Rasberry, 39 S.E.2d 601, 603 (N.C. 1946); State ex rel. Pryorv. Paul, 104 P.2d 745, 746 (Wash.
1940).
247. No. 2015CP4601409, 2016 WL 11620552, at *3 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Sep. 13, 2016), aff'd
in part, DeborahDereede Living Tr. dated Dec. 18, 2013 v. Karp, 427 S.C. 336, 346, 831 S.E.2d
435, 441 (Ct. App. 2019).
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§ 62-7-1004, which nowhere addresses the question of whether the

settlor may override the fee statute in the provisions of the trust agreement. 248

The trial judge did not mention § 62-7-105.249 On appeal, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals did not address this particular issue either.250 As a result, it
cannot be said that South Carolina's courts have definitively decided this
question. 25 1
The trustee argued in In re MargareteMarthe Milliette 1997 Irrevocable

Trust that the court could not order him to reimburse the trust for attorney's
fees which the trustee incurred in defending against the beneficiary's petition
to remove him because of a provision in the trust document authorizing the
trustee to "employ . . legal counsel" and to "remunerate them and pay their
expenses." 252 However, applying Wisconsin's versions of UTC

§§ 105(b)(13)

and 1004, the trial court rejected the trustee's argument and explicitly ruled
that

§ 1004 "superseded any contrary language in the Trust." 253 The appellate

court did not confront the question because the trustee failed to address it on
appeal, which the appellate court considered a concession of the ruling's
validity. 254
In Cohen v. Minneapolis Jewish Federation, which

involved

a

beneficiary's claims against the trustees of a charitable trust for breach of their
duties, the beneficiary moved to prohibit payment of the trustees' litigation
expenses and costs from the trust funds during the litigation pursuant to a
Wisconsin statute permitting such a motion "[i]f a claim or defense based
upon breach of trust is made against [the] trustee." 255 The trustees opposed the
motion and argued that the trust agreement explicitly authorized them to use

248. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1004.
249. Dereede v. Feeley-Karp, No. 2015CP4601409, 2016 WL 11620552, at *3 (S.C. Ct.
C.P. Sept. 13, 2016).
250. See Dereede, 427 S.C. at 346, 831 S.E.2d at 441.
251. In Dereede, there was no dispute that South Carolina law governed the claims in that
case, thus the lower and appellate courts were not faced with any choice of law issues. See
Feeley-Karp, 2016 WL 11620552, at *1; Dereede, 427 S.C. at 346-48, 831 S.E.2d at 441-42.
As discussed below, a related question involves whether the settlor may render a fee statute such
as § 62-7-1004 inapplicable by including a choice of law provision in the trust agreement
adopting another state's laws, including its law concerning the recovery of attorney's fees. South
Carolina's courts have not yet addressed or resolved that issue.
252. Appeal No. 2017AP2303, 2018 WL 2229366, at *7 (Wis. Ct. App. May 15, 2018).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Cohen v. Minneapolis Jewish Fed'n, No. 16-CV-325, 2017 WL 108087, at *1 (D.
Wis. Jan. 11, 2017). This statute is discussed in a subsequent section of this Article. See infra
notes 516-524 and accompanying text.
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trust funds to pay their litigation expenses during the pendency of the litigation
and, as a result, it superseded the statute. 256
In resolving the motion, the Cohen court observed that Wisconsin has
enacted a statute similar to UTC § 105(b)(13), which generally allows the
settlor to override most statutory default rules in the trust agreement. 257
However, based on a narrow construction of the provisions in the trust
agreement, the court held the trust only allowed the trustees to use trust funds
to pay litigation expenses in "suits by or against the Trust itself." 258 It did not
allow the trustees to use trust funds to defend against "a suit against [the]
trustee" for breach of its duties to the trust.259 The court "conclude[d] that
there is no language in the Trust Agreement that conflicts with [Wisconsin's
statutory version of UTC

§ 1004], so that statutory section controls." 260

It

altogether avoided tackling the question of whether Wisconsin's statute,
which is based on UTC § 105(b), permits the settlor to override Wisconsin's
attorney's fees statute derived from UTC
provisions in the trust instrument. 26 1
V.

§ 1004 by drafting contrary

CHOICE OF LAW IN TRUST INSTRUMENTS

It is now commonplace for trust agreements to include a choice of law
provision stating that a particular jurisdiction's laws will govern some or all
aspects of the trust including its validity, construction, or administration. 262
Choice of law clauses are generally honored in South Carolina in keeping with
the fundamental policies of effectuating the settlor's intent and promoting
freedom of disposition. 263
256. Cohen, 2017 WL 108087, at *3. The trust agreement stated that the trustees have the
power "[t]o pay all administration expenses of this trust . . to commence or defend suits or legal
proceedings, and to represent this trust in all suits or legal proceedings" and that "all expenses
of this trust or of any Trustee acting hereunder shall be paid by the Trustees from the trust fund."
Id.
257. Id. at *2. The Wisconsin statute provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the
terms of the trust," the Wisconsin Trust Code governs the duties and powers of trustees and the
rights and interests of beneficiaries and that "[t]he terms of a trust prevail over any provision of
this chapter except . . . [t]he power of the court to take such action and exercise such jurisdiction
as may be necessary in the interests of justice." Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 701.0105(1),
701.0105(2)(k) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 186).
258. Cohen, 2017 WL 108087, at *3.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See id. at *2.
262. Eugene F. Scoles, Choice of Law in Trusts: Uniform Trust Code, Sections 107 and
403, 67 MO. L. REv. 213, 216 (2002).
263. See Team IA, Inc. v. Lucas, 395 S.C. 237, 248, 717 S.E.2d 103, 108 (Ct. App. 2011)
(citing NuCor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F. Supp. 2d 714, 728 (D.S.C. 2007)); Carolina Cargo Inc. of
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When a trust agreement includes a choice of law provision, issues may
arise as to (1) which jurisdiction's law governs the question of a party's
entitlement to attorney's fees in a judicial proceeding involving the
administration of the trust and (2) whether a settlor may choose to avoid a
forum jurisdiction's statute derived from UTC § 1004 by designating a foreign
law that has not enacted the uniform provision or which does not provide for
the recovery of attorney's fees. 264 Research has yet to reveal a case in which
a court has ruled on these issues. Their resolution can encompass several
complicated questions, including whether the fee statutes based on UTC
§ 1004 are part of the substantive law as determined by the choice of law
provision or if they instead involve a procedural remedy resulting in the
application of the forum's state law irrespective of such a provision and, if the
former, whether the settlor's choice of a foreign jurisdiction's law as to the
matter at issue should be disregarded on public policy grounds.
Under the UTC, the starting point for analyzing choice of law provisions
in trusts is typically UTC § 107(1), which provides:
[The] meaning and effect of the terms of a trust are determined
by . . . the law of the jurisdiction designated in the terms unless the

designation of that jurisdiction's law is contrary to a strong public
policy of the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to
the matter at issue. 2 65
However, this provision does not expressly provide for choice of law
regarding the administration of trusts. 266 As discussed above,

§ 62-7-1004

Rock Hill v. Countrywide Payroll & HR Sols., Inc., No. 0:16-CV-03249, 2018 WL 1443947, at
*2 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2018) (citing Nucor Corp, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 714).
264. See Lucas, 395 S.C. at 249, 717 S.E.2d at 109.
265. UNIF. TR. CODE § 107(1) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018) (emphasis added). South Carolina
has adopted this uniform provision, although in significantly modified form. S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 62-7-107(1), -7-107 cmt. (2009). Unlike the uniform provision, § 62-7-107(1) simply
provides that the "meaning and effect of the terms of a trust are determined by . . the law of the
jurisdiction designated in the terms of the trust." Id § 62-7-107(1). Importantly, the South
Carolina statute eliminates the "unless" clause found in UTC § 107(1). Id.
266. See In re Thomas H. Gentry Revocable Tr., No. 29727, 2013 WL 376083, at *9 (Haw.
Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2013); see also Foster v. Foster, No. 1180648, 2020 WL 1071331, at *3 (Ala.
Mar. 6, 2020) (providing a choice of law provision stating that the trust is to be construed
according to California law did not indicate settlor's intent regarding which state's law should
apply to matters of trust administration (emphasis added)); Steiger v. Steiger, No. D068385,
2016 WL 4156689, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2016) (holding that a choice of law provision
in a trust stating that the agreement will be construed for all purposes in accordance with the
laws New Jersey expressly stated the settlor's intent with respect to the law to be applied in
construing the trust, but it did not designate any particular law to govern trust administration
(second emphasis added)); In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trs., 77 A.3d 249, 257 (Del. 2013)

Published by Scholar Commons,

39

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 8
184

[VOL. 72: 145]

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

applies to a "judicial proceeding involving the administration of a trust." 267
Consequently, the terms of UTC § 107(1) do not govern the enforceability of
a choice of law provision designating a jurisdiction's law which conflicts with

§ 62-7-1004 because that statute concerns the administration of a trust, not the
meaning or effect of that trust. 268
In the absence of a relevant statute, the South Carolina Supreme Court
has turned to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (Restatement
(Second)) to review the enforceability of a settlor's designation of law
governing a trust. 269 In Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., the settlor created
testamentary and living trusts that held personal property (or "movables"
using the Restatement (Second)'s phraseology). 27 Both trust documents
expressly provided that "the administration and construction of the trust, and
the rights of the beneficiaries hereof, shall be governed by the laws of the State
of North Carolina." 27 1

To determine which state's law governed the question of the trusts'
validity with regard to alleged undue influence, the Russell court applied
§§ 268-270 of the Restatement (Second), which govern the choice of law
applicable to the "construction" and "validity" of testamentary and living
trusts holding personal property. 272 Pursuant to these sections, absent any

strong public policy reason or lack of a substantial relation to the trust, the
trust's validity is governed by the law designated by the settlor in the trust

("Matters concerning a trust's validity, effect, and interpretation are not generally matters of
administration.").
267. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1004 (2009).
268. Compare UNIF. TR. CODE § 107(1) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018), with S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-7-1004.
269. Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 221, 578 S.E.2d 329, 336 (2003)
(adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§

268-70 (AM. L. INST. 1971)).

The Restatement (Second) provides specific principles for particular choice of law problems.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§

267-282 (AM. L. INST.

1971). Chapter 10 of the Restatement is dedicated to trusts. See generally id. That chapter is
bifurcated into two topics: movables (Topic 1) and land or real property (Topic 2). See generally
id. The Restatement provides different guidance depending on (1) whether the trust is a
testamentary, inter vivos, or charitable trust; (2) whether the trust holds real estate (described in
the Restatement as "immovables") or personal property (described by the Restatement as
"movables"); and (3) whether the choice of law issue concerns the validity, construction, or
administration of the trust. See id. at introductory n.
270. 353 S.C. at 214-15, 578 S.E.2d at 331. The Restatement (Second) uses the terms
"movables" and "immovables" rather than personal and real property and defines "immovables"
to include land and fixtures, and "movables" to include "all things that are not immovables,"
including stocks, bonds, and tangibles such as chattels. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 9, topics 2-3, introductory n. (AM. L. INST. 1971).
271. Russell, 353 S.C. at 220-21, 578 S.E.2d at 335.
272. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss1/8

40

Blanchard: Attorney's Fees in Judicial Proceedings Involving Trusts, Estates
2020]

ATTORNEY'S FEES IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

185

instrument. 273 The choice of law will be disregarded, however, if (1) the
designated law does not have a substantial relation to the trust or (2) the
application of the designated law would be contrary to South Carolina public
policy. 274 Because the Russell court found that a substantial relationship
existed between the trust and North Carolina and because no strong public
policy reason was presented to deny application of North Carolina law, the
court held that North Carolina law governed the question of whether the trusts
were invalid due to alleged undue influence brought to bear upon the settlor.275
Whereas §§ 268-270 of the Restatement (Second) govern the choice of
law applicable to the "construction" and "validity" of testamentary and living
trusts involving personal property, §§ 271-272 specifically govern choice of
law provisions applicable to the "administration" of such trusts. 276 Although

the court's opinion in Russell did not cite to these specific sections involving
trust administration, 277 South Carolina courts would presumably follow them
because they are part of the Restatement (Second)'s overall scheme,
specifically involving the choice of law principles applicable to trusts. 278

273. Id. at 221, 578 S.E.2d at 336. "A state has a substantial relation to the trust when it is
the state, if any, which the settlor designated as that in which the trust is to be administered, or
that of the place of business or domicile of the trustee at the time of the creation of the trust, or
that of the location of the trust assets at that time, or that of the domicil of the settlor, at that
time, or that of the domicil of beneficiaries." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 270 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1971). "There may be other contacts which will likewise suffice."
Id.
274. See Russell, 353 S.C. at 221, 578 S.E.2d at 336.
275. Id. at 221-22, 578 S.E.2d at 336; see also In re Est. of Mullin, 155 A.3d 555, 560
(N.H. 2017) (holding that a trust's choice-of-law provision, which provided that California law
governed validity, construction, and administration of a trust, controlled regarding the issue of
validity of a settlor's inter vivos transfers of her property to trust); In re Zukerkom, 484 B.R.
182, 191 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) ("Effect will be given to a provision in the trust instrument that
the validity of the trust shall be governed by the local law of a particular state, provided that this
state has a substantial relation to the trust and that the application of its local law does not violate
a strong public policy of the state with which as to the matter at issue the trust has its most
significant relationship.").
276. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 271-72 (AM. L. INST. 1971).
The Comments to these sections provide that "[t]he term 'administration of a trust' . . includes
those matters which relate to the management of the trust." Id. §§ 271 cmt. a, 272 cmt. b.
"Matters of administration" include "those relating to the duties owed by the trustee to the
beneficiaries," "the powers of a trustee, such as the power to lease, to sell and to pledge, the
exercise of discretionary powers, the requirement of unanimity of the trustees in the exercise of
powers, and the survival of powers," the "liabilities which may be incurred by the trustee for
breach of trust," the "questions as to what are proper trust investments," "the trustee's right to
compensation," "the trustee's right to indemnity for expenses incurred by him in the
administration of the trust," "the removal of the trustee and the appointment of successor
trustees," and "the terminability of the trust." Id. § 271 cmt. a.
277. Russell, 353 S.C. at 221, 578 S.E.2d at 335.
278. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-107 (2009).
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Sections 271 and 272 state that the "administration" of a testamentary or

living trust holding personal property "is governed as to matters which can be
controlled by the terms of the trust . . by the local law of the state designated
by the [testator or settlor] to govern the administration of the trust." 279 The
Comments explain that the matters which the testator or settlor "cannot
control" by any provision in the trust document include those matters that are
prohibited by statute or that would violate public policy. 280 The Comments
further clarify that "[a]s to those matters which are subject to [the testator's or
settlor's] control, [they] may designate a state which has no relation to the
trust[,]" and they "can freely regulate most matters of administration." 281
Thus, unlike the sections governing the choice of law applicable to the
"construction" or "validity" of a trust, those governing the choice of law
applicable to the "administration" of a trust do not require that the law chosen
by the settlor have any relation to the trust itself.282
Based on

§§ 271 and 272 of the Restatement (Second), courts have

enforced choice of law provisions in trust documents that designate a foreign
state's law to govern administration of the trust.283 The overarching emphasis
of the Restatement (Second) is on the settlor's intent and freedom of
disposition, but this freedom is not unfettered. 28 4 Sections 271 and 272 and

279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 271(a), 272(a) (AM. L. INST.
1971). Even as to the administration of a trust of an interest in land, the Comments to the
Restatement (Second) provide that "if the testator or settlor provides that the local law of some
other state shall be applied to govern the administration of the trust, or certain issues of
administration, the courts of the situs would apply the designated law as to issues which can be
controlled by the terms of the trust." Id. § 279 cmt. b. Therefore, the Restatement would still
give effect to the choice of law provision absent a public policy reason to disregard it.
280. Id. §§ 271 cmt. c, 271 cmt. h, 272 cmt. c. The Restatement (Second) explains that
"[c]ertain matters of administration may be such that the [testator or settlor] cannot regulate
them by any provision in the terms of the trust." Id. §§ 271 cmt. h, 272 cmt. f.
281. Id. §§ 271 cmt. c, 272 cmt. c ("Thus, [the testator or settlor] can usually provide what
compensation shall be paid to the trustee, what investments he may properly make, what powers
are conferred and what duties are imposed upon the trustee. As to such matters, [the testator or
settlor] can make his desires known by stating them explicitly in the will [or trust instrument].
As a shorthand device, he may incorporate by reference provisions of the local law of a particular
state, even though that state has no connection with the administration of the trust.").
282. Id.
283. See, e.g., Jacksonv. Mercantile Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., No. 3:07-CV-2707, 2008 WL
11349735, *1-3 (D.S.C. June 24, 2008) (applying Restatement (Second) and holding that
Maryland law governed a trust beneficiary's claims against a trustee forbreach of fiduciary duty
in the administration of the trust based on a choice of law provision in trust agreement stating
that all questions pertaining to the trust's validity, construction and administration shall be
determined in accordance with the laws of Maryland); In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trs., 77
A.3d 249, 265 (Del. 2013) ("A settlor may designate, either expressly or implicitly within the
trust instrument, the law governing the trust's administration.").
284. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 271 cmt. g, 272 cmt. e (AM. L.
INST. 1971).
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their related Comments indicate that a testator or settlor may freely designate
the law of a jurisdiction to govern the administration of a trust, even when it
lacks any relation to the matter at issue (unless, of course, it would contravene
some public policy to apply that law). 285 While these sections give the testator
or settlor autonomy to choose the controlling law, this power is withdrawn if
the designated law is contrary to the public policy of the forum state. 286
The Russell case did not involve a party's request for an award of
attorney's fees or costs. 287 Thus, the court was not confronted with the issues
of whether the choice of law provisions required the court to apply a foreign
state's law to the question of attorney's fees or whether the application of
foreign law would violate South Carolina public policy. 288 What if those
issues had been presented? Would the choice of law provisions in the trust
agreements have required the court to apply foreign law in deciding a party's

entitlement to attorney's fees, even though the case involved a judicial
proceeding in a South Carolina court? South Carolina has adopted UTC
§ 1004, but not all states have done so. 289 If a South Carolina court were to
conclude that "justice and equity" require an award of attorney's fees and
costs in favor of a party to the proceedings pursuant to

§ 62-7-1004, would

the court give effect to a trust instrument's choice of law provision requiring
application of a foreign state's law which disallows the award of fees and
costs, or would it find the foreign law offensive to the public policy of South
Carolina and disregard the provision?
These questions are difficult to answer under current South Carolina law.
Their resolution necessitates an initial determination of whether the recovery
of attorney's fees under fee statutes based on UTC

§ 1004 is a substantive

matter or a procedural remedy. South Carolina traditionally follows the rule
of the Restatement (First) of Conflicts of Laws (Restatement (First)) with
respect to procedural or remedial matters. 290 Under the Restatement (First),

285. Id. §§ 271 cmt. c, 272 cmt. c.
286. Id. §§ 271 cmt. h, 272 cmt. e.
287. 353 S.C. 208, 216, 578 S.E.2d 329, 333 (2003).
288. Id.
289. Alabama and Maryland, as examples, have enacted the UTC, but they specifically
rejected UTC § 1004. See generally ALA. CODE §§ 19-3B-101 to -1305 (West, Westlaw though
Act 2020-206); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 14.5-101 to -1006 (West, Westlaw through legislation
effective July 1, 2020, from the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.).
290. Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co., 210 S.C. 264, 271, 42 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1947); McDaniel
v. McDaniel, 243 S.C. 286, 289, 133 S.E.2d 809, 811 (1963); Menezes v. WL Ross & Co., 403
S.C. 522, 551 n.2, 744 S.E.2d 178, 194 n.2 (2013) (citing Menezes v. WL Ross & Co., 392 S.C.
584, 590, 709 S.E.2d 114, 117 (2011)); Nash v. Tindall Corp., 375 S.C. 36, 39-40, 650 S.E.2d
81, 83 (Ct. App. 2007).
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the lex fori, or law of the forum, controls procedural matters. 291 Thus, a
determination that the recovery of attorney's fees under the these statutes is
procedural results in an application of the forum state's law regardless of the
presence of a choice of law clause in the trust agreement. 292 As an example, if
a beneficiary commences a judicial proceeding against a trustee in a South
Carolina court and seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs against the
trustee or from the trust, South Carolina law would govern the issue of
whether it is a procedural matter, despite the presence of a choice of law
provision in the trust agreement applying a different state's law on substantive
issues.293

South Carolina case law has yet to decide whether any of the fee statutes
applicable to trust, probate, or protected person proceedings are substantive
or procedural for purposes of conflicts of law. 294 Prior South Carolina cases
applying different statutes that make a party responsible for another party's
attorney's fees and costs have indicated that such statutes are substantive
rather than procedural. 295 However, case law from other jurisdictions has
generated mixed results. 296
Some courts take the position that attorney's fees issues are procedural
and, therefore, governed by the lexfori, whereas other courts regard them as
substantive and thus susceptible to inclusion within the scope of a choice of
law provision. 297 A few courts have taken an even more nuanced approach
and reached different outcomes depending on the bases for recovery of
attorney's fees such as whether under a contract, pursuant to a prevailing party
291. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585 (AM. L. INST. 1934) ("All

matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum."); see 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of
Laws § 134, Westlaw (database updated July 2020) (explaining that matters of procedure,
remedies, or remedial rights are governed by the law of the forum); Danielson v. Nat'l Supply
Co., 670 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (noting the "almost universal rule that matters of
procedure and remedies [are] governed by the law of the forum state") (citing Davis v. Furlong
328 N.W.2d 150, 153 (Minn. 1983)).
292. See Nash, 375 S.C. at 39, 650 S.E.2d at 83.
293. See McDaniel, 243 S.C. at 289, 133 S.E.2d at 811.
294. See Dowaliby v. Chambless, 344 S.C. 558, 562, 544 S.E.2d 646,648 (Ct. App. 2001).
295. Hardaway v. Cnty. of Lexington, 314 S.C. 22, 24, 443 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1994)
(changing the law under which counties became liable for reasonable attorney's fees and costs
beyond those provided under Defense of Indigents Act held to create a new liability); Se. Site
Prep, LLC v. Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC, 394 S.C. 97, 107, 713 S.E.2d 650, 655
(Ct. App. 2011) (concluding that the newly enacted portion of Frivolous Civil Proceedings
Sanctions Act created substantive rights); cf Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, No. 6:16-CV02758, 2016 WL 6962775, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 29, 2016) ("[W]hen a plaintiff is entitled to
recover attorneys' fees by statute or contract, the plaintiff has a substantive right to such
fees .... ").
296. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2016: Thirtieth
Annual Survey, 65 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 1, 53 (2017) (discussing and citing the conflicting case

law).
297. Id.
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statute, or as a sanction for bad faith litigation practices. 298 It appears that
South Carolina courts would likely deem the fee statutes based on UTC
§ 1004 to involve substantive rights, but the issue is far from definitively
decided at this point.
If the South Carolina fee statutes based on UTC § 1004 are substantive in
nature, then

§§ 271 and 272 of the Restatement (Second) give the settlor

autonomy to stipulate in the trust agreement that another state's substantive
law will govern that matter unless doing so would contravene some strong

'

South Carolina public policy.299 Under South Carolina's public policy
exception, our courts will not give effect to foreign law if it offends the public
policy of the state.300 The applicable inquiry is whether foreign law "is against
[the] good morals or natural justice" of South Carolina. 30
South Carolina courts "exercise restraint when undertaking the
amorphous inquiry of what constitutes public policy." 30 2 Public policy is not
susceptible to an exact definition, and its contours are often blurred rather than
bright-lined. 303 Public policy is "a wide domain of shifting sands" and
"imports something that is uncertain and fluctuating, varying[] with the

changing economic needs, social customs, and moral aspirations of a
people." 304 It nevertheless must be derived (or derivable) by clear implication
from the established law of the state as found in its constitution, statutes, and

298. Id. at 53-54.
299. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 271 cmt. c, 272 cmt. c (AM. L.
INST. 1971).
300. Nashv. Tindall Corp., 375 S.C. 36, 41, 650 S.E.2d 81, 83-84 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing
Boone v. Boone, 345 S.C. 8, 14, 546 S.E.2d 191, 193 (2001)); Jerrold A. Watson & Sons, L.L.C.
v. C.H. Robinson Co., No. CV 8:16-2833, 2017 WL 11317861, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 28, 2017)
(citing Boone, 345 S.C. at 14, 546 S.E.2d at 193); Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F. Supp. 2d 714, 728
(D.S.C. 2007) (citing Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 70-71, 119 S.E.2d 533,
541-42 (1961)).
301. Nash, 375 S.C. at 41, 650 S.E.2d at 83-84 (quoting Boone, 345 S.C. at 14, 546 S.E.2d
at 193); see Grant v. Butt, 198 S.C. 298, 298, 17 S.E.2d 689, 693 (1941) (citing Wiggins v.
Postal Tel. Co., 130 S.C. 292, 125 S.E. 568, 569 (1924)) (stating the rule as to the types of
contracts that are void under public policy). In Judge Cardozo's classic formulation of the
doctrine, to render foreign law unenforceable as contrary to public policy, it must "violate some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, [or] some deeprooted tradition of the common weal." Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 202
(N.Y. 1918).
302. Taghivandv. Rite Aid Corp., 411 S.C. 240, 244, 768 S.E.2d 385, 387 (2015).
303. Id. (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930)).
304. Weeks v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 128 S.C. 223, 223, 122 S.E. 586, 587 (1924) (quoting
MacKendree v. S. States Life Ins. Co. of Ala., 112 S.C. 335, 335, 99 S.E. 806, 807 (1919)).
Commentators have derided the public policy exception as providing a "substitute for analysis"
because it is difficult to ascertain exactly what constitutes a state's public policy. See, e.g.,
Yasamine J. Christopherson, Conflicted About Conflicts? A Simple Introductionto Conflicts of
Laws, S.C. LAW., Sept. 2009, at 30, 33.
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judicial decisions. 305 The primary source of South Carolina's public policy
declaration is the General Assembly, and the courts will assume this
prerogative only in the absence of a legislative declaration. 306
Not every foreign law inconsistent with a South Carolina statute or
judicial decision will be considered offensive to South Carolina public policy,
however.3 07 The fact that the laws of two states may conflict or differ does not
necessarily mean that the law of one jurisdiction violates the public policy of
the other.308 Otherwise, every case involving conflicts of law would result in
the application of the forum state's law. Traditionally, South Carolina courts
have narrowly defined the types of foreign law that qualify for the public
policy exception. 309 Noted examples of cases against good morals and natural

justice include prohibited marriages, wagers, lotteries, racing, contracts for
gaming, and the sale of liquors. 310
It is often difficult to predict how the "against good morals or actual
justice" standard will apply to a given case. In one case, the South Carolina
Supreme Court ruled that when foreign law was applied to bar a tort action
for money damages (even though recovery would have been allowed under
the application of South Carolina law), the good morals or natural justice of
South Carolina were not violated. 31' On the other hand, the South Carolina
Supreme Court refused to follow a foreign state's law that recognized the
doctrine of interspousal immunity, which would have deprived the plaintiff of
a right of action if it applied, on the ground that it conflicted with South
305. Temple v. McKay, 172 S.C. 305, 305, 174 S.E. 23, 31 (1934); Weeks, 128 S.C. at
223, 122 S.E. at 587 (citing People v. Hawkins, 51 N.E. 257, 260 (1898)); see also Williams v.
Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. (GEICO), 409 S.C. 586, 599, 762 S.E.2d 705, 712 (2014) ("Public policy
considerations include not only what is expressed in state law, such as the constitution and
statutes, and decisions of the courts, but also a determination whether the agreement is capable
of producing harm such that its enforcement would be contrary to the public interest or
manifestly injurious to the public welfare." (citing Country Preferred Ins. Co. v. Whitehead, 979
N.E.2d 35, 42 (2012))).
306. Citizens' Bank v. Heyward, 135 S.C. 190, 190, 133 S.E. 709, 737 (1925); Taghivand,
411 S.C. at 244, 768 S.E.2d at 387; see Maybank v. BB&T Corp., 416 S.C. 541, 574, 787 S.E.2d
498, 515 (2016) (citing Gladdenv. Boykin, 402 S.C. 140, 143, 739 S.E.2d 882, 883 (2013)) ("In
determining the public policy of this State, our courts must rely on legislative enactments
whenever possible.").
307. Rautonv. Pullman Co., 183 S.C. 495, 508, 191 S.E. 416, 422 (1937) (quoting Herrick
v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 16 N.W. 413, 414 (1883)).
308. Id.
309. Id. (citing Howard v. Howard, 158 S.E. 101, 104 (1931)).
310. Dawkins v. State, 306 S.C. 391, 393, 412 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1991) (citing Rauton, 183
S.C. at 508, 191 S.E. at 422).
311. Dawkins, 306 S.C. at 393, 412 S.E.2d at 408; see Butler v. Ford Motor Co., 724 F.
Supp. 2d 575, 582 (D.S.C. 2010) ("South Carolina courts have 'repeatedly adhered to the lex
loci delicti rule to apply foreign law that defeated claims which would have survived under South
Carolina law."' (quoting Thornton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 703 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (D.S.C.
1988))).
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Carolina public policy since the same doctrine had been abolished in this
state. 312 Likewise, on public policy grounds, a South Carolina federal district
court refused to follow Indiana law regarding the consideration sufficient to
sustain a restrictive covenant in an employment setting when South Carolina
followed a contrary rule. 313 It is also significant that the South Carolina
Supreme Court has ruled that contracts attempting to waive certain mandatory
rights afforded by state statutes actually violate state public policy.314
In light of the above, whether a settlor may validly circumvent the
provisions of § 62-7-1004-namely, by placing a choice of law provision in
the trust agreement designating a foreign law to govern the administration of
the trust-may turn on whether § 62-7-1004 is part of the "public policy" of
South Carolina. At first blush, the elimination of a party's right to recover
attorney's fees in a judicial proceeding involving trust administration does not
neatly correspond with the "natural injustices" that our case law has
historically acknowledged (e.g., prohibited marriages, wagers, lotteries,
racing, contracts for gaming, or the sale of liquors). 315 However, our courts
have never limited public policy to those examples.3 16 Other courts have held
that it would violate the forum state's fundamental public policy to apply a
foreign state's conflicting law with regard to the recovery of attorney's fees,
thus indicating the issue can implicate a state's public policy. 317
The recovery of attorney's fees in judicial proceedings involving trust
administration certainly is a right ensconced in a South Carolina statute, 318
which signifies that it is a legislative declaration of state public policy. Yet
some courts have refused to accept that every statutory provision constitutes
312. Boone v. Boone, 345 S.C. 8, 16, 546 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2001).
313. Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F. Supp. 2d 714, 729 (D.S.C. 2007).
314. See, e.g., SCN Mortg. Corp. v. White, 312 S.C. 384, 386, 440 S.E.2d 868, 869 (1994)
(holding that a mortgage provision waiving mortgage debtor's appraisal rights under South
Carolina statute was invalid as against public policy); see also Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist. v.
State Budget & Control Bd., 313 S.C. 1, 6, 437 S.E.2d 6, 8 (1993) (citing Jordan v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 264 S.C. 294, 297, 214 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1975)) (holding that an insurance contract
providing for an appraisal process that was in contravention of appraisal process mandated by
statutes relating to insurance contracts was invalid).
315. Cf SCNMortg. Corp., 311 S.C. at 386, 440 S.E.2d at 869.
316. Cf id.
317. See, e.g., First Intercontinental Bank v. Ahn, 798 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2015);
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. for Carolina Stone Setting Co. v. Gate Precast Co., No. 5:05-CV-228,
2006 WL 8438619, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 4, 2006); Ribbens Int'l, S.A. de C.V. v. Transp. Int'l
Pool, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 1999); ABF Capital Corp. v. Grove Props. Co.,
23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 815 (2005); Capital One Bank v. Fort, 255 P.3d 508, 511 (Or. Ct. App.
2011). But see Walls v. Quick & Reilly, Inc., 824 So. 2d 1016, 1019 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002);
Precision Tune Auto Care, Inc. v. Radcliffe, 815 So. 2d 708, 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(quoting Mazzoni Farms, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 761 So. 2d 306, 311, 312 (Fla.
2000)).
318. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1004 (2009).
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the public policy of a state. 319 In Volvo Construction Equipment North

America, Inc., in the absence of any state court decisions determining whether
these statutes embodied state public policy, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals viewed as determinative not only whether the text or legislative
histories of the statutes explicitly declared they reflected a fundamental state
policy but also whether the statutes contained anti-waiver provisions. 320 On
one side, the court found that a Louisiana statute did not constitute a state
public policy sufficient to override a choice of law provision in a contract
because the statute contained no explicit legislative declaration that it was a
fundamental state policy, and it contained no anti-waiver provision. 321
Conversely, the court found that an Arkansas statute did embody a
fundamental state policy sufficient to invalidate a contractual choice of law
provision when the statute contained an anti-waiver provision, as well as an
"emergency clause," in which it set forth a compelling statement of state
public policy.322

A legislature greatly simplifies the task of determining whether a state
statute embodies public policy when it explicitly states that the statute
constitutes such policy, 323 and the presence of an anti-waiver provision may
signify the statute embodies a state public policy in light of the importance the
legislature attached to the statute. 324 However, South Carolina state courts
have never mandated that a state statute must explicitly declare it reflects

&

319. Kunda v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 671 F.3d 464, 467 (4th Cir. 2011); Cherokee Pump
Equip. Inc. v. Aurora Pump, 38 F.3d 246, 252 (5th Cir. 1994). But see Volvo Constr. Equip. N.
Am., Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., 386 F.3d 581, 617 (Widener, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) ("The majority refuses to remand [defendant's] claims and counterclaims under the
Louisiana Act to the district court on the ground that the Louisiana Act does not constitute a
fundamental policy of Louisiana. In my opinion, this reasoning is not only overly-and hypertechnical, it is fundamentally wrong. A statute enacted by a state legislature establishes the
public policy of that State.").
320. 386 F.3d at 607-10, 620 n.26; see also Kunda, 671 F.3d at 468 (noting cases have
struck down contractual provisions as contrary to public policy when the related statute contains
an express statement that the law is a fundamental public policy, an anti-waiver provision, or
similar language of clear legislative intent).
321. Volvo, 386 F.3d at 609.
322. Id. at 610.
323. See, e.g., Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc v. AB Volvo, 349 F.3d 376, 390 (7th Cir.
2003) (observing that the state legislature made the task of determining whether a statute
constituted the state's public policy exceedingly easy when the statute expressly stated that a
contract in violation of its provisions is deemed against public policy and is void and
unenforceable); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 498 A.2d 605, 608 (Md. 1985)
(noting that the legislature's explicit determination of public policy was sufficient to override
conflict of law provision).
324. Volvo, 386 F.3d at 609; Nat'l Glass, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Props., Inc., 650 A.2d 246,
250 (Md. 1994); Wyatt Energy, Inc. v. Motiva Enters. LLC, No. X01CV0204670905, 2002 WL
31374797, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002) (citing Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1364
(2d Cir. 1993)).
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public policy or contain an anti-waiver provision for it to constitute public
policy. 325 Thus, it is uncertain whether South Carolina courts will find the
Fourth Circuit's reasoning to be dispositive or persuasive.
The SCTC does not contain any explicit declaration by the General
Assembly that its provisions constitute the public policy of South Carolina.3 26
The SCTC also does not contain an anti-waiver provision explicitly
referencing

§ 62-7-1004, although it does contain a general anti-waiver

provision which could be interpreted to reach § 62-7-1004's requirements.3 27
While the SCTC primarily consists of default rules that apply only if the trust
agreement fails to address a particular issue, it also establishes mandatory
rules that apply regardless of the settlor's intent to the contrary. 328 Among
these mandatory rules is a provision stating that the trust terms cannot negate
"the power of the court to take such action and exercise such jurisdiction as
may be necessary in the interests of justice." 329
Because § 62-7-1004 applies when "justice and equity may require" an
award of attorney's fees and costs, 330 a court could find that this right fits
within the scope of § 62-7-105(b)(1 1)'s "interests of justice" language,
thereby prohibiting a settlor from overriding

§ 62-7-1004's requirements in

the trust instrument. A court could then exercise its power to take action as
"necessary in the interests of justice" and award attorney's fees and costs to a
party when "justice and equity" require it, notwithstanding a conflict of law
provision in the trust stipulating a contrary result. Put differently, a court could
conclude that

§ 62-7-1004 is a mandatory rule that cannot be waived.

South Carolina courts have not yet directly addressed the questions of (1)
whether the non-waiver provisions found in § 62-7-105(b) apply to the
attorney's fees provision in

§ 62-7-1004 or (2) whether the inclusion of a

choice of law provision in the trust instrument designating a foreign law that
conflicts with § 62-7-1004's requirements violates South Carolina public
policy. 331 This may well be what one South Carolina law professor has
325. Cf Cunningham v. Feinberg, 107 A.3d 1194, 1213 (Md. 2015) ("Anti-waiver
provisions and explicit legislative language are not required always in order to reach a
conclusion that a Maryland Code provision represents strong public policy."); Dix v. ICT Grp.,
Inc., 161 P.3d 1016, 1023 (Wash. 2007) (noting that the absence of an anti-waiver provision in
statute did not undercut finding that statute expressed state public policy).
326. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-105 rptr.'s cmt. (2009).
327. Id.
328. Id.

329. Id. § 62-7-105(b)(11).
330. Id. § 62-7-1004.
331. As discussed above, although not explicitly relying on § 62-7-105(b)(11) for support,
a South Carolina trial court has ruled that a settlor may not override the provisions of § 62-71004 by drafting contrary provisions in the trust instrument. Dereede v. Feeley-Karp, No.
2015CP4601409, 2016 WL 11620552, at *3 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Sept. 13, 2016), aff'd in part sub
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§ 62-7-1004 is considered to

provide non-waivable rights under § 62-7-105(b), it follows that a settlor
cannot accomplish the same objective by choosing a foreign law that conflicts
with the statute.333 However, if it is determined that the rights under § 62-71004 can be waived notwithstanding the mandatory rules of

§ 62-7-105(b), no

public policy concern would prevent a settlor from avoiding the statute's
requirements by inserting a choice of law provision in the trust document
stipulating to another jurisdiction's laws .14
Courts from other jurisdictions have held that choice of law provisions
govern the parties' entitlement to attorney's fees and require the application

of foreign states' laws on this subject matter, although none addressed statutes
based on UTC § 105(b)(13) or confronted public policy arguments.33 5 For
example, in In re Thomas H. Gentry Revocable Trust, the trust instrument

included such a provision, stating it "shall be construed and administered in
accordance with the laws" of California.33 6 In litigation filed in Hawaii, trust
beneficiaries filed objections to several years of trust accountings submitted
by the trustees. 337 They argued on appeal that the trial court erred in awarding
attorney's fees and costs to the trustees based on California law rather than
Hawaii law.338
The appellate court rejected this argument and held that the approval of
the trustee's attorney's fees pertained to trust administration and, therefore,
the choice of law provision in the trust document was controlling. 339 The court
supported its decision with citations to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
nom. In re Deborah Dereede Living Tr. dated Dec. 18, 2013 v. Karp, 427 S.C. 336, 346, 831
S.E.2d 435, 441 (Ct. App. 2019). Additionally, in an unpublished decision, a Wisconsin trial
court held that a Wisconsin statute nearly identical to § 62-7-105(b)(11) superseded the settlor's
ability to override a statute similar to § 62-7-1004 by virtue of contrary terms in the trust
instrument. See In re Margarete Marthe Milliette 1997 Irrevocable Tr., Appeal No.
2017AP2303, 2018 WL 2229366, at *7 (Wis. Ct. App. May 15, 2018); see also supra notes
247-268 and accompanying text.
332. S. Alan Medlin, The Impact of Signficant Substantive Provisions of the South

Carolina Trust Code, 57 S.C. L. REV. 137, 176 n.290 (2005).
333. Cf Richland Horizontal Prop. Regime Homeowners Ass'n v. Sky Green Holdings,
Inc., 392 S.C. 194, 198, 708 S.E.2d 225, 227 (Ct. App. 2011) (stating that parties may not
contractually circumvent the requirements of a statute).
334. Cf Swansonv. Image Bank, Inc., 77 P.3d 439, 443 (Ariz. 2003) (holding that because
the state statute did not preclude parties from agreeing by express provision in a negotiated
contract to surrender their right to a statutory remedy, they may do so by adopting the law of
another state through a choice of law provision).
335. Calvert v. Est. of Calvert, 259 S.W.3d 456, 459 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007); see In re
Thomas H. Gentry Revocable Tr., No. 29727, 2013 WL 376083, at *9 (Haw. Ct. App. Jan. 31,
2013).
336. 2013 WL 376083, at *9.
337. Id. at *3.
338. Id. at *8.
339. Id. at *9.
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of Laws.340 The court disagreed with the beneficiaries' argument "that
[Hawaii] law must apply because the attorneys' fees were incurred in
[Hawaii]-based litigation" and held that "where the fees were incurred is not
determinative of which law governs the administration of the trusts." 34
Because the fees were incurred in the course of trust administration, the court
found that "California law regarding their compensability and reasonableness
applies." 342 This opinion does not suggest that the beneficiaries raised any

public policy challenge to the application of California law or showed that a
material difference existed between the substantive laws of Hawaii and
California involving attorney's fees.343
In Calvertv. Estate of Calvert, a divided Arkansas Court of Appeals ruled

that a trust's choice of law provision controlled a party's entitlement to
attorney's fees, and it mandated the application of Texas law to that
question. 344 The trust document in Calvert expressly stated that the Texas
Trust Act governed administration of the trust, except in circumstances where
the act conflicted with the trust agreement. 345 A beneficiary of the trust sued
to invalidate certain transfers of trust assets made by the trustees to a trusteebeneficiary. 346 The plaintiff-beneficiary lost in the trial court and an award of
attorney's fees and costs was rendered against him, albeit under Arkansas

law. 347
On the beneficiary's subsequent appeal of the attorney's fee award, the
majority opinion enforced the choice of law provision and held that Texas law
controlled all substantive matters in the case, including entitlement to
attorney's fees. 348 In doing so, it held that the trial judge erred in applying
Arkansas law.349 The appellate court nevertheless affirmed the trial court's
award of attorney's fees, maintaining that it was justified under a Texas statute
similar to UTC § 1004.350
The concurring judge ruled that it was error to apply the choice of law
provision to the question of attorney's fees based on her conclusion that the
allowance of attorney's fees is a "procedural matter," rather than a substantive
340. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 272 cmt. c (AM. L.
INST. 1971)).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See id. at *1.
344. See 259 S.W.3d 456, 459 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007).
345. Id.
346. See id. at 458.
347. See id.
348. See id. at 459.
349. See id.
350. Id. at 459-60. The court further pointed out that even if Arkansas law had controlled
the question, the award of attorney's fees would have been proper under an Arkansas statute
derived from UTC § 1004. Id.
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issue, and procedural matters are governed by the law of the forum state.35
However, she concurred with the majority's conclusion that the ruling on the
merits would be the same applying Arkansas law.35 2
Again, this case does not indicate that the beneficiary raised any public
policy challenge to the application of Texas law, and the court specifically
held there was no material difference between the substantive laws of
Arkansas and Texas involving attorney's fees.353 Although there is no South
Carolina case directly addressing this issue under any of the fee statutes
derived from UTC § 1004, South Carolina cases involving other laws that
make one party responsible for another party's attorney's fees and costs
indicate that such laws are substantive in nature.35 4 Thus, the majority opinion
in Calvert is likely more consistent with South Carolina law on this particular
issue than is the concurring opinion.
VI. FEE STATUTE RELATIONSHIP TO COMMON LAW RIGHTS AND
STATUTORY BASES FOR RECOVERY OF FEES

Section 62-7-106, like UTC

OTHER

§ 106, expressly provides that, except as

modified in the statute, the common law of trusts and principles of equity
supplement its provisions.355 Although the American Rule ordinarily holds
parties responsible for payment of their own attorney's fees regardless of the
outcome of the litigation,35 6 a number of exceptions to this rule have
developed under the common law and equity jurisdiction, including: (1) a
"bad faith" exception, (2) the "common fund doctrine," and (3) the rule
entitling trustees to reimbursement from the trust estate for attorney's fees

351. Id. at 460 (Heffley, J., concurring) (quoting BAAN, U.S.A. v. USA Truck, Inc., 105
S.W.3d 784, 789 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003)).
352. Id. at 461.
353. See id. at 459 (majority opinion).
354. See Hardaway v. Cnty. of Lexington, 314 S.C. 22, 24, 443 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1994);
Se. Site Prep, LLC v. Atil. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC, 394 S.C. 97, 107, 713 S.E.2d
650, 655 (Ct. App. 2011); Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, No. 6:16-CV-02758, 2016 WL
6962775, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 29, 2016) ("[W]hen a plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys' fees
by statute or contract, the plaintiff has a substantive right to such fees .... ").
355. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-106 (2009) ("The common law of trusts and principles of
equity supplement this article, except to the extent modified by this article or another statute of
this State."); see UNIF. TR. CODE § 106 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
356. Layman v. State, 376 S.C. 434, 451, 658 S.E.2d 320, 329 (2008).
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reasonably incurred in good faith in defending the administration of the
trust.357 This last rule is now codified in UTC § 709(a)(1).358
Courts have reached differing conclusions as to whether the fee statutes
based on UTC § 1004 supplant, supplement, or modify these traditional
common law and equitable exceptions to the American Rule. 359 Some courts
have held that UTC § 1004 simply codifies or echoes the old common law and
equitable exceptions and does not expand or enlarge the court's discretion to
award attorney's fees and costs beyond those principles. 360 To adopt this view
of the South Carolina fee statutes based on UTC § 1004 would largely render
them inutile in the majority of fee disputes because South Carolina common
law does not recognize exceptions beyond the common fund and bad faith
contexts.3 61 However, other courts have concluded that the 'justice and
equity" standard of UTC § 1004 is not limited by the common law and
equitable exceptions but rather expands the court's discretionary authority to
award fees and costs. 362
A.

Common Fund Doctrine

South Carolina, like many jurisdictions, has long followed the "common
fund" exception.3 63 Although the doctrine applies to contexts beyond trusts
and estates, it has been utilized to allow a beneficiary, trustee, or party to a
trust to recover attorney's fees and expenses from the entire trust estate under
certain circumstances.3 64 This doctrine allows a court in its equitable
357. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-259 (1975)
(quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. U.S. for Use of Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974));
Layman, 376 S.C. at 452, 658 S.E.2d at 329; Lund as Tr. of Revocable Tr. of Kim A. Lund v.
Lund, 924 N.W.2d 274, 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting In re Freeman's Tr., 75 N.W.2d

906, 907 (Minn. 1956)).
358. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 709 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
359. A preceding section of this Article discusses that UTC § 1004 departs from the
common law rule and does not require a showing of bad faith or egregious conduct for attorney's
fees to be awarded, although the presence or absence of bad faith conduct is a factor to be
considered. See supra Section III.A.1. Thus, the "bad faith" exception to the American Rule is
not discussed in this section.
360. See Lund, 924 N.W.2d at 286.
361. See Layman, 376 S.C. at 452, 658 S.E.2d at 329; Runyon v. Wright, 322 S.C. 15, 19,
471 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1996).
362. E.g., Watkins v. Tr. Under Will of William Marshall Bullitt ex rel. PNC Bank, N.A.,
No. 3:13-CV-1113-DJH-CHL, 2015 WL 13849175, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 16, 2015) (stating
that Kentucky's version of UTC § 1004 widely expands the right to receive attorney's fees in
judicial proceedings involving disputes over the administration of a trust beyond the common
law exceptions).
363. Layman, 376 S.C. at 452, 658 S.E.2d at 329-30; Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S.

472, 478 (1980).
364. See Layman, 376 S.C. at 452, 658 S.E.2d at 329-30; Boeing, 444 U.S. at 478, 486
(1980).
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jurisdiction to award attorney's fees to the attorney representing a party who,
at the party's own expense, has maintained a suit for the creation, recovery,
preservation, or increase of a common fund or common property in which
others are entitled to share-with the fees to be paid directly out of the
common fund or common property so created or preserved.3 65
The common fund principle derives from the equitable doctrines of
quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. 66 The doctrine's rationale is that
when individuals benefit from litigation without contributing to its costs, they
have been unjustly enriched at the successful litigant's or lawyer's expense
and, therefore, courts remedy this inequity by shifting a proportional share of
reasonable attorneys' fees onto these unjustly enriched beneficiaries. 367

"A common fund recovery places the cost of litigation on the recovering
beneficiariesof a lawsuit, whereas a fee-shifting statute places this burden on

the losingparty."368 It follows that a key distinction between the common fund
doctrine and an award of fees authorized by a fee-shifting statute "is that the
equitable principles underlying the common fund doctrine create a mechanism
in which attorneys' fees are not assessed against the losing party by feeshifting, but rather, are taken directly from the common fund or recovery and
3 69 Through the method
borne by the prevailing party throughfee-spreading."

of fee-spreading, the doctrine's rationale is that "one who preserves or protects
a common fund works for others as well as for himself, and the others so
benefited should bear their just share of the expenses." 3 70 The doctrine limits
365. First Union Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. Soden, 333 S.C. 554, 573-74, 511 S.E.2d 372, 382
(Ct. App. 1998) (citing In re Crum, 196 S.C. 528, 531, 14 S.E.2d 21, 23 (1941)); see Shriner v.
Dyer, 462 So. 2d 1122, 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that under the "common fund
rule" the beneficiaries of a trust were entitled to recover their attorney's fees and costs for
successfully requiring the trustee to refund attorney's fees previously paid from the trust in a
prior action).
A notable "outgrowth" of the common fund rule is the "substantial benefit doctrine." Smith
v. Szeyller, 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 592-93 (Ct. App. 2019) (citing Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d
1303, 1309 (Cal. 1977)). Whereas the common fund doctrine applies only to pecuniary benefits,
the substantial benefit doctrine applies to both pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits. Id. (citing
Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1309). The latter doctrine "permits the award of fees when the litigant,
proceeding in a representative capacity, obtains a decision resulting in the conferral of a
'substantial benefit' of a pecuniary or nonpecuniary nature." Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1309. It has
been applied to actions to remove a trustee who has breached the trust or to compel an
accounting. See Smith, 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 593. South Carolina's courts have not yet addressed
or adopted the substantial benefit doctrine.
366. Brundle ex rel. Constellis Emp. Stock Ownership Plan v. Wilmington Tr., N.A., 919
F.3d 763, 785 (4th Cir. 2019) (first citing Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116,
127 (1885); and then citing Trs. v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1881)).
367. Id. (citing Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970)).
368. Id. at 786.
369. Layman, 376 S.C. at 452, 658 S.E.2d at 330.
370. In re Est. of Kay, 423 S.C. 476, 489, 816 S.E.2d 542, 549-50 (2018) (quoting
Layman, 376 S.C. at 452, 658 S.E.2d at 329).
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payment of attorney's fees from the estate or trust corpus only to those whose
actions benefitted the entire estate or trust-such as by bringing about an
enhancement in value or an increase in the estate or trust assets-rather than
solely for their own benefit.3 71
Case law reflects confusion as to whether UTC § 1004 incorporates this
equitable or common law doctrine; in doing so, it would require a beneficiary
or trustee to show that its actions resulted in a benefit for the trust as a whole,
not just for the beneficiary or trustee individually. The result most congruous
with UTC § 1004's purpose is that, while it does not supplant this equitable
or common law doctrine, it departs from the limitation expressed in the case
law applying that doctrine. Unlike the common fund cases, UTC § 1004 is not
derived from the principles of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. 372

Section 1004 is not confined to fee-spreading but specifically authorizes feeshifting in favor of or against an adversary. 373 An important goal of feeshifting statutes is to encourage plaintiffs to enforce their own statutory rights
when the cost of litigation, absent the fee-shifting provision, would otherwise
dissuade them from doing so. This is especially true when the pecuniary loss
is small in relation to such cost.374 This goal would be frustrated by importing

into UTC § 1004 a mandate that the plaintiffs' action must be for the benefit
of the trust as a whole.
Given the different rationales underlying UTC § 1004 and the common
fund doctrine, the uniform statute does not limit payment of attorney's fees
from the trust assets to those fiduciaries, beneficiaries, or others whose actions
inure to the benefit of the entire trust as opposed to the benefit of one or more
trustees or beneficiaries. 375 Though fee awards normally involve such parties,
371. See In re Crum, 196 S.C. 528, 528, 14 S.E.2d 21, 23 (1941); In re Est. of Rohrich,
496 N.W.2d 566, 572-73 (N.D. 1993).
372. See Brundle, 919 F.3d 763, 785 (first citing Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113
U.S. 116, 127 (1885); and then citing Trs. v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1881)); cf UNIF.
TR. CODE § 1004 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018) ("This section . . codifies the court's historic
authority to award costs and fees, including reasonable attorney's fees, in judicial proceedings
grounded in equity.").
373. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
374. Betz v. Diamond Jim's Auto Sales, 849 N.W.2d 292, 299-300 (Wis. 2014) (quoting
Koluparv. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 735 N.W.2d 93, 108 (Wis. 2007)); see Friolo v. Frankel,
942 A.2d 1242, 1250-51 (Md. 2008); Coleman v. Fiore Bros., 552 A.2d 141, 143 (N.J. 1989),
abrogatedin parton othergroundsby Pinto v. Spectrum Chems. & Lab. Prods., 985 A.2d 1239
(N.J. 2010).
375. See Rouner v. Wise, 446 S.W.3d 242, 260 (Mo. 2014) (en banc); Garwood v.
Garwood, 233 P.3d 977, 985 (Wyo. 2010); Atwood v. Atwood, 25 P.3d 936, 947 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2001); In re Conservatorship of Annette H. Cross, No. W201801179COAR3 CV, 2020 WL
6018759, at *11-14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2020); see also Kane v. Locklin Revocable Tr.
Agreement, No. 116,752, 2017 WL 4700389, at *7 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2017) (pointing out
that while "[o]lder caselaw suggests that an award of attorney fees is reasonable if the litigation
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§ 1004 impose no such litmus test.376 Provided the

applicant incurs the fees in a judicial proceeding involving the administration
of a trust and the fees are reasonable, UTC § 1004 permits a court to award
such fees against any other party or from the trust assets "as justice and equity
may require."37 7 The fact that a party was acting for their personal interest
rather than for the trust as a whole does not prohibit the party's recovery of
fees under UTC § 1004; however, it is a consideration that may factor into the
overall calculus and should be given as much or little weight as the individual
circumstances validate. 378

Despite the UTC's divergence from the traditional limitations of the
common fund cases, some courts applying statutes based on UTC

§ 1004

nevertheless continue to hearken back to the common law cases and engraft
on the statute the requirement that a party's actions must inure to the benefit
of the entire estate or trust, rather than to the benefit of any particular party. 379
These cases interpret

§ 1004 as simply codifying the common law exceptions

to the American Rule, and they fail to appreciate that the uniform act expands
the court's discretionary authority to award attorney's fees and costs in trust
litigation and, therefore, diverges from the case law applying those traditional
exceptions. 380

proved beneficial to the trust estate," the case law applying § 1004 takes a more "deferential
stance" towards attorney's fees) (first citing Moore v. Adkins, 576 P.2d 245, 255 (1978); and
then citing In re Est. of Somers, 89 P.3d 898, 907-08 (Kan. 2004)); see generally Henry, supra
note 47, at 23-24 (explaining why in litigation between a trustee and a beneficiary the standard
in UTC § 1004 should not require a showing that the trustee's attorney's fees and costs were
expended for the benefit of the trust).
376. UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018). Notably, in applying § 45 of
the General Laws of Massachusetts, Massachusetts's courts have declined to require that the
attorney's services confer a benefit upon the whole estate in the sense of creating, preserving, or
increasing the same as a condition to the attorney's fees being paid for out of the estate. See First
Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Sullivan, 350 N.E.2d 473, 478-79 n.15 (Mass. App. Ct. 1976).
377. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
378. See Garwood, 233 P.3d at 983, 987, 988 (holding that the trial court acted within its
discretion when it required trustees to reimburse a trust for all but $10,000 of the money they
had withdrawn to pay for their attorney's fees in litigation even though trustees had paid over
$49,000 in fees; litigation was made necessary by trustees' actions and did little to benefit trust).
379. See, e.g., Honsingerv. UMB Bank, N.A., No. 06-0018-CV-W, 2009 WL 10704888,
at *2-3 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 2009); Foster v. Eckert, No. 4:09-CV-328, 2010 WL 1706174, at
*1-2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2010); In re T.R. Potter, Jr. Exempt Tr., 593 S.W.3d 556, 570-71 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2019); In re Schauer, No. A18-0969, 2019 WL 1510698, at *5- (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
8, 2019). The courts in these cases relied upon cases pre-dating the UTC which applied the
common law rule.
380. See Watkins v. Tr. Under Will of William Marshall Bullitt ex rel. PNC Bank, N.A.,
No. 3:13-CV-1113-DJH-CHL, 2015 WL 13849175, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 16, 2015).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss1/8

56

Blanchard: Attorney's Fees in Judicial Proceedings Involving Trusts, Estates
2020]
B.

ATTORNEY'S FEES IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

201

Rule of Trustee Reimbursementfrom Trust

Confusion also exists as to the relationship between UTC § 1004 and the
traditional rule of trustee reimbursement from the trust for expenses incurred
in the administration of the trust, which is now codified in UTC § 709(a)(1). 381
Courts have had difficulty working out the interplay between UTC

§§ 709(a)(1) and 1004 when a trustee seeks payment or reimbursement of
attorney's fees and costs from the trust assets.382 In particular, courts have
struggled to decide whether UTC § 709(a)(1), UTC § 1004, or some
combination of both provisions governs the situation in which a trustee seeks
reimbursement from the trust estate for any attorney's fees and costs incurred
in a judicial proceeding involving trust administration. 383 To solve this puzzle
requires consideration of the different rationales underlying these two
provisions of the UTC.
Prior to the UTC, the common law long recognized that a trustee is
entitled to reimbursement or indemnification from the trust for attorney's fees
and expenses that the trustee, acting reasonably and in good faith, incurs in
defending their administration of the trust.384 Reasonableness and good faith
are the leading touchstones of the common law rule. 385 This rule has also been
applied to personal representatives for an estate. Indeed, it has now been
codified in the SCPC. 386
This common law rule almost always encompasses a trustee's attorney's
fees and costs incurred in successfully defending against actions that (1) seek
the trustee's removal, (2) allege the trustee has mismanaged or
misappropriated the trust estate, or (3) charge the trustee with breach of

381. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 709 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
382. See Henry, supra note 47, at 20-24.
383. See id. (discussing conflicting case law).
384. Lund as Tr. of Revocable Tr. of Kim A. Lund v. Lund, 924 N.W.2d 274, 285 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2019) (quoting In re Freeman's Tr., 75 N.W.2d 906, 907 (Minn. 1956)); In re
Trusteeship of Williams, 591 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing In re Tr. Created
by Hill, 499 N.W.2d 475, 494 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)); see W.A.K., II ex rel. Karo v. Wachovia
Bank, N.A., No. 3:09-CV-575, 2010 WL 2976518, at *4 (E.D. Va. July 19, 2010) (quoting Ward
v. NationsBank of Va., N.A., 507 S.E.2d 616, 624 (1998)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 88
cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2007); 90A C.J.S Trusts § 400 (2020); 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 395 (2020).
This rule has been applied to trustees who were no longer trustees by the time the lawsuit was
brought against them or the award was made. See Ladd v. Stockham, 209 So. 3d 457, 474 (Ala.
2016); Kasperbauer v. Fairfield, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2009).
385. See 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 395 (2020).
386. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-720 (2009) ("If any personal representative or person
nominated as personal representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith,
whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and
disbursements including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred."); see In re Est. of Connor, No.
2009-UP-501, 2009 WL 9530096, at *4 (S.C. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2009).
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trust.387 Additionally, because reasonableness and good faith are the
guideposts, many courts have held that the mere lack of success in the
litigation is not determinative of the trustee's right to reimbursement.388
Courts have allowed attorney's fees of unsuccessful trustees to be paid from
the trust estate when "honest differences of opinion" existed over the
administration of the trust.389 These courts effectively recognize that a trustee
may act reasonably and in good faith in prosecuting or defending litigation,
but its judgment nevertheless may turn out to be wrong in light of subsequent
events. 390
387. See DuPont v. S. Nat'l Bank of Hous., 771 F.2d 874, 886 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Grey
v. First Nat'l Bank, 393 F.2d 371, 387 (5th Cir. 1968)); French v. Wachovia Bank, 722 F.3d
1079, 1089 (7th Cir. 2013) (first citing McGeochBldg. Co. v. Dick & Reuteman Co., 40 N.W.2d
577, 579 (Wis. 1950); and then citing In re Cole's Est., 78 N.W. 402, 406 (Wis. 1899)); Snook
v. Tr. Co. of Ga. Bank of Savannah, 909 F.2d 480, 485 (11th Cir. 1990); Regions Bank v.
Lowrey, 101 So. 3d 210, 220 (Ala. 2012); First Union Nat'l Bank v. Jones, 768 So. 2d 1213,
1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citing W. Coast Hosp. Ass'nv. Fla. Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville,
100 So. 2d 907, 812 (Fla. 1958)); Caruso v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't Pension Funds, 470 N.Y.S.2d
963, 967 (Sup. Ct. 1983); Willson v. Whitehead, 27 S.E.2d 213, 216 (Va. 1943); Saulsbury v.
Denton Nat'l Bank, 335 A.2d 199, 201 (Md. Ct. App. 1975) (citing Jessup v. Smith, 119 N.E.
403, 404 (N.Y. 1918)); Bond v. Bond, 592 S.E.2d 801, 810 (W. Va. 2003).
388. See Am. Nat'l Bank of Beaumont v. Biggs, 274 S.W.2d 209, 222 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954); Webbe v. First Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. of Barrington, 487 N.E.2d 711, 713 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) (citing Brown v. Com. Nat'l Bank of Peoria, 237 N.E.2d 567, 570 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968),
aff'd, 247 N.E.2d 894 (Ill. 1969)); In re Thomas Rowe Stockton Tr., No. 332278, 2017 WL
4158017, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2017); see also Evans v. Super. Ct. of S.F., 96 P.2d
107, 113 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1939) ("If the trustee acts in good faith, he has the power
to employ such assistants and to compensate such assistants out of the assets of the trust even
though he may not ultimately succeed in establishing the position taken by him as such trustee."
(citing Dingwell v. Seymour, 267 P. 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928))); GEORGE GLEASON. BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 971 (June 2020) (stating that the reimbursement of
trustee's legal fees from trust is not conditioned on the outcome of the legal services being
favorable to the trust).
389. Eg., Stuart v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 369 N.E.2d 1262, 1279 (Ill.
1977) (citing Orme v. Northern Tr. Co., 183 N.E.2d 505, 513 (Ill. 1962)) (explaining that in
litigation between individual trustees and corporate co-trustee, attorney's fees and expenses of
individual trustees were paid from trust even though court adopted corporate trustee's position
when the trustees were hopelessly deadlocked over the manner in which they should discharge
their duties as trustees, resort to the courts was necessary to resolve the impasse, and the
litigation was the result of honest differences of opinion).
390. See In re Est. of Burnette, No. E2016-02452-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1413122, at *5
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018) (citing In re Est. of Ladd, 247 S.W.3d 628, 637-38 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2007)). In harmony with the common law tradition, it is not uncommon for trust
agreements to contain provisions explicitly requiring that trustees be reimbursed or indemnified
for legal fees incurred in trust matters unless the trustee acted in bad faith or was guilty of some
level of culpable conduct beyond ordinary negligence. Cf Brown v. Brown-Thill, 543 S.W.3d
620, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018) (holding trustee did not breach her fiduciary duty by reimbursing
her legal expenses from trust when the trust agreement provided that the trustee shall be
indemnified and reimbursed for any expense the trustee incurred, individually or as a fiduciary,
absent gross negligence or willful malfeasance).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss1/8

58

Blanchard: Attorney's Fees in Judicial Proceedings Involving Trusts, Estates
2020]

ATTORNEY'S FEES IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

203

With good reason, the common law rule (now UTC § 709(a)(1)) treats
trustees differently from beneficiaries with respect to the payment of
attorney's fees from a trust, primarily because they have inherently dissimilar
obligations and interests. 391The nature of a beneficiary's interest is a personal
one: to protect or maximize its own share in the trust estate. 392 Unlike a
beneficiary, a trustee has no personal stake in the trust's assets but instead has
a fiduciary duty to protect and defend the trust and its assets for the benefit of
others. 393 A trustee should not have to personally bear the expense for
performing its duty to the trust.394 Equity requires that the trust estate must

bear the trustee's attorney's fees and costs reasonably incurred in the good
faith administration of the trust.395 As one court has expressed the rationale
underpinning the rule:

The reason involved in the rule is this: trustees have no beneficial
interest in the trustproperty. They hold it for the accommodation and
benefit of others. If they perform their duties faithfully, and are guilty
of no unjust, improper, or oppressive conduct, they ought not in

justice and good conscience to be put to any expense out of their own
moneys. If, therefore, they are brought before the court without blame
on their part, they should be reimbursed all the expenses that they
incur[] and allowed their costs as between solicitor and client for this
purpose. 396
The common law rule is rooted in the notion that it is necessary for the
trustee's attorney's fees and costs to be paid from the trust estate because
doing so effectuates the settlor's intent.397 Because the trustee must take
reasonable action to uphold the trust, carry out its purposes, and defend against
lawsuits that will invalidate the trust or reduce its assets, the fees and expenses
incurred in such actions should be reimbursed directly from the trust estate. 398

391. See Beneficiary, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Trustee, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
392. See Beneficiary, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (i1thed. 2019).
393. See Trustee, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (i1thed. 2019).
394. Garwood v. Garwood, 233 P.3d 977, 985 (Wyo. 2010).
395. Lund as Tr. of Revocable Tr. of Kim A. Lund v. Lund, 924 N.W.2d 274, 285-86
(Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting In re Freeman's Tr., 75 N.W.2d 906, 907 (Minn. 1956)).
396. Klinkerfussv. Cronin, 199 S.W.3d 831, 845 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
397. Cf O'Riley v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 412 S.W.3d 400, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (stating
thatjustice and equity required that trustee recover the expenses it incurred in defending against
beneficiaries' claims because by defending its conduct, it defends the settlor's intent).
398. See Klinkerfuss, 199 S.W.3d at 844 (citing Anselmo v. Guasto, 13 S.W.3d 650, 653
(Mo. Ct. App 1999)).
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This includes the trustee's good faith defense of actions seeking the
trustee's removal from office. 399 In his classic statement of the principle, thenJudge Benjamin Cardozo explained that a trustee "owe[s] a duty to the estate
to stand his ground against unjust attack[,]" to "resist[] an attempt to wrest the
administration of the trust from one selected by the testator[,] and to place it
in strange hands." 400 Judge Learned Hand later reiterated that "[w]hen the
trustee's administration of the assets is unjustifiedly assailed[,] it is a part of
his duty to defend himself, for in so doing he is realizing the settlor's
purpose." 40 1
UTC

§ 709 embraces these common law principles. 40 2 Section 709(a)(1)

of the UTC codifies the longstanding rule that a "trustee is entitled to be
reimbursed out of

for . .

the trust property,

with interest

as

appropriate,

expenses that were properly incurred in the administration of the

trust." 403 The Comments further explain that "[r]eimbursement under this

section may include attorney's fees and expenses incurred by the trustee in
defending an action," except that "a trustee is not ordinarily entitled to
attorney's fees and expenses if it is determined that the trustee breached the
trust." 404 Taken together, this section and its Comments suggest that a

trustee's attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending an action involving
trust administration are authorized expenses and, unless the trustee is
"determined" to have breached the trust, they are reimbursable from the trust's
assets.405
Importantly, § 709(a)(1) is not a litigation fee-shifting statute by which
parties in litigation may be ordered by the court to pay the attorney's fees of
their adversary. Instead, it represents a codification of a trustee's broader right
to reimbursement from the trust estate in line with the trustee's "authority to

399. Id.
400. Jessup v. Smith, 119 N.E. 403, 404 (N.Y. 1918).
401. Weidlichv. Comley, 267 F.2d 133, 134 (2d Cir. 1959).
402. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 709(a)(1) cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
403. UNIF. TR. CODE § 709(a)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018). South Carolina has adopted
this uniform provision with slight modifications. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-709(a)(1) (2009).
404. UNIF. TR. CODE § 709 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-709
rptr.'s cmt. (adopting the uniform act's comment). A trustee is not entitled to attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation when it is determined that the trustee committed a breach of trust, unless
the court otherwise orders reimbursement under § 709(a)(2) because the trustee's actions would
unjustly enrich the trust. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 709 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-7-709 rptr. 's cmt. Specifically, a trustee "is entitled to reimbursement for
unauthorized expenses [under subsection (a)(2)] only if the unauthorized expenditures benefited
the trust." UNIF. TR. CODE § 709(a)(2) cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7709 rptr. 's cmt. A finding that a trustee committed a breach of fiduciary duty would be
inconsistent with a finding of good faith. See Cohen v. Minneapolis Jewish Fed'n, 346 F. Supp.
3d 1274, 1288 (W.D. Wis. 2018), aff'd, 776 F. App'x 912 (7th Cir. 2019).
405. UNIF. TR. CODE § 709 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
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expend trust funds as necessary in the administration of the trust." 406 The
trustee is not seeking to require another party to pay its attorney's fees;

instead, the fees are to be reimbursed from the trust itself.407 Additionally,
UTC § 709(a)(1) provides for reimbursement of a trustee's expenses
irrespective of any litigation involving the trust. 408
In contradistinction to § 709(a)(1), the animating principle of UTC
§ 1004 is not to reimburse a trustee for expenses incurred in the performance
of its duty to the trust. 409 Instead, § 1004 is a fee-shifting statute by which one

party is ordered to pay the fees and expenses of an adversary incurred in the
litigation, either directly from personal assets or indirectly through the trust
estate. 410 Rights arise under this provision only in the specific context of
litigation involving trust administration. 411

Because the reimbursement detailed in UTC § 709(a)(1) is broadly
worded, there exists a potential overlap as to whether a trustee is entitled to
recover fees and costs under UTC

§ 709(a)(1), UTC § 1004, or both when the

trustee is a party to a judicial proceeding involving the administration of the
trust. 412 This overlap has led to inconsistent case law involving the
relationship between UTC

§§ 709(a)(1) and 1004 and the proper application

of those sections to trustee requests for litigation-related attorney's fees and
expenses. 413

Some courts have conflated the two standards in the context of trustee
requests for payment of litigation expenses from the trust. 414 Other courts have
constrained the "justice and equity" analysis by importing into UTC § 1004
406. UNIF. TR. CODE § 709 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018) ("A trustee has the authority to
expend trust funds as necessary in the administration of the trust, including expenses incurred in
the hiring of agents."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-709 rptr. 's cmt. (same); see Rudd v. Branch
Banking & Tr. Co., No. 2:13-CV-02016, 2016 WL 7209727, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2016);
see also Rudd v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 2:13-CV-02016, 2019 WL 3082585, at *4
(N.D. Ala. July 15, 2019).
407. UNIF. TR. CODE § 709(a) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
408. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 709 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
409. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 cmt. (UNiF. L. COMM'N 2018).
410. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
411. See id.
412. See Lund as Tr. of Revocable Tr. of Kim A. Lund v. Lund, 924 N.W.2d 274, 285-86
(Minn. Ct. App. 2019).
413. See Henry, supra note 47, at 23-24 (noting uncertainty in case law with respect to the
role of UTC § 709(a)(1), at least when a trustee is seeking fees in connection with litigation).
414. See, e.g., In re Tr. No. T-1 of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474, 490-92 (Iowa 2013) (holding
that in analyzing a trustee's request for reimbursement of attorneys' fees from the trust the
correct legal standard requires the court to "first consider whether the expenditures were
properly incurred in the administration of the trust or otherwise benefited the trust" pursuant to
Iowa's version of UTC § 709(a)(1) and then it must also apply the Atwood factors under the
"justice and equity" analysis of Iowa's version of UTC § 1004); In re Joan T. Goetzinger Living
Tr. Dated May 30, 2014, No. 19-1342, 2020 WL 4201492, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 2020)
(applying Trimble, 826 N.W.2d at 491-92).
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the standards of the common law cases relative to a trustee's right to
reimbursement from the trust for expenses incurred in the administration of
the trust, which is the rule now codified in UTC § 709(a)(1).4 1 5 With respect

to trustee requests for reimbursement of litigation expenses from the trust,
these courts effectively construe UTC §§ 709(a)(1) and 1004 as having the
same or equivalent requirements. 416 However, the "justice and equity"
standard of UTC § 1004 is not synonymous with the common law standard
codified in UTC § 709(a)(1);41 7 there is no persuasive reason to construe the
former as simply incorporating the same standard as the latter.
Instead of conflating the two sections, courts should construe UTC

§§ 709(a)(1) and 1004 to principally apply to separate spheres with their own
purpose-oriented criteria. In those instances when the sections potentially
overlap (which may occur when deciding a trustee's request for attorney's
fees and costs in a judicial proceeding involving trust administration), UTC
§§ 709(a)(1) and 1004 are best harmonized by applying UTC § 709(a)(1) to
decide a trustee's entitlement to payment or reimbursement of fees and
expenses from the trust estate and by applying UTC

§ 1004 when deciding a

trustee's right to payment or reimbursement of fees and expenses from
another party to the proceeding, such as a beneficiary or fellow fiduciary.
Either UTC § 709(a)(1) or UTC § 1004 may govern a trustee's entitlement to

fees and costs incurred in a judicial proceeding involving trust administration,
but it should depend on the source from which the trustee seeks payment.
In this sense, the two sections complement and do not take away from one
another. Additionally, it would be erroneous to conclude that either section
exclusively governs a trustee's ability to recover attorney's fees and costs in
such a judicial proceeding. UTC § 1004 would exclusively govern a nontrustee 's (e.g., beneficiary's) entitlement to payment or reimbursement of fees

and expenses, either from the trust estate or from another party to the

415. See, e.g., W.A.K., II ex rel. Karo v. Wachovia Bank, No. 3:09-CV-575, 2010 WL
2976518, at *4 (E.D. Va. July 19, 2010) (finding the common law cases applying the rule of
trustee reimbursement were "instructive" in resolving a trustee's request for payment of
litigation expenses from the trust under a Virginia statute based on UTC § 1004); Duke v.
Simmons, No. M200801967COAR3CV, 2009 WL 1175114, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30,
2009) (quoting Marshall v. First Nat'l Bank, 622 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)).
(holding that the requirement of common law cases predating the enactment of the UTC, which
permit an award of attorney's fees from the trust corpus "only when the services of such
attorneys inure to the benefit of the entire estate as distinguished from services rendered to
benefit one or more of the individuals interested in the trust," governed application of the
Tennessee statute based on UTC § 1004).
416. See, e.g., WA.K., 2010 WL 2976518, at *4; Duke, 2009 WL 1175114, at *6.
417. See Julian C. Zebot & Evan A. Nelson, Tilting the LitigationPlayingField Under the
Uniform Trust Code: The Availability of Temporary Injunctive Relief in Trustee Removal
Actions, 34 PROB. & PROP. 34, 34-35 (2020) ("These standards are not the same.").
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§ 709(a)(1) relates only to a trustee's request for

reimbursement.
Several considerations support this construction of the two statutes. First,
UTC § 709(a)(1) codifies the longstanding common law rule of trustee
reimbursement from the trust estate for expenses reasonably incurred in the
good faith administration of the trust. 418 Nothing in UTC § 1004 or the related
Comments suggests the drafters intended to displace or modify this rule of
reimbursement. 419 If it was the drafters' intention for UTC

§ 1004 to override

or modify UTC § 709(a)(1), they would have clearly stated as much. Thus,
§ 709(a)(1) should govern when a trustee seeks payment or reimbursement
from the trust estate.
The rule reflected in UTC § 709(a)(1) justifiably considers a trustee more
favorably than UTC § 1004 considers a beneficiary with respect to payment
of expenses from the trust estate because a trustee, unlike a beneficiary, lacks
a beneficial interest in the trust and has a duty to protect and defend the trust
and its assets. 420 Provided the trustee acts reasonably and in good faith, the
trustee should be entitled to payment from the trust for expenses incurred in
carrying out its trust duties without having to satisfy the Atwood factorswhich include, inter alia, relative ability to bear the financial burden, results
obtained, and prevailing party concepts-or UTC § 1004's justice and equity

analysis, even though those criteria rightfully apply when the trustee seeks
payment of fees and expenses from another party to the judicial proceeding.
Whereas a trust beneficiary ordinarily will not recover any attorney's fees
under UTC § 1004 unless the beneficiary achieved at least partial success on
the merits in the litigation, a trustee (absent a showing of bad faith or breach
of trust) is generally entitled to reimbursement of reasonable attorney's fees
under UTC

§ 709(a)(1), even if unsuccessful. 42 1

418. See supra Section VI.B; UNIF. TR. CODE § 709(a)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
419. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018) ("With respect to a party's
own fees, § 709 authorizes a trustee to recover expenditures properly incurred in the
administration of the trust."); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1004 rptr.'s cmt. (2009)
(containing substantially same Comment).
420. See Zebot & Nelson, supra note 417, at 35 ("As a practical matter, the standard for a
beneficiary challenging the trustee's actions to be reimbursed from the trust can be difficult to
meet, while the trustee enjoys a presumption that its attorney fees will be reimbursed from the
trust as a matter of course.").
421. See Regions Bank v. Lowrey, 154 So. 3d 101, 109-12 (Ala. 2014); Regions Bank v.
Lowrey, 101 So. 3d 210, 220-21 (Ala. 2012). In the Regions Bank litigation, the court held the
trustee was not only entitled to reimbursement from the trust under Alabama's version of UTC
§ 709(a)(1) for its attorney's fees and expenses reasonably incurred during its successful defense
of the beneficiaries 'claims for breach of fiduciary duty, but also to reimbursement for its fees
and expenses incurred in litigating its right to reimbursement and to prejudgment interest on the
amount of its reimbursement. Regions Bank, 154 So. 3d at 112.
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Consistent with an understanding that UTC § 1004 is not intended to
override a trustee's right to reimbursement contained in UTC § 709(a)(1), a
few states have added provisions to their versions of the UTC to make this
intention explicit. 422 For example, Michigan, Utah, and Wisconsin have added
a subparagraph to § 1004 of their trust codes specifying that if a trustee
defends or prosecutes a judicial proceeding in good faith, whether successful
or not, the trustee is entitled to receive from the trust attorney's fees and
expenses necessarily incurred in the proceeding. 423 These additional
subparagraphs are modeled after Uniform Probate Code § 3-720, which
applies to personal representatives and persons nominated as personal
representatives for an estate. 424

Alabama also added language to its version of UTC § 709(a)(1) to
expressly state that the expenses properly incurred in the administration of the
trust for which a trustee "is entitled to be reimbursed" include "the defense or
prosecution of any action, whether successful or not, unless the trustee is
determined to have willfully or wantonly committed a material breach of the
trust." 425 Similarly, Arizona has enacted a provision stating that a trustee's
right to reimbursement from the trust includes attorney's fees and costs "that
arise out of and that relate to the good faith defense or prosecution of a judicial
or alternative dispute resolution proceeding involving the administration of
the trust, regardless of whether the defense or prosecution is successful." 426
Second, UTC § 1004 is the only provision that specifically authorizes a
trustee's fees and costs "to be paid by another party." 427 This section is more
specific to the question of a trustee's entitlement to have its fees and expenses
422. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7904(2) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg.
Sess., 100th Leg.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-1004(2) (West, Westlaw through 2020 5th Spec.
Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.1004(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 186).
423. See § 700.7904(2); § 75-7-1004(2); § 701.1004(2). In Fisherv. Fisher,221 P.3d 845,
855 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (Thorne, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), a majority of
the court held that a trustee was not entitled to have the trust reimburse his attorney's fees when
the trial court had found him guilty of self-dealing, even though the trial court also found that
he had acted in good faith with respect to the challenged transactions. The court said that the
trustee's "actions, even if done in good faith, violated the prohibition against self-dealing, and
reimbursement of reasonable attorney fees used to defend against self-dealing is not appropriate
or allowed under Utah Code § 75-7-1004(2)." Id. But see Feeley v. Feeley, No. 64896, 2016 WL
276452, at *5 (Nev. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2016) (holding it was not an abuse of discretion under the
"justice and equity" analysis to award attorney's fees to trustee out of trust property even though
she had breached her fiduciary duty to the trust).
424. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-720 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2010). South Carolina is among
the jurisdictions that have enacted this provision. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-720 (2009).
425. ALA. CODE § 19-3B-709(a) (Westlaw through Act 2020-206).
426. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-11004(A) (Westlaw through legislation effective June
5, 2020 of the 2d Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Fourth Legislature).
427. UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018); see S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1004
(2009).
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paid by another party and, therefore, controls over
general provision

authorizing

209

§ 709(a)(1)-the more

similar reimbursements

from

the trust

property. 428 Settled law holds that a specific statutory provision controls over
a general provision on the same subject; thus, UTC § 1004 rather than UTC
§ 709(a)(1) governs a trustee's ability to recover fees and expenses from
another party in litigation involving the administration of the trust.429
A corollary to this point is that because UTC § 709(a)(1)'s terms speak
only to a trustee being "reimbursed out of the trust property" and not from any
other source, it could lead to unjust and inequitable results. Specifically, if
courts find that § 709(a)(1) exclusively governs a trustee's ability to recover
attorney's fees and costs in a judicial proceeding involving trust
administration, this could deprive courts of the flexibility to order another
party (rather than the trust itself) to pay or reimburse the trustee's fees and
costs. 430 As explained in Webbe v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of
Barrington:

[W]hen one of several beneficiaries brings essentially groundless and
unsuccessful litigation against a trustee the purpose of which was to
benefit only himself, no reason suggests itself why the other
beneficiaries, who did not join with him, sought no relief and had no
voice in the conduct of the case, should share the expense with the
initiating beneficiary. If such were not the case, a beneficiary could
assault will and trust provisions attempting to increase his individual
shares secure in the knowledge that, if he was unsuccessful, the cost
428. Compare UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018), with UNiF. TR. CODE
(UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
429. See Garwood v. Garwood, 233 P.3d 977, 985 (Wyo. 2010) ("[T]he UTC provision
governing an award of fees and costs is more specific to the question of litigation expenses and
therefore controls over the general UTC provisions authorizing a trustee to defend claims and
pay expenses related to trust administration."); Atwood v. Atwood, 25 P.3d 936, 947 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2001) (explaining that the Oklahoma version of § 1004 governed trustee's recovery of
litigation-related expenses, not the more general provision allowing a trustee to employ attorneys
to assist with trust administration); see also Henry, supra note 47, at 24 (arguing that applying
"each section in the appropriate circumstance" is "consistent with the principal of statutory
construction that the more specific statute (applying to litigation) controls over the more
general"). South Carolina follows the rule that specific statutory provision prevails over a more
general one. Dreher v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 412 S.C. 244, 251, 772 S.E.2d
505, 509 (2015) (quoting Wooten ex rel. Wooten v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 333 S.C. 464, 468,
511 S.E.2d 355, 357 (1999)).
430. Wisconsin's version of UTC § 1004, which states that if a trustee defends or
prosecutes a judicial proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, the trustee is entitled
to receive from the trust his or her attorney's fees and expenses necessarily incurred in the
proceeding, further provides that "[t]his subsection does not preclude a court from ordering
another party to reimburse the trust for these expenses and disbursements as provided in
[§ 701.1004(1)]." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 701.1004(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 186).

§ 709(a)(1)
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would be borne by the other beneficiaries equally and not recovered
solely out of the share of the party seeking to further his own ends. 431
This would be an unjust and inequitable outcome.
In such a circumstance, instead of requiring the trust to absorb the
trustee's fees and expenses incurred in defending against a beneficiary's
groundless action (which would harm those beneficiaries who did not join in
or support the action), it would be more just and equitable to require the
beneficiary who initiated the ill-advised action to directly bear those
expenses. 43 2 A court can make such an award of fees and costs against the
beneficiary only under UTC § 1004-not under UTC § 709(a)(1). 433
Third, UTC § 1004 expressly states the court may award fees and
expenses "to any party." 43 4 It nowhere indicates that a trustee should be

exempt from the ambit of this term. 435 To hold that UTC § 709(a)(1)
exclusively governs a trustee's ability to recover these fees effectively
rewrites UTC

§ 1004 to eliminate trustees from the term or phrase "any party"

as used in the latter section. 43 6 On the other hand, construing

§ 1004 to include

431. 487 N.E.2d 711, 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
432. See Henry, supra note 47, at 24; Shurtleff v. United Effort Plan Tr., 289 P.3d 408,
414-16 (Utah 2012) (noting that although § 709 provides the usual mechanism for a trustee's
payment for trust administration because in most cases the trustee will be paid directly from trust
assets, § 1004 provides an alternative mechanism in unusual circumstances where justice and
equity require a different source of payment); Warnerv. Warner, 319 P.3d 711, 727 n.18 (Utah
2014) (citing Shurtleff, 289 P.3d at 415-16); see also Klinkerfuss v. Cronin, 289 S.W.3d 607,
617-18 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that justice and equity required an innocent beneficiary,
who had no part in the litigation, should not have her share of the trust depleted due to other
beneficiary's vexatious litigation); Regions Bank v. Davis, 521 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Mo. Ct. App.
2017) ("It is not just or equitable for the beneficiaries of the Trust, who are not a part of Davis's
appeal and who are innocent as to Davis's disagreements with the Trustee, to bear the Trustee's
attorney fees in this appeal.").
433. Compare UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018), with UNiF. TR. CODE
§ 709(a)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
434. UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018); see S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1004
(2009).
435. See In re Est. of Hohler, 915 N.W.2d 730, at *2 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018) ("[I]f the
legislature had intended the statute to apply only to legal fees for another beneficiary it would
have used that term. Instead, the statute broadly utilizes the term 'party."'); Gray v. Gray, No.
18-CV-522-JD, 2019 WL 2106390, at *5 (D.N.H. May 14, 2019) (a trustee can recover
attorney's fees and costs under § 1004); In re Joan T. Goetzinger Living Tr. Dated May 30,
2014, No. 19-1342, 2020 WL 4201492, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 2020) ("By its express
terms, [Iowa's statute based on § 1004] applies to an award of attorney fees to anyparty. Nothing
in the statute confines its application to a beneficiary's attorney fees.").
436. See Henry, supra note 47, at 24 (observing that this application effectively changes
the language of § 1004 to limit a trustee's request for fees to § 709). Under the plain meaning
rule of statutory construction, "[w]hen the terms of a statute are clear, the court must apply those
terms according to their literal meaning" and "it is not the court's place to change the meaning
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the situation in which a trustee seeks payment or reimbursement from another
party to the proceeding is consistent with a more natural reading of that
section's use of the term "any party." 437

Finally, because UTC § 709(a)(1) specifically references a trustee being
"reimbursed" for expenses, a question arises as to whether this section applies
to litigation fees and expenses that the trustee has not actually paid. 4 38 In
Foulston Siefkin LLP v. Wells Fargo Bank of Texas N.A., for instance, the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals construed a trust provision stating the trustee
"shall be entitled to reimbursement out of the trust estate for all reasonable
costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred in resisting" any

lawsuit for which the trustee is adjudicated to be free from liability. 439 The
court held this clause did not entitle a trustee to be reimbursed for fees and
expenses that were incurred but which the trustee had not paid. 440 The court
construed the term "reimbursement" as "necessarily impl[ying] that
something has been paid which requires compensation for money spent." 441
Unlike UTC § 709(a)(1), UTC § 1004 is not limited to "reimbursement" of
fees or expenses the trustee has paid; thus, it may be the sole means of
recovery (either from the trust or another party) for a trustee who has incurred
liability for such fees or expenses but has not yet paid them. 442
A pair of Minnesota cases illustrate the difficulty courts have had with the
proper interplay between UTC

§§ 709(a)(1) and 1004 and the significant

impact that an enacting state's slight deviation from the language of the
uniform provisions can have on that analysis. 443 In Lund as Trustee of
Revocable Trust of Kim A. Lund v. Lund, which involved a trust beneficiary's

breach of fiduciary duty claims against the trustees, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals elucidated the relationship between that state's versions of UTC

of a clear and unambiguous statute." Georgia-Carolina Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Cnty. of Aiken, 354
S.C. 18, 24-25, 579 S.E.2d 334, 337 (Ct. App. 2003) (first citing Cooper v. Moore, 351 S.C.
207, 212, 569 S.E.2d 330, 332 (2002); then citing Holly v. Mount Vernon Mills, 312 S.C. 320,
323, 440 S.E.2d 373, 374 (1994); then citing Carolina All. for Fair Emp. v. S.C. Dep't of Lab.,
Licensing, & Regul., 337 S.C. 476, 489, 523, S.E.2d 795, 802 (Ct. App. 1999); then citing
Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000); and then citing Bayle v. S.C.
Dep't of Transp., 344 S.C. 115, 122, 542 S.E.2d 736, 739 (Ct. App. 2001)).
437. See Henry, supra note 47, at 24.
438. UNIF. TR. CODE § 709(a)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018); see S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7709(a)(1) (2009).
439. 465 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2006).
440. See id. at 215.
441. Id. (citing United States v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677, 682, n.8 (5th Cir. 1996)).
442. Compare UNIF. TR. CODE

§

1004 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018), with UNiF. TR. CODE

§ 709(a)(1)

(UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
443. See Lund as Tr. of Revocable Tr. of Kim A. Lund v. Lund, 924 N.W.2d 274 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2019); In re Schauer, No. A18-0969, 2019 WL 1510698, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 8,
2019).
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§§ 709(a)(1) and 1004.444 The court held that § 501C.1004 445 of the
Minnesota Statutes (derived from UTC

§ 1004) does not supplant or

supersede a trustee's common law right to payment or reimbursement from
the trust estate for its attorney's fees and costs incurred in litigation with a
beneficiary, which Minnesota has codified in its own version of UTC
§ 709(a)(1) (Minnesota Statutes § 501C.0709(a)(1)).446 The court instead held
that

§ 501C.1004 leaves "undisturbed" the common law standard reflected in

§ 501C.0709(a)(1), which authorizes a trustee to recover from the trust its
expenditures, including attorney's fees, reasonably incurred in the good faith
administration of the trust.447 The court found that while a beneficiary's right
to attorney's fees is subject to the "justice and equity" analysis, trustees are
"entitled" to fees when "the fees are reasonable and incurred in good faith." 448
The trial court in Lund ruled that, in the context of a trustee's litigation
with a beneficiary regarding

administration of the trust,

§ 501C.1004

superseded the common law rule of trustee reimbursement and, thus, the trial
court did not apply § 501C.0709(a)(1). 449 After it determined that
§ 501C.1004-as opposed to the common law standard-controlled, the trial

court found that "justice and equity" did not require the payment of the
trustees' attorney's fees and costs from the trust assets. 450 The court of appeals
reversed this decision, holding that the trial court "applied the wrong legal
standard" by reviewing the trustees' request under

§ 501C.1004, and it

remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the trustees were
entitled to recover their fees and costs from the trusts pursuant to the standard
in § 501C.0709(a)(1), which focuses on whether the fees are reasonable and
incurred in good faith.45i Critically, Lund decided a trustee's right to payment
of attorney's fees and costs from the trust assets, not from the beneficiary or
another party to the litigation. 452 The court did not confront the question of

444. See Lund, 924 N.W.2d at 286.
445. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501C.1004 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.). South
Carolina has enacted a similar provision, but with important differences. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-7-1004 (2009).
446. Lund, 924 N.W.2d at 286 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501C.0709(a) (West,
Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.)). As noted above, the SCTC also codifies the same common
law rule. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-709(a)(1) (2009).
447. See Lund, 924 N.W.2d at 286. Minnesota's Trust Code provides that the "common
law of trusts and principles of equity supplement [the code], except to the extent modified by
[the code] or another law of this state." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501C.0106 (West, Westlaw through
2020 Reg. Sess.). As discussed above, the SCTC includes a similar provision. See S.C. CODE

ANN. § 62-7-106 (2009).
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

Lund, 924 N.W.2d at 285-86.
See id.
Id. at 286.
See id.
See id.
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whether the trustee would be entitled to recover attorney's fees or costs from
another party to the proceedings, rather than from the trust, or what standard
(UTC § 709(a)(1) or UTC § 1004) governs that determination. 453
More recently in In re Schauer,454 the Minnesota Court of Appeals
indicated that its prior decision in Lund means § 501C.1004 governs a
beneficiary's or third party's ability to recover attorney's fees in a judicial
proceeding involving the administration of a trust, whereas § 501C.0709(a)(1)

exclusively governs a trustee 's ability to recover fees in such a proceeding. 455
The court stated that "[w]hile beneficiary attorney fees are subject to a justiceand-equity analysis, trustees are entitled to fees when 'the fees are reasonable
and incurred in good faith[,]"' implying it is never necessary for a trustee to
satisfy the justice and equity analysis to recover attorney's fees in this
context. 456

To the extent that Lund and Schauer are construed to mean that UTC

§ 709(a)(1) exclusively governs a trustee's ability to recover fees, these cases
are sensible when viewed through the lens of Minnesota's unique versions of
the uniform statutes. Minnesota adopted UTC § 709(a)(1) literatim.457 It also
enacted UTC

§ 1004 but not in toto.458 Minnesota made a subtle but

significant change to its version of § 1004 by omitting the language that
allows a court to order a party's attorney's fees and costs "be paid by another
party." 459 Consequently, the state's versions of UTC §§ 709(a)(1) and 1004
only permit a court to order payment or reimbursement of a trustee's

attorney's fees and expenses from the trust itself, not from another party to
the proceeding. 460 The Minnesota legislature essentially denuded its version
of UTC § 1004 of the fee shifting component.
With Minnesota's alteration to the uniform provision in focus, it becomes
understandable that the Lund and Schauer courts (1) construed

§ 501C.1004

453. See id.
454. In re Schauer, No. A18-0969, 2019 WL 1510698 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2019).
455. Id. at *5 ("In Lund, we held that [MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501C.1004] did not apply to
the trustee fees, but that [] did apply, as supplemented by common law. On the other hand,
[§ 501C.1004], the justice-and-equity rule, applies to the award of beneficiary and third-party
attorney fees, as supplemented by the common law." (citations omitted)).
456. See id. (quoting Lund, 924 N.W.2d at 286).
457. Compare UNIF. TR. CODE § 709 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018), with MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 501C.0709 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.).
458. Compare UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018), with MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 501C.1004.
459. The UTC states, "In a judicial proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the
court, as justice and equity may require, may award costs and expenses, including reasonable
attorney's fees, to any party, to be paidby anotherparty or from the trust that is the subject of
the controversy." UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018) (emphasis added).
Minnesota's version of this provision omits the italicized language. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 501C.1004 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.).
460. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501C.0709(a)(1); id. § 501C.1004.

Published by Scholar Commons,

69

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 8
214

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 72: 145]

to exclusively govern a beneficiary's or third party's ability to recover
attorney's fees in a judicial proceeding involving the administration of a
trust46 ' and (2) construed

§ 501C.0709(a)(1) to exclusively govern a trustee's

ability to recover fees in such a proceeding. 462 Because the source of the
payment of the trustee's attorney's fees and costs is the same under either
section (i.e., from the trust),463 it makes perfect sense to analyze a trustee's
request for such fees and costs only under § 501C.0709(a)(1) because a
trustee's right to reimbursement under that section is broader than that of
§ 501C.1004.464
On the other hand, looking at the uniform provisions from a panoptic
view, it distorts the proper relationship between UTC

§§ 709(a)(1) and 1004

to hold that either section exclusively governs a trustee's ability to recover
attorney's fees and costs in a judicial proceeding involving trust
administration. Either UTC

§ 709(a)(1) or UTC § 1004 governs a trustee's

entitlement to fees and costs incurred in a judicial proceeding involving trust
administration, depending on the source from which the trustee seeks payment
(i.e., the trust estate or another party to the proceeding). 465
VII. RETROACTIVITY OF FEE STATUTES

South Carolina's appellate courts have not yet addressed the question of
whether the fee statutes are to have prospective or retroactive application. The
retrospective application of a statute is disfavored, and statutes are presumed
to be prospective in effect. 466 "Legislative intent is paramount in determining

whether a statute has a prospective or retroactive application." 467 If the statute
itself clearly indicates that it is to be applied prospectively or retroactively,
then that intent controls. "Absent a specific provision or clear legislative intent
to the contrary, the general rule is that statutes are to be construed
461. See Lund, 924 N.W.2d at 285-86; In re Schauer, 2019 WL 1510698, at *6.
462. Lund, 924 N.W.2d at 285-86; In re Schauer, 2019 WL 1510698, at *6.
463. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501C.0709(a); id § 501C.1004.
464. Compare id. § 501C.0709(a), with id. § 501C.1004 (illustrating that § 501C.0709(a)
allows reimbursement for expenses incurred not only in the administration of the trust but also
to prevent unjust enrichment, while § 501C.1004 only covers expenses incurred because of a
judicial proceeding).
465. See supra notes 417-437 and accompanying text.
466. State v. Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 186, 747 S.E.2d 677, 681 (2013) (citing State v. Dickey,
380 S.C. 384, 404, 669 S.E.2d 917, 928 (Ct. App. 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 394 S.C. 491,
716 S.E.2d 97 (2011)). But see Est. of Derzon, 908 N.W.2d 471, 485 n.9 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018)
(refusing to assume that § 1004 was inapplicable to trustee's actions that took place before the
statute's enactment when the trustee had failed to "develop any argument that the statute does
not apply in this case").
467. Isaac, 405 S.C. at 186, 747 S.E.2d at 681 (citing Jenkins v. Meares, 302 S.C. 142,
146, 394 S.E.2d 317, 319 (1990)).
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prospectively rather than retroactively, unless the statute is remedial or
procedural in nature." 468
The South Carolina fee statutes based on UTC

§ 1004 were not enacted

as free-standing provisions but were appended to comprehensive legislation
covering other topics. 469 These thorough statutes contain provisions expressly

addressing their application to judicial proceedings commenced before their
"effective dates." 470 It is unclear how courts will apply these provisions with
respect to the particular sections authorizing recovery of attorney's fees and
costs.

The effective date provisions applicable to the fee statutes for trust and
probate matters are located in the codified statutes,471while the corresponding
provision for the fee statute applicable to formal proceedings involving
protected persons is found only in the session laws. 472 Although these
provisions are not identical, they are similar in material respects. 473 They both

provide that the fee statutes will apply to judicial proceedings commenced
before their effective dates unless the court determines their application would
substantially interfere with the litigation or prejudice the rights of the parties,
in which case the former law will apply. 474 They further provide that any act
done and any right acquired before the effective date of the fee statutes (e.g.,
a vested right) will not be affected by the statutes. 475
It is difficult to predict whether courts will find that the retroactive
application of the South Carolina fee statutes to previously commenced
judicial proceedings would substantially interfere with the conduct of the
litigation, prejudice the rights of the parties, affect acts done or rights acquired
before the statutes became effective, or impair vested rights. Good arguments
can be made both ways, and the outcome will likely depend on the particular
facts and circumstances of each individual case.
If the courts determine that the effective date provisions are unclear as to
the retroactive or prospective application of the fee sections to any given case,
the presumption applies that they are applied prospectively. This presumption

may be overcome only when a statute is "remedial" or "procedural" in
468. Se. Site Prep, LLC v. Ail. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC, 394 S.C. 97, 106, 713
S.E.2d 650, 654-55 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Bartley v. Bartley Logging Co., 293 S.C. 88, 90,
359 S.E.2d 55, 56 (1987)).
469. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-100, -7-1106 (2009).
470. Id. §§ 62-1-100(b)(4), -7-1106(a)(3).
471. Id. §§ 62-1-100, -7-1106.
472. See Act effective Jan. 1, 2019, No. 87, § 6, 2017 S.C. Acts 104-105.
473. A South Carolina law professor has described the effective date provisions in the
statutes as being "substantially similar." Medlin, supra note 332, at 201-02.
474. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-100(b)(2), -7-1106(a)(3); § 6(B)(3), 2017 S.C. Acts at
104-105.
475. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-100(b)(4), -7-1106(a)(5); § 6(B)(3), 2017 S.C. Acts at
104-105.
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nature. 476 A statute is "remedial" when it creates new remedies for existing
rights "unless it violates a contractual obligation, creates a new right, or
divests a vested right." 47 7 This exception is not applicable to a statute that
supplies a legal remedy where formerly there was none. 478 When a statute
creates new obligations or imposes a new duty, it is remedial. 479 Conversely,
a law is "procedural" when it establishes a court procedure or prescribes a
method of enforcing rights. 480
South Carolina case law has not yet decided whether any of the fee
statutes applicable to trust, probate, or protected person proceedings are

substantive or procedural. If the courts determine that these fee statutes create
a new substantive right or supply a legal remedy where formerly there was
none, then the statutes must only be applied prospectively. Looking to former
South Carolina case law, it is evident that changes in law that make a party
responsible for another party's attorney's fees and costs effect a substantive
change and are to be applied prospectively. 48 1

In addition, federal district courts in Kentucky and Missouri have held
that their respective states' versions of UTC

§ 1004 do not apply to trustees'

actions when the trustees' tenure ended prior to the statutes' effective dates. 482
These states based their holdings either on the conclusion that the fee statutes
were substantive provisions that could not be applied retroactively or on
statutory provisions stating the statutes do not affect acts completed before

476. State v. Bolin, 381 S.C. 557, 561, 673 S.E.2d 885, 887 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State
v. Davis, 309 S.C. 326, 334, 422 S.E.2d 133, 139 (1992)).
477. Se. Site Prep, LLC v. Ail. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC, 394 S.C. 97, 106, 713
S.E.2d 650, 655 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Smith v. Eagle Constr. Co., 282 S.C. 140, 143, 318
S.E.2d 8, 9 (1984)).
478. Boyd v. Boyd, 277 S.C. 416, 418, 289 S.E.2d 153, 154 (1982) (first citing Hercules,
Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 274 S.C. 137, 143, 262 S.E.2d 45, 48-49 (1980); and then citing
Hyderv. Jones, 271 S.C. 85, 88, 245 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1978)).
479. Se. Site Prep, 394 S.C. at 106, 713 S.E.2d at 655; see Edwards v. State Law Enf't
Div., 395 S.C. 571, 579, 720 S.E.2d 462, 466 (2011).
480. Edwards, 395 S.C. at 580, 720 S.E.2d at 466.
481. Hardaway v. Cnty. of Lexington, 314 S.C. 22, 24, 443 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1994)
(holding change to law under which counties became liable for reasonable attorney's fees and
costs beyond those provided under Defense of Indigents Act applies prospectively only because
it created a new liability for counties where none formerly existed); Se. Site Prep, 394 S.C. at
107, 713 S.E.2d at 655 (holding that newly enacted portion of Frivolous Civil Proceedings
Sanctions Act that created substantive rights and which imposed new obligations for imposing
sanctions applied prospectively, rather than retroactively).
482. See Watkins v. Tr. Under Will of William Marshall Bullitt ex rel. PNC Bank, N.A.,
No. 3:13-CV-1113-DJH-CHL, 2015 WL 13849175, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 16, 2015); Jo Ann
Howard & Assocs., P.C. v. Cassity, No. 4:09-CV-01252, 2020 WL 870987, at *5 (E.D. Mo.
Feb. 21, 2020).
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they became effective. 483 In a recent case discussing a Virginia statutory
amendment established to create an award of attorney's fees "as justice and
equity may require" in a judicial proceeding concerning a power of attorney,

the Virginia Supreme Court declined to give the amendment retroactive
application to a proceeding commenced before the amendment's effective
date. 484

Other courts applying state versions of UTC

§ 1004 have reached

contrary conclusions. 485 These courts deemed the fee statutes based on § 1004
to be merely effectuating procedural changes. 48 6 In Vander Boegh v. Bank of

Oklahoma, N.A., the Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected the defendants'
argument that Kentucky's version of UTC

§ 1004 did not apply because it

became effective during the pendency of the proceedings. 487 The court did not
mention a prior case, however, in which a federal district court in Kentucky
reached a contrary holding involving the same state statute. 488 The Vander
Boegh court based its decision on Kentucky precedent holding that statutes
that authorize an attorney's fee award are deemed remedial and, therefore,
applicable to pending cases. 48 9 The court also cited to other states' decisions
which reached similar conclusions under their versions of UTC § 1004.490 The
court further disagreed that application of the statute to the pending case
would substantially interfere with the conduct of the litigation or prejudice the
parties' rights because the defendants "had actual and constructive knowledge
when the statute took effect that the [plaintiff] would seek to recover its
attorney fees under [the statute]," but they "persisted in vigorously

483. Watkins, 2015 WL 13849175, at *5 (finding that fee statute is substantive and does
not apply retroactively to a trustee's conduct prior to the statute's enactment); Howard, 2020
WL 870987, at *5.
484. Harold v. Devening, No. 181308, 2020 WL 1943524, at *4 n.5 (Va. Apr. 23, 2020)
(discussing VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1614(E) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.)). This
statutory amendment was a response to the decision in Mangrum v. Chavis, No. 160782, 2018
WL 1101719, at *4 (Va. Mar. 1, 2018), in which the plaintiffs had successfully sued an agent
under a durable general power of attorney for breach of fiduciary duty when the agent had
improperly deposited the proceeds from the principal's annuity into his own personal bank
account, but the plaintiffs were denied recovery of their legal fees from the agent and were not
made whole.
485. See Vander Boeghv. Bank of Okla., No. 2016-CA-001307-MR, 2019 WL 1495712,
at *8-9 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2019).
486. See id.
487. See id.
488. See id.; Watkins, 2015 WL 13849175, at *5.
489. Vander Boegh, 2019 WL 1495712, at *9 (citing Cent. Ky. Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Smith, 633 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. 1982)).
490. Id. (first citing Young v. Young, No. CA08-212, 2008 WL 5176763, at *8 (Ark. Ct.
App. Dec. 10, 2008); and then citing Atwood v. Atwood, 25 P.3d 936, 948-49 (Okla. Civ. App.
2001)).
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prosecuting their counterclaims, and even amended them after the statute
became effective." 49
Whether the fee statutes derived from UTC § 1004 will be applied to
conduct or judicial proceedings commenced before their effective dates is
presently an open question under South Carolina law. Even though the fee
statutes involving trusts and probate matters have been in effect for several
years, thus diminishing the likelihood that retroactivity concerns will arise,
the statute applicable to such proceedings with regard to protected persons did
not become effective until January 1, 2019; therefore, retroactivity questions

may still arise under this statute. 492 Hopefully, South Carolina appellate courts
will provide some clarity on this issue in the near future.
VIII.

INTERIM OR PENDENTE LITE AWARDS OF FEES

The fee statutes based on UTC

§ 1004 and their related Reporter's

Comments do not specifically address at what point in the litigation fees can
or should be awarded to a party. 493 Moreover, the statutes give no guidance as
to whether a trustee, personal representative, or other party can be entitled to
an interim or pendente lite award of fees from the trust, estate, or other party
during the pendency of the litigation or whether they must wait until the
litigation is finally resolved in their favor. 494
Answering the question of whether a trustee 495 can pay its attorney's fees
and costs either from the assets of the trustpendente lite or while the litigation
is ongoing can have significant and determinative ramifications. On the one
hand, when a trustee can pay its attorney's fees from trust assets while
litigation is ongoing, the trustee has less of an incentive to settle disputes and
is given greater leverage in the litigation vis-i-vis a trust beneficiary who does
not have access to the trust assets to pay litigation expenses. 496 Although

South Carolina has not addressed this issue, some states have indicated that
491. Id.
492. See, e.g., Berlinsky v Berlinsky, No. 2013-GC-10-0150, 2019 WL 7212469, at *8 n.4
(S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 20, 2019) (noting that retroactivity issues involving the applicability of
§ 62-5-105 were raised, but the case was disposed of on other grounds).
493. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1004 (2009).
494. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 1004 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018); see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-7-1004 (2009).
495. Although the immediate discussion refers to trustees for simplicity, this discussion
equally applies to other fiduciaries such as trust advisors, trust protectors, and personal
representatives.
496. See Robert Whitman & Kumar Paturi, Improving Mechanisms for Resolving
Complaints of Powerless Trust Beneficiaries, 16 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 64, 79 n.21 (2002)

("The question of fees and the source of their payment can dramatically affect the cooperation
of a trustee. Where fees can be drawn from the trust funds, a trustee has less of an incentive to
settle a dispute.").
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trustees sued for trust mismanagement in both their individual capacities and
as trustees may have a conflict of interest with respect to the decision to use
trust assets to pay their legal bills in defending the litigation. 497 The interim
payment of fees from the trust may end up unjustly enriching a trustee who is
ultimately found guilty of malfeasance at the action's conclusion, especially
if the trustee is unable to repay or reimburse the payments to the trust or estate.
On the other hand, if a trustee cannot use the trust's or estate's assets to
pay its fees during the litigation, it usually means the trustee will have to use
personal funds to retain legal counsel until the matter is concluded. This not
only "evens the playing field" between a trustee and an adverse litigant (such
as a beneficiary), but it arguably tilts the field in favor of the beneficiary by
forcing the trustee to expend personal funds to defend against those
allegations. This effectively diminishes any compensation the trustee was
once entitled to receive for its services, which was part of the inducement for
the trustee to accept the rigors of fiduciary responsibility in the first place. 498
Very few corporate trustees, and even less individual trustees, are willing or
able to undertake such a financial burden. 499 The denial of interim awards of
fees and costs can make it difficult-if not impossible-to find qualified
persons or entities willing to serve as trustees. 500 Withholding payment of
interim fees may also prevent trustees from defending themselves against
even meritless allegations, which would ultimately frustrate or defeat the
'

settlor's purpose in creating the trust. 50

The resolution of this issue is the most challenging when a beneficiary
sues a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty or other malfeasance in office, and
497. See Shrinerv. Dyer, 462 So. 2d 1122, 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that
"[s]ince [trustees] defended against individual liability for trust mismanagement in the previous
action, their personal interests conflicted with their position as trustees[,]" and they "should have
obtained court approval before exercising their trustee power to use trust funds to pay their
attorney's fees"); J.P. Morgan Tr. Co. v. Siegel, 965 So. 2d 1193, 1196-1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007). The Shriner and J.P. Morgan courts based their holdings on a Florida statute that has
since been repealed. The statute in effect at the time had provided that "[i]f the duty of the trustee
and the trustee's individual interest . . . conflict in the exercise of a trust power, the power may
be exercised only by court authorization." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 737.403(2) (West, repealed 2008).
The statute had further stated that "[c]ourt authorization is not required" for "[p]ayment of costs
or attorney's fees incurred in any trust proceeding from the assets of the trust unless an action
has been filed or defense asserted against the trustee based upon a breach of trust." Id

(emphasis added).
498. See Weidlichv. Comley, 267 F.2d 133, 134 (2d Cir. 1959).
499. See Regions Bank v. Davis, 521 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017); Shurtleff v.
United Effort Plan Tr., 289 P.3d 408, 416 (Utah 2012).
500. See Shurtleff, 289 P.3d at 417 (upholding interim payment of attorney's fees and
expenses to a special fiduciary appointed for a charitable trust and noting that to hold otherwise
would deter future potential fiduciaries from answering the call to come to the aid of charitable
trusts).
501. See Weidlich, 267 F.2d at 134.
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the trustee wants to pay its attorney's fees from the assets of the trust or estate
before the merits of the claims are determined. A trustee is ordinarily entitled
to reimbursement or indemnification from the trust for attorney's fees and
expenses incurred in the successful defense of an action seeking the trustee's
removal or alleging mismanagement or misappropriation of the trust.50 2
However, if the defense was unsuccessful, the trustee usually will not be

entitled to such reimbursement or indemnification of fees and costs unless it
acted reasonably and defended or prosecuted the litigation in good faith.503
The question can be further complicated if the trustee was sued both in its
official and individual capacities because a trustee cannot use trust assets to
defend against claims asserted against the trustee solely in an individual
capacity. 504

South Carolina courts have not yet addressed the perplexing issue of
interim or pendente lite awards of fees in litigation involving the fiduciary's

conduct or challenging the fiduciary's administration of the trust or estate.
Case law from other jurisdictions reflects a wide divergence of approaches to
this question. 505 A number of courts held not only is it unnecessary for the
trustee to prevail in the litigation in order to obtain payment of its attorney's
fees from the trust but also the court need not await the final conclusion of the
lawsuit to do so. 506 Yet, some courts condition interim awards upon some
showing beyond the mere allegations in the pleadings that the action was
prosecuted or defended in good faith and the fees were necessary. 507 In
applying § 45 of the General Laws of Massachusetts, Massachusetts courts
have held that an award of fees and costs can be made at any stage of a pending
proceeding. 508
In a California case involving a fee statute that was not based on UTC
§ 1004, the court utilized a balancing of the harms approach to resolve a
trustee's petition for an award of interim attorney's fees incurred in the
defense of the state attorney general's lawsuit seeking the trustee's removal

502. See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
503. Snook v. Tr. Co. of Ga. Bank of Savannah, 909 F.2d 480, 485 (11th Cir. 1990).
504. See, e.g., Jelletichv. Pawlaksi, No. 5:14-CV-00017, 2015 WL 1249673, at *3 (W.D.
Ky. Mar. 18, 2015).
505. See supra notes 508-524 and accompanying text.
506. See, e.g., Shurtleff v. United Effort Plan Tr., 289 P.3d 408, 414, 416 (Utah 2012); In
re Life Ins. Tr. Agreement of Julius F. Seeman, Dated Apr. 19, 1962, 841 P.2d 403, 404-05
(Colo. App. 1992); In re Daly's Est.,120 N.Y.S.2d 896, 903 (Sur. Ct. 1953); Kasperbauer v.
Fairfield, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2009); cf In re Guardianship of Hollis, No. 1413-00659-CV, 2014 WL 5685570, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2014) (finding trustee did not
engage in gross mismanagement by seeking reimbursement from trust of $23,000 in attorney's
fees that it had incurred to defend itself in proceedings).
507. See, e.g., Ball v. Mills, 376 So. 2d 1174, 1181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
508. See Clark v. Clark, 716 N.E.2d 144, 150 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999).
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for alleged mismanagement and self-dealing. 509 Under this approach, "the
court first must assess the probability that the trustee will ultimately be entitled
to reimbursement of attorney's fees and then balance the relative harms to all
interests involved in the litigation, including the interests of the trust
beneficiaries." 1 0 This assessment "requires at least some inquiry into the
ability of the trustee or former trustee to repay [the interim] fees [awarded] if
ultimately determined not to be entitled to the costs of defense.""' The court
held that it must consider whether the trustee would be unduly prejudiced by
having to bear its own fees until the merits of the case were determined (i.e.,
its ability to mount an adequate defense) and whether the beneficiaries would
be unduly prejudiced if the fees were advanced and not repaid (i.e., trust assets
would be placed at risk).5 12
A growing number of courts have refused to approve the expenditure of
trust assets to pay a trustee's legal fees and expenses in defending against
allegations of maladministration of the trust until the allegations have been
resolved in the trustee's favor. 513 These courts view it as premature to allow
the trustee to use the trust's assets for payment of fees and costs until the
merits are decided.5 14 The result in these cases may have differed if the trustee
was able to show that the assets of the trust or estate would likely be depleted

509. People ex rel. Harris v. Shine, 224 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380, 392 (Ct. App. 2017).
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id. at 393. The court commented that "an award of pendente lite fees will seldom be
justified where, as here, the trustis silent on interim fees and the trustee's misconduct is at issue."
Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
513. See, e.g., Sierra v. Williamson, 784 F. Supp. 2d 774, 777 (W.D. Ky. 2011); Jelletich
v. Pawlaksi, No. 5:14-CV-00017, 2015 WL 1249673, at *3 n.3 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 18,2015); Cohen
v. Minneapolis Jewish Fed'n, 286 F. Supp. 3d 949, 979 (W.D. Wis. 2017), aff'd, 776 F. App'x
912 (7th Cir. 2019); Ralph Anderson Family Tr. v. Anderson, No. BDV 2017-29, 2018 WL
6721944, at *2 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Sept. 28, 2018); Ex parte Adams, 514 So. 2d 845, 850 (Ala.
1987). In In re Louise v. Steinhoefel Tr., 854 N.W.2d 792, 794 (Neb. Ct. App. 2014), the trial
court had initially awarded interim attorney's fees to a trustee, but later determined that the
trustee had breached his fiduciary duties. As part of the subsequent ruling, the appellate court
vacated the prior award of interim fees and remanded the matter "to determine whether justice
and equity require that the trust bear the cost of these fees." Id. at 803.
514. See, e.g., Cohen, 286 F. Supp. 3d at 979; see also Burns v. Bums Rhine, No. 15-CV02329, 2016 WL 6679807, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2016) (approving an interim award of
attorney's fees to a trustee that were incurred in preparing an accounting requested by a
beneficiary, including responding to the beneficiary's objections to the accounting, but denying
the trustee's request for an interim award of attorney's fees incurred in defending against the
beneficiary's lawsuit alleging the trustee had improperly used trust funds for her own benefit).
The court held that "[t]hese questions are the subject of this litigation, and their resolution now
would be premature." Id. at *4.
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before the merits were determined, thus jeopardizing the trustee's recovery of
fees and costs if a decision was delayed until the end of the case.515
Unlike South Carolina, Florida and Wisconsin both enacted rather unique
statutes specifically addressing the propriety of a trustee's use of trust assets
to make interim payments of attorney's fees in an action against the trustee
alleging breach of trust.5 16 These statutes allow a trustee to use trust funds to
pay attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending a breach of trust claim
without prior court approval, provided the trustee first gives written notice of
its intention to do so to the qualified beneficiaries whose shares of the trust
may be affected by the payment.517 This "notice of intent" must be given prior
to making a payment and must inform the beneficiary that it has the right to
apply for an order prohibiting the trustee from paying attorney's fees or costs
from trust assets. 5 18 If the notice requirement is satisfied, the trustee may pay

the attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending the breach of trust
proceeding from the trust assets without court approval, unless an affected
beneficiary applies for and obtains a court order prohibiting the payment.519
If the trustee fails to give notice before using trust assets to pay attorney's
fees, the court can order the trustee to personally reimburse the trust for the
amounts paid from the trust assets. 520
Once the trustee provides notice of intent, these statutes put an affirmative
burden on the beneficiary to obtain a court order barring the trustee from using
trust assets to pay its attorney's fees and costs. 521 To obtain such an order, the
affected beneficiary must demonstrate a "reasonable basis" for concluding
that a breach of trust occurred. 522 "Conclusory allegations" are insufficient to
515. See Sierra, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 778 ("[B]ecause the parties have agreed that no
distributions from the Trust shall be made to beneficiaries during the pendency of this action,
there is no concern that sufficient funds will not be available should the Court decide to award
attorney's fees from the Trust at a later time.").
516. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.0802(10) (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess. of the
26th Leg.); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 701.1004(3) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 186).
517. § 736.0802(10)(b); § 701.1004(3)(a)-(b).
518. § 736.0802(10)(c); § 701.1004(3)(b).
519. § 736.0802(10)(b)-(e); § 701.1004(3)(a)-(c).
520. See, e.g., In re Margarete Marthe Milliette 1997 Irrevocable Tr., Appeal No.
2017AP2303, 2018 WL 2229366, at *8 (Wis. Ct. App. May 15, 2018) (affirming trial court's
order requiring a trustee to reimburse the trust for attorney's fees paid from the trust to defend
against a beneficiary's petition seeking the trustee's removal when the trustee had failed to
provide the beneficiary with the statutory notice pursuant to § 701.1004(3)).
521. See, e.g., Schwab v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 516 F. App'x 545, 550 (6th Cir. 2013)
(discussing changes to Florida's statute and observing that current version puts the burden on
the beneficiary to seek a court order enjoining payments of fees and costs once the trustee gives
notice to the beneficiaries).
522. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.0802(10)(e)(1); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 701.1004(3)(c)(2); see
Cohen v. Minneapolis Jewish Fed'n, No. 16-CV-325, 2017 WL 108087, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Jan.
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make this showing, although the affected beneficiary does not have "a burden
akin to that of a movant on summary judgment." 23 If this showing is made,
the court must enter an order barring further payment and compelling the
return to the trust of any fees and costs already paid, unless the court finds
"good cause" not to do so. 524
Even though South Carolina does not have statutory provisions like those
enacted in Florida and Wisconsin,5 25 these statutes could still inform courts in
deciding whether a trustee or other fiduciary is entitled to an interim award of
fees from the trust or estate under the statutes patterned after UTC § 1004.
Additionally, the statutes also address the closely related question of whether
a beneficiary should be entitled to an order prohibiting a trustee or fiduciary
from using trust or estate assets to pay attorney's fees and expenses on an

interim basis before the court has determined the merits of the litigation.
IX. TEMPORARY OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF INVOLVING FEES

Beneficiaries have received mixed results when seeking injunctions to
restrain a trustee or personal representative from using trust or estate assets to
pay attorney's fees and expenses on an interim basis during the litigation.5 26
In Snook v. Trust Co. of Georgia Bank of Savannah, which involved

beneficiaries' claims against the trustees for breach of fiduciary duties, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in denying the beneficiaries' motion for a preliminary injunction to
enjoin the trustees from using trust funds to pay their attorney's fees during
the litigation.5 27 The court reached this conclusion despite the trial court
11, 2017) (prohibiting trustees from using trust funds to pay their attorney's fees during litigation
when trust beneficiary satisfied its burden under § 701.1004(3)(c)(2) of the Wisconsin Code and
showed a "reasonable basis" for concluding that the trustees had breached their duties to the
trust); Covenant Tr. Co. v. Guardianship of Ihrman, 45 So. 3d 499, 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010) (holding trial court erred in entering order barring trustee from making further payment
of attorney's fees out of the trust in the absence of any finding of a breach of trust by the trustee).
523. Abromats v. Abromats, No. 16-CV-60653, 2016 WL 5941888, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 13, 2016).
524. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.0802(10)(e)(1); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 701.1004(3)(c)(2); see
Abromats, 2016 WL 5941888, at *6 (finding good cause existed pursuant to
§ 736.0802(10)(e)(1) of the Florida Code to deny beneficiary's motion to enjoin trustee from
using trust assets to fund his legal fees and costs); Cohen, 2017 WL 108087, at *4 (concluding
that the trustees did not show good cause sufficient to allow them to use trust funds to pay their
attorney's fees and costs associated with beneficiary's litigation against them alleging a breach
of their duties to the trust).
525. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-3-720, -7-709 (Supp. 2019).
526. See Snook v. Tr. Co. of Ga. Bank of Savannah, 909 F.2d 480, 487 (11th Cir. 1990);
Salmon v. Old Nat'l Bank, No. 4:08CV-116-M, 2010 WL 1463196, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 8,
2010).
527. See 909 F.2d at 486-87.
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finding that the beneficiaries were substantially likely to prevail on the merits
of their claim and that the trustees had no authority absent prior judicial
authorization to use trust funds for that purpose.5 28 The appellate court held
that the beneficiaries would have an adequate legal remedy at the end of the
case in the form of a monetary recovery against the trustees and that the
beneficiaries failed to establish irreparable harm.5 29 Other courts have
likewise denied beneficiaries' motions for preliminary injunctions in similar
circumstances. 530

On the opposing side, a Kentucky federal district court granted the trust
beneficiaries' preliminary injunction motion in Salmon v. Old National
Bank.53 ' The beneficiaries in this case sued the trustee, alleging breach of

fiduciary duties. 532 The trust settlor was a ninety-eight-year-old widow who
suffered a stroke and required around-the-clock nursing care and
rehabilitation therapy. 533 The trustee used trust funds to pay approximately
$103,000 in attorney's fees incurred in defending the breach of fiduciary duty
suit. 534 The trustee was also attempting to sell the trust's real estate holdings

because the settlor was in immediate need of disbursements from the trust due
to her personal income and assets being insufficient to meet her needs.535
The district court granted the beneficiaries' motion for a preliminary
injunction to prevent the trustee from selling the trust's real property; it further
ordered the trustee to return to the trust the amount taken for attorney's fees
to defend the fiduciary duty case.53 6 The court maintained that it initially
denied the beneficiaries' motion because they failed to offer proof of
irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction, but it also noted that "the
circumstances [had] changed" when it became aware of the settlor's imminent

528. See id.
529. Id. at 486.
530. See, e.g., Alexanderv. Martin, No. 2:08-CV-400, 2010 WL 11530306, at *5-6 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 23, 2010); McCoy v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. D067110, 2015 WL 6438478, at *3-5
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2015). In Alexander, the court later denied the trustee's motion for
summary judgment involving the beneficiary's claim that the trustee's payment of interim
attorney's fees from the trust constituted a breach of fiduciary duty on the grounds it would be
premature to rule on the issue until the merits of the case had been adjudicated. Alexander v.
Martin, No. 2:08CV400, 2010 WL 11527378, at *17 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2010).
531. Salmon, 2010 WL 1463196, at *5.
532. Id. at *3.
533. Id.
534. Id.
535. Id.
536. Id. at *5-6.
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need of disbursements from the trust and the need to sell the trust's real

property to provide continued support to the settlor.5 37

One commentator has argued that a beneficiary may be able to obtain
temporary injunctive relief by suspending or thwarting a trustee's ability to

reimburse its attorney's fees from the trust in conjunction with an action under
UTC § 706 seeking the trustee's removal from office. 538 Section 706(c) of the
UTC states that "[p]ending a final decision on a request to remove a trustee,
or in lieu of or in addition to removing a trustee, the court may order such
appropriate relief under [§] 1001(b) as may be necessary to protect the trust

property or the interests of the beneficiaries.""' The accompanying
Comments to UTC § 706 explain that it "authorizes the court to intervene

pending a final decision on a request to remove a trustee." 54 0 In turn, UTC

§ 1001(b) lists a broad arsenal of remedies that a court may award for "a
breach of trust that has occurred or may occur," including a catch-all clause
permitting the court to "order

any other

appropriate relief."

54

1 This

authorization allows a court to grant an injunction that seeks the trustee's
removal to restrain the trustee from using trust assets to pay or reimburse its
attorney's fees and costs. 542 Despite this statutory authorization, the
commentator suggests that the availability of a preliminary injunction under
UTC § 706(c) may depend on whether the traditional requirements for

537. See id. at *3; see also Jelletichv. Pawlaksi, No. 5:14-CV-00017, 2015 WL 1249673,
at *3 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2015), which involved a Kentucky federal district court that entered
an order granting the trust beneficiaries' motion seeking to bar the trustee from paying any
further attorney's fees and costs from the trust corpus during the litigation without leave of the
court. Although the court did not analyze the motion as if it was seeking injunctive relief, the
opinion makes clear the court granted the motion because the trustee was presently paying her
and her husband's attorney's fees from the trust estate and was thereby dissipating the funds that
the beneficiaries may ultimately be entitled to if they were to prevail in the litigation. Id. at *4.
The court said its "present ruling is intended to preserve the remaining trust corpus pending the
resolution of this lawsuit," which is akin to granting a preliminary injunction to maintain the
status quo. Id. at *3 n.3.
538. See Zebot & Nelson, supra note 417, at 36-37.
539. UNIF. TR. CODE § 706(c) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018). South Carolina has adopted this
uniform provision with slight modifications. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-706(c) (Supp. 2019).
540. UNIF. TR. CODE § 706 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018). The Comments to § 706 further
note that "[p]ursuant to Section 1004, the court may also award attorney's fees as justice and
equity may require," thus suggesting that an interim award of attorney's fees and costs may be
appropriate during a proceeding for the trustee's removal. Id.
541. Id. § 1001(b). South Carolina has adopted this uniform provision with slight
modifications. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1001(b).
542. See Zebot & Nelson, supra note 417, at 36-37. The Comments to § 706 state that
"[a]mong the relief that the court may order under Section 1001(b) is an injunction prohibiting
the trustee from performing certain acts and the appointment of a special fiduciary to perform
some or all of the trustee's functions." UNIF. TR. CODE § 706 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018).
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at law"-can

be

satisfied.5 43

It is open to debate whether the requirement of an inadequate remedy at
law is even relevant when the purpose of the temporary injunction is either to
"freeze" specific funds or assets held by a trustee or personal representative
as a fiduciary or to prevent their disposition when those assets may be the
subject of an equitable decree (e.g., constructive trust, restitution, accounting,
disgorgement) at the conclusion of the case. When a person holds legal title
to funds as a fiduciary and the party requesting the preliminary injunctive

relief holds equitable title (such as a beneficiary), courts no longer require a
showing of inadequate remedy at law if the purpose of the preliminary
injunction is to preserve the court's ability to provide final equitable relief.544
Neither the Snook nor Salmon cases indicate the parties raised this
argument.5 45

Under these principles, the ordinary requirement of an inadequate remedy
at law is satisfied based on the view that the legal remedy by way of a money
judgment is "inadequate" because the funds will be reduced pending final
hearing and, thus, will not be available in their entirety for the purposes for
which they were entrusted to the fiduciary in the first place.5 46 "[T]he court
543. See Zebot & Nelson, supra note 417, at 37 ("Regardless, the availability of temporary
injunctive relief may still be limited by the common law factors governing the propriety of such
relief in a particular jurisdiction. Given that many trust litigation actions involve distributionrelated issues, it may be rare to find circumstances in which there is 'no adequate remedy at law'
for the threatened harm such that a subsequent monetary award of damages would not provide
an adequate remedy to justify immediate injunctive relief. But exceptions exist." (citations
omitted)).
544. See, e.g., Deckert v. Indep. Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940) (holding that
plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction to restrain defendants from transferring assets
during the pendency of the action where plaintiffs stated a claim for final equitable relief and
demonstrated a risk of dissipation of assets by defendants); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin
Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 97-98 (6th Cir. 1982) (upholding preliminary injunction that froze
defendant's assets because it secured plaintiffs' claim for restitution and a constructive trust, the
court stated that "[t]he power of the district court to preserve a fund or property which may be
the subject of a final decree is well established" (citing DeBeers Consol. Mines v. United States,
325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945))); Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177, 189-190 (Ct. App.
1985) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction to enjoin transfer of money as to which a
constructive trust was sought in action alleging breach of fiduciary duty); see 183/620 Grp. Joint
Venture v. SPF Joint Venture, 765 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Sargeantv. Al Saleh,
512 S.W.3d 399, 415 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016); Korn v. Ambassador Homes, Inc., 546 So. 2d 756,
757 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Keeshin v. Schultz, 262 N.E.2d 753, 757 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970);
Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Laughlin, 623 A.2d 854, 856 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
545. See Snook v. Tr. Co. of Ga. Bank of Savannah, 909 F.2d 480 (11th Cir. 1990); Salmon
v. Old Nat'l Bank, No. 4:08CV-116-M, 2010 WL 1463196, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 8, 2010).
546. 183/620 Grp., 875 S.W.2d at 904 (citing Minexa Ariz., Inc. v. Staubach, 667 S.W.2d
563, 567 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)); Gryphon Master Fund, L.P. v. Path 1 Network Techs., Inc., No.
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can be seen as having not only the discretion but the duty, when requested, to
attempt preservation of the property or fund in controversy so that ultimate
success by plaintiffs may not result in a meaningless victory."5 47 Provided the
complaint asserts a cause of action cognizable in equity, the court may
exercise its general equitable powers to enter an asset-preserving preliminary
injunction.5 48 The fact that a complaint seeks money damages or other legal

relief along with equitable relief does not defeat the court's equitable powers
to enter an asset-freezing preliminary injunction.5 49 In such "mixed" relief
cases, however, the preliminary injunction must be ancillary to the plaintiff's
claims for equitable relief 550
The South Carolina Supreme Court followed these principles in
Grosshuesch v. Cramer.5"' In this case, an elderly couple suffering from

dementia brought an action against an employee of their bank who eventually
became the couple's caregiver as well as the trustee of different trusts in which
the couple had assets. 5 2 The defendant transferred substantial assets
(including funds from an investment account) belonging to the couple to
herself and her husband, and she claimed that the couple gifted the assets to
her.553 Through their guardians, the couple sued the defendant to set aside the
transfers and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendant from
exercising any control over the couple's trusts and assets during the

litigation. 554
The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the trial judge's ruling that
the prejudgment attachment statute provided an adequate remedy at law.555
The court maintained that the underlying action was not one at law and the
couple was not seeking an injunction to preserve "another's assets for

3:06 CV 0107 D, 2007 WL 1723703, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2007) (citing Lometa
Bancshares, Inc. v. Potts, 952 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997)); Gatlinv. GXG, Inc., No.
05-93-01852-CV, 1994 WL 137233, at *8 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1994) (citing Minexa, 667
S.W.2d at 567-68).
547. Keeshin, 262 N.E.2d at 757.
548. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 133 (2d Cir. 2014).
549. U.S. ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., 198 F.3d 489, 498 (4th Cir. 1999); Dong
v. Miller, No. 16CV5836NGGJO, 2018 WL 1445573, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2018) (quoting
Paradigm BioDevices, Inc. v. Centinel Spine, Inc., No. 11 CIV. 3489, 2013 WL 1915330, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2013)).
550. Dong, 2018 WL 1445573, at *8; cf Quantum Corp. Funding, Ltd. v. Assist You
Home Health Care Servs. of Va., 144 F. Supp. 2d 241, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting a
preliminary injunction when there was a "nexus" between the injunction and the plaintiff's claim
for equitable relief).
551. 367 S.C. 1, 6, 623 S.E.2d 833 (2005).
552. Id. at 2-3, 623 S.E.2d at 833-34.
553. Id. at 3-4, 623 S.E.2d at 834.
554. Id. at 3, 623 S.E.2d at 834.
555. Id. at 6, 623 S.E.2d at 835 (discussing S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-19-10 (2005)).
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satisfaction of a potential [money] judgment." 5 6 Instead, the case was "an
equitable action in which the assets sought to be preserved, specifically $2
million worth of accounts, monies, and personal property, are the subject of
the instant dispute."5 57 In the court's view, the case "involve[d] the
quintessential hallmark of an injunction: preservation of the property at issue
until the matter has been adjudicated." 5

Whenever

a

beneficiary's

58

action

against

a

trustee,

personal

representative, or fiduciary asserts a claim cognizable in equity as to specific

assets or an equitable remedy involving those assets, the beneficiary should
seek a preliminary injunction that freezes the assets-first to avoid their
dissipation before the conclusion of the case and, second, to further the court's
ability to grant the final relief requested. 559 By doing this, a court may issue a
preliminary injunction restraining a trustee or personal representative from

dissipating trust or estate funds to pay for their legal fees, irrespective of the
existence of an adequate remedy at law.560
In McDevitt v. Wellin, a South Carolina federal district court treated a

trustee and trust protector's motion for payment of interim attorney's fees as
a request for injunctive relief when no statute clearly authorized the award of
such fees.561 In McDevitt, a co-trustee and trust protector of an irrevocable
trust filed a breach of fiduciary duty and conversion lawsuit against three cotrustees and beneficiaries who liquidated all of the trust's assets and
distributed over $95.6 million of those assets to themselves personally.56 2 The
556. Id. at 5, 623 S.E.2d at 835.
557. Id.
558. Id. The supreme court also affirmed the trial judge's findings that the couple had
shown a likelihood of success on the merits and they would suffer irreparable harm if a
preliminary injunction was not issued. Id. at 6, 623 S.E.2d at 835. The court's opinion did not
discuss whether the defendant was financially capable of satisfying a judgment against her for
the return of the funds or assets in question.
559. In Verenes v. Alvanos, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a grantor's breach
of fiduciary duty claims against a former trustee, individually and as former trustee, sounded in
equity when the main purpose of the action was to seek relief that was equitable in nature. 387
S.C. 11, 17-18, 690 S.E.2d 771, 773-74 (2010). The remedies requested in that case included
restitution (restoring funds back into the trust) and disgorgement of commissions and profits. Id
at 17-18, 690 S.E.2d at 774.
560. See, e.g., Greenspan v. Mesirow, 485 N.E.2d 1196, 1201 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); In re
Est. of Reilly, 933 A.2d 830, 834 (D.C. 2007). Contra Zaffirini v. Guerra, No. 04-14-00436CV, 2014 WL 6687236, at *3-4 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2014) (reversing a temporary injunction
that prevented trustees from paying their attorney's fees from the trust in defending breach of
fiduciary duty lawsuit filed by beneficiaries, the court ruled there was no evidence of irreparable
harm or an inadequate legal remedy given that trustees could pay back the money at the end of
the case).
561. McDevitt v. Wellin, No. 2:13-cv-3595, 2016 WL 199626, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 15,
2016).
562. Id. at *1; see Schwartz v. Wellin, No. 2:13-cv-3595, 2014 WL 51212, at *1-2 (D.S.C.
Jan. 7, 2014).
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defendants were the children of the trust settlor, who was then deceased. 563
The plaintiffs' lawsuit sought to remove the defendants from their positions
as co-trustees and to compel them to restore the trust's assets to the trust and
compensate the trust for lost appreciation damages of approximately $42

million. 564 The defendants held funds in certain accounts and used millions of
dollars of the trust's assets to pay their own attorneys, experts, and consultants
in the litigation. 565
During the litigation, the McDevitt plaintiffs moved for payment of

interim trustee fees, trust protector fees, and attorneys' fees and expenses from
the trust assets that were under the defendants' control. 566 Because the trust
contained a choice of law provision stating it was governed by South Dakota
law, the plaintiffs brought their motion under that state's version of UTC
§ 706(c), which governs the removal of trustees.567 Critically, South Dakota
had yet to enact its own version of UTC § 1004, which means there was no
clear statutory basis for the district court to award attorney's fees and
expenses. 568 The Comments to § 706 include a reference to § 1004, thereby
suggesting it may be appropriate for the court to intervene pending a final
decision on a request to remove a trustee under § 706 and make an interim

award of fees and expenses to the moving party under § 1004.569 Although the
district court acknowledged both the Comments' reference to § 1004 and

§ 1004's authorization to "award attorneys' fees as justice and equity may
require," the court did not apply that section or standard in resolving the
plaintiffs' motion. 570

Instead, the district court in McDevitt held the plaintiffs' motion
constituted a request for injunctive relief pursuant to the court's general equity
power and, as such, the plaintiffs were required to satisfy the elements
necessary for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 571In the Fourth Circuit,
a preliminary injunction consists of four elements: (1) the movant is likely to
succeed on the merits, (2) the movant is likely to suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of the equities tips in its
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
request to

McDevitt, 2016 WL 199626, at *1 n.1.
Id. at *1, *5.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at n.3. The South Dakota statute provides that "[p]ending a final decision on a
remove a trustee, the court may order such appropriate relief as may be necessary to
protect the trust property or the interests of the beneficiaries." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-3-20.1
(West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.).
568. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-3-1 to -4-58 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg.

Sess.).
569. UNIF. TR. CODE § 706 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2018) ("Pursuant to [§] 1004, the court
may also award attorney's fees as justice and equity may require.").
570. McDevitt, 2016 WL 199626, at *4 n.5.
571. See id. at *4.
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favor, and (4) the injunction is in the public interest.57 2 Because the plaintiffs'
motion included a request for the segregation of trust assets or funds for the
payment of ongoing or future fees and expenses, the district court further
treated the motion as a request for a mandatory-rather than prohibitoryinjunction, which is subject to a "heightened" or more exacting standard.5 73
By applying this heightened standard to the criteria, the district court
denied the plaintiffs' motion based on its finding they could not satisfy the
"irreparable harm" element.5 74 The court reached this conclusion primarily
because the special administrator for the settlor's estate entered an agreement
with the plaintiffs that obligated the estate to both advance the plaintiffs' fees
and expenses incurred in the litigation with the defendants and to relieve the
plaintiffs of any obligation to repay those advances if they were unsuccessful
in recovering the fees and expenses from the defendants.5 75 As a result, the
district court determined "there [was] no real risk that the trust plaintiffs
[would] go unpaid in this case," thus defeating any assertion of irreparable
harm to the plaintiffs if their motion was denied.5 76

The outcome of the motion in McDevitt may have been different if the
district court considered South Dakota's version of UTC § 706(c) to be an
independent source of power explicitly authorizing it to award attorney's fees
and expenses, rather than simply a codification of the court's inherent or
general equitable power which requires satisfaction of the elements necessary
for a mandatory injunction. 7 7 Likewise, the outcome would have been
572. Id. In comparison, South Carolina state courts traditionally require a three-part
showing to support the issuance of a preliminary injunction: (1) the movant will suffer
irreparable harm without such relief, (2) it has a likelihood of success on the merits, and (3) there
is no adequate remedy at law. Poynter Invs., Inc. v. Century Builders of Piedmont, Inc., 387 S.C.
583, 586-87, 694 S.E.2d 15, 17 (2010). The "balancing the equities" requirement utilized by the
federal courts is unnecessary as it is "subsumed by the irreparable harm and inadequate remedy
at law components of the three-part test." Id. at 587, 694 S.E.2d at 17.
573. McDevitt, 2016 WL 199626, at *4. The district court observed that "[w]hereas
'prohibitory injunctions aim to maintain the status quo,' . . '[m]andatory preliminary
injunctions generally do not [ ] and normally should be granted only in those circumstances
when the exigencies of the situation demand such relief."' Id. (first quoting Pashby v. Delia, 709
F.3d 307, 319 (4th Cir. 2013); then quoting E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828
(4th Cir. 2004); and then citing Vollette v. Watson, No. 2:12CV231, 2012 WL 3026360, at *3
(E.D. Va. July 24, 2012)).
574. Id. at *6. Because the court ruled against the plaintiffs on the irreparable harm
element, it did not reach or analyze the other elements necessary for a preliminary injunction.
575. See id. at *5.
576. Id.
577. Id. at *3 (holding that § "55-3-20.1 does not provide an independent basis for any
court action, but simply confirms the availability of the court's general equitable power" and
concluding "that section 55-3-20.1 does not provide the court with an independent source of
equitable power."). Earlier in the same litigation, the district court ruled that § 55-3-20.1 "does
not expressly authorize court-ordered injunctive relief," but "simply codifies a court's inherent

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss1/8

86

Blanchard: Attorney's Fees in Judicial Proceedings Involving Trusts, Estates
2020]

ATTORNEY'S FEES IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

231

different if South Dakota enacted UTC § 1004 because the fee statutes derived
from this section constitute an independent source of power explicitly
authorizing the court to award fees and expenses.5 78
X.

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FEE APPLICATIONS

The terms of the fee statutes derived from UTC § 1004 are silent on many
procedural matters involving fee applications including when and how an
applicant must raise a request for attorney's fees, whether a party is entitled
to a jury trial on such a request, what type of evidentiary hearing is necessary
or proper to resolve a contested application for fees, and the degree of scrutiny
that an appellate court will give to a subordinate court's fee award on appeal.
Case law has addressed some of these procedural questions, while others
remain unsettled.
A.

Procedurefor Applying for Fees Once Merits of Action Decided

The fee statutes based on UTC

§ 1004 do not speak to the timing or

method of requesting fees after the merits of the action are decided. 579 The
statutes also do not discuss whether a request for fees against another party is
an element of damages to be proven at trial on the merits of the underlying
claims or if it is a collateral matter to be determined following an adjudication
of the merits. 580 In this same vein, they do not indicate whether a request for
fees must be specifically pled as special damages, raised as an affirmative
claim or counterclaim in a party's pleading, or raised for the first time in a
'

post-trial or post-judgment motion.58
In determining a party's statutory request for an award of fees against an

opposing party at the conclusion of litigation, South Carolina cases have
generally treated such a request as a motion to tax costs under Rule 54(d) of
the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure5 82 or a motion to alter or amend
power by reiterating that the court may award appropriate relief to parties before it." Schwartz
v. Wellin, No. 2:13-CV-3595, 2014 WL 51212, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 2014).
578. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1004 (2009).
579. See, e.g., id
580. See, e.g., id
581. See, e.g., id.
582. Berlinsky v. Berlinsky, No. 2013-GC-10-0150, 2019 WL 7212469, at *4 (S.C. Ct.
Com. Pl. Dec. 20, 2019). South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) states that "[a] motion
for costs, supported by an affidavit that the costs are correct and were necessarily incurred in the
action, may be filed by the prevailing party within 10 days of the receipt of written notice of the
entry of final judgment," and "[u]pon allowance, the costs shall be included in the judgment or
decree." S.C. R. Civ. P. 54(d). Rule 54(e)(1), which is entitled "Costs Authorized by Statute and
Sanctions Imposed in Favor of Prevailing Party," also states that "[a]ll sanctions including
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the judgment under Rule 59(e) of the same rules. 583 Under the state rule, a
properly supported motion for attorney's fees must be filed no later than ten
days after the termination of the action or the court loses jurisdiction to award
such fees. 584 In following this rule, a South Carolina trial court dismissed a
party's request for attorney's fees under

§ 62-5-105 when the party failed to

file a motion for fees within ten days after the opposing party voluntarily
dismissed the action. 585
Other cases across the state involving the recovery of attorney's fees
under contract provisions indicate that the request must be specifically pled as
special damages. 58 6 In a case involving an attorney's claim for attorney's fees
in representing a class of plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held the attorney waived his right to recover such fees by
failing to raise the request in his pleading, presumably based on the conclusion
(although not explicitly stated) that the fees were part of the underlying
substantive claim and, therefore, must be specifically pled as an element of
damages. 58 7 Although the attorney raised the issue of attorney's fees on
appeal, he did not plead a claim for fees to the trial court. 588 Further, the

reasonable attorney[']s fees, if ordered, imposed upon another party and in favor of the
prevailing party under any statute or Rule of Civil Procedure are taxable" as costs. Id. r. 54(e)(1).
583. Berlinsky, 2019 WL 7212469, at *4; see Lollis v. Dutton, 421 S.C. 467, 486-87, 807
S.E.2d 723, 733 (Ct. App. 2017) (citing Rules 54(d) and 59(e) as support for holding that a posttrial motion sufficiently raised requests for attorney's fees pursuant to two statutes and a rule);
see also Belton v. State, 339 S.C. 71, 73, 529 S.E.2d 4, 5 (2000) (observing generally that
attorney's fees may be taxed as costs under Rule 54 if otherwise allowed by statute or rule);
Hueble v. S.C. Dep't of Nat. Res., 416 S.C. 220, 236 n.9, 785 S.E.2d 461, 469 n.9 (2016)
(Kittredge, J., dissenting) (citing id.) (same).
584. Berlinsky, 2019 WL 7212469, at *4; see Pitman v. Republic Leasing Co., Inc., 351
S.C. 429, 430, 432, 570 S.E.2d 187, 188-89 (Ct. App. 2002) (requesting for attorney's fees as
sanctions under the South Carolina Frivolous Proceedings Sanctions Act (FCPSA)); cf In re
Beard, 359 S.C. 351, 359-60, 597 S.E.2d 835, 839 (Ct. App. 2004) (distinguishing between
motions requesting attorney's fees as sanctions under the FCPSA and S.C. R. Civ. P. 11, the
court held that a motion under the former must be made within the ten day limitation for postjudgment motions while motions under the latter are not required to be made within the ten day
limitation); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, 370 S.C. 5, 20 n.11, 633 S.E.2d 722, 730 n.11 (2006)
(same). This ten-day limitation does not govem when the trial court retained jurisdiction over
the question of attorney's fees, such as by granting a party leave to file a motion for fees or by
reserving the matter of attorney's fees for future determination. See Jackson v. Speed, 326 S.C.
289, 299-300, 486 S.E.2d 750, 755 (1997); Hardaway Concrete Co., Inc. v. Hall Contracting
Corp., 374 S.C. 216, 233, 647 S.E.2d 488, 497 (Ct. App. 2007); Baird Pac. W. v. Blue Water
Sunset Park, Inc., No. 2004-UP-011, 2004 WL 6248287, at *5 (S.C. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2004).
585. See Berlinsky, 2019 WL 7212469, at *4-5, *9.
586. See infra notes 587-560 and accompanying text.
587. See Premium Inv. Corp. v. Green, 283 S.C. 464, 467, 474, 324 S.E.2d 72, 74, 78 (Ct.
App. 1984) (citing Glass v. Glass, 276 S.C. 625, 628, 281 S.E.2d 221, 222 (1981)).
588. See id.
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court's opinion does not indicate whether the attorney filed a post-trial motion
in the trial court seeking an award of attorney's fees. 589
In a later case involving an award of attorney's fees based on a provision
in an option contract, the South Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the
argument that a special referee improperly awarded attorney's fees to the
prevailing party when that party's complaint requested "an award of

attorney's fees and costs for the maintenance of this action which has been
occasioned by [the opposing party's] actions and conduct[]" but did not
specifically plead the contract between the parties as the basis for its claim. 590
The court stressed that (1) the prevailing party commenced the action to
determine the validity of the option pursuant to the contract, (2) the contract
allowed any prevailing party to seek attorney's fees in an action to enforce
any right under the contract, and (3) the prevailing party requested attorney's
fees in its pleading. 59 1 Therefore, the opposing party was on notice that the

prevailing party would be seeking fees if successful. 592
The Tennessee Court of Appeals likewise rejected the argument that a
request for attorney's fees under that state's version of UTC § 1004 must be
specifically pled as special damages, although it reached this decision
primarily because the objecting party failed to raise the issue in the lower
court. 593 The court observed that Tennessee's rule (which would normally
require requests for attorney's fees be specifically pled as special damages) is
relaxed or modified (1) when the recovery of fees is statutorily authorized,
putting the parties on notice that fees may be recovered from another party
and (2) when the party seeking fees files a timely post-trial motion for
approval following the issuance of the court's judgment. 594

The federal rule differs from the South Carolina state rule. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(A) provides that "[a] claim for attorney's fees and
related nontaxable expenses must be made by motion unless the substantive
law requires those fees to be proved at trial as an element of damages." 595 The
rule further states that "[u]nless a statute or a court order provides otherwise,

589. See id.
590. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Hartough, 375 S.C. 541, 550-51, 654 S.E.2d 87, 91-92 (Ct.
App. 2007).
591. Id. at 551, 654 S.E.2d at 92.
592. Id.
593. Duke v. Simmons, No. M2008-01967-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 1175114, at *5
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2009).
594. Id. at *4-5 (citing Marshall v. First Nat'l Bank of Lewisburg, 622 S.W.2d 558, 561
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)); see also George v. Dunn, No. E2015-02312-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL
6471334, at *8 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2016).
595. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A).
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the motion must . .. be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of
judgment[.]"59 6
Consequently, if a request for attorney's fees under §§ 62-1-111, 62-5105, or 62-7-1004 is deemed to be part of the substantive law governing the

action, then the federal rule holds such fees are an element of damages that
must be claimed in a pleading and proved at trial and cannot be raised by postjudgment motion. 59 7 If a request for fees under those statutes is considered
collateral to the merits of the action, however, then the federal rule allows for
the request to be raised in a post-judgment motion. 598 In applying Rule 54(d),

federal courts have distinguished between requests for fees under a contract
(which generally, but not always, are treated as part of the merits under the
substantive law) and requests for fees under a prevailing party statute (which
are collateral to the merits of the litigation). 599
Because §§ 62-1-111, 62-5-105, and 62-7-1004 do not indicate whether a
request for fees is an element of damages under the substantive law or a matter
collateral to the merits, the law is unsettled as to whether a party must include
a request for attorney's fees in its pleading or if it may wait to raise the matter
in a post-trial or post-judgment motion. 600 It appears it is best to allow a party

to make such a request by motion after judgment is entered, provided the
596. Id. r. 54(d)(2)(B)(i). Importantly, this 14-day period does not begin running until the
court has entered a "judgment" in the case, which is an "order from which an appeal lies."
W.A.K., II ex rel. Karo v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 3:09CV575, 2010 WL 2976518, at *4 n.1
(E.D. Va. July 19, 2010). The federal rule elaborates that the motion must "specify the judgment
and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the movant to the award," "state the amount
sought or provide a fair estimate of it," and "disclose, if the court so orders, the terms of any
agreement about fees for the services for which the claim is made." FED. R. Civ. P.
54(d)(2)(B)(ii)-(iv). Rule 54(d)(2)(D) also provides that "[b]y local rule, the court may establish
special procedures to resolve fee-related issues without extensive evidentiary hearings." Id.
r. 54(d)(2)(D).
597. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A).
598. Id. r. 54(d)(2)(A)-(B)(i).
599. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Dynegy Mktg. & Trade, 415 F.3d 354, 358-59,
361 (4th Cir. 2005), abrogatedon other grounds by Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension
Fund of Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs & Participating Emps., 571 U.S. 177 (2014);
Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 740 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (5th Cir. 2014); Sequoia Fin. Sols.,
Inc. v. Warren, 660 F. App'x 725, 728 (11th Cir. 2016); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Fam.
Ventures, LLC, 682 F. App'x 921, 927 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The Comments to the 1993 amendments
to Rule 54(d) explain that subdivision (2) was added to that rule "to provide for a frequently
recurring form of litigation not initially contemplated by the rules-disputes over the amount of
attorneys' fees to be awarded in the large number of actions in which prevailing parties may be
entitled to such awards or in which the court must determine the fees to be paid from a common
fund." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) cmt. to 1993 amend. However, "it does not . . apply to fees
recoverable as an element of damages, as when sought under the terms of a contract; such
damages typically are to be claimed in a pleading and may involve issues to be resolved by a
jury." Id r. 54(d)(2) cmt. to 1993 Amend. "Nor . . does it apply to awards of fees as sanctions
authorized or mandated under these rules or under 28 U.S.C. § 1927." Id.
600. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-111, -5-105, -7-1004 (2009).
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motion is made within the ten day limitation of Rules 54(d) and 59(e) in the
state court or within the fourteen day limit under Rule 54(d)(2) in the federal
courts.

Sections 62-1-111, 62-5-105, and 62-7-1004 all refer to the attorney's
fees that can be awarded using the "costs and expenses" language. 601 When
the substantive law governing an action provides for attorney's fees as a
recoverable cost as opposed to an element of damages, a request for such fees
need not be asserted in a pleading.60 2 Additionally, although these sections are
not dependent on prevailing party status, the factors courts must consider to

determine entitlement of an award of fees and costs, as well as to establish the
reasonableness of the amount to be awarded under those statutes, include the
beneficial result obtained by the litigation and prevailing party concepts. 603
Determining these factors before the merits of the underlying litigation have
been resolved would be impractical. 604 As such, there is no logical reason to
require that a party either plead a request for attorney's fees and costs or offer
evidence proving the fees and expenses during the trial on the merits of the
underlying claims. 605
In Garwood v. Garwood, the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed a

request for attorney's fees and costs under Wyoming's version of UTC

§ 1004.606 In this case, trustees argued the trial court did not have jurisdiction
under the statute to order them to reimburse amounts they withdrew from the
trust for payment of their attorney's fees and costs in litigation adverse to the
settlor, especially when the settlor did not raise the request for attorney's fees

601. Id. §§ 62-1-111, -5-105, -7-1004 (stating that the court "may award costs and
expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees").
602. See Perry v. Serenity Behav. Health Sys., No. CV106-172, 2009 WL 1259367, at *2
n.5 (S.D. Ga. May 6, 2009); Riordan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. CV 07-38-MDWM, 2008 WL 2512023, at *2-3 (D. Mont. June 20, 2008), aff'd, 589 F.3d 999 (9th Cir.
2009); NGM Ins. Co. v. Carolina's Power Wash & Painting, LLC, No. 2:08-CV-3378, 2010
WL 3258145, at *3-5 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2010); see also In re Joseph A. Bulger Living Tr., 394
P.3d 898, at *9 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017) (treating attorney's fees and guardians ad litem fees as an
element of costs, rather than part of the merits judgment).
603. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-111, -5-105, -7-1004; Atwoodv. Atwood, 25 P.3d 936,
947 (Okla. Ct. App. 2001).
604. See Carolina's Power, 415 F.3d at 361 (treating a claim for attorney's fees as a
collateral issue, rather than as part of the merits of the action, makes sense when the fees are
sought as costs for prosecuting an underlying litigation).
605. When it is known that attorney's fees is an issue in the case, it is not uncommon for
the parties in state court cases to stipulate before the trial that the court will reserve the issue of
attorney's fees for determination after the trial so the parties are not having to litigate that
question during the trial of the underlying claims. See, e.g., Vick v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 347
S.C. 470, 483 n.6, 556 S.E.2d 693, 700 n.6 (Ct. App. 2001).
606. 233 P.3d 977, 985 (Wyo. 2010).
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until a post-judgment motion. 607 In rejecting this argument, the court
observed:
The question of attorneys' fees and costs in a given civil action is a
common issue that a trial court may address, and it does not, as
suggested by the Trustees, require the filing of a separate action or a
motion to amend a judgment. The issue may be addressed as an
element of damages, or it may be addressed, as it was in this case,
through the filing of a post-judgment motion, as described in Rule
54.608

The court further held that "[t]he issue of attorneys' fees and costs was
properly placed before the district court by [the settlor's] timely filing of a
post-judgment application for fees and costs, and the court thus had authority
to address the issue in the action before it." 609

Similarly, in Khalsa v. Puri, the New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected
a trust beneficiary's argument that the trustees waived their claim to attorney's
fees and costs by failing to request them in their pleadings. 610 Instead, the
trustees made their request for fees and costs in a post-judgment motion. 611
Moreover, in Gray v. Gray, the court denied a trust beneficiary's motion
to dismiss the trustee's counterclaim for indemnification in which the trustee
sought reimbursement of attorney's fees, expenses, and costs incurred in
defending against the beneficiary's action, alleging the trustee breached his
fiduciary duties and requesting his removal as trustee. 612 The trustee's
counterclaim was based, in part, on New Hampshire's versions of UTC
§§ 709 and 1004.613 Applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2), the
court rejected the beneficiary's arguments, first that the trustee's counterclaim
was premature until the beneficiary's underlying claims were adjudicated and
second, that the trustee could not request fees under the statutes through a
counterclaim but must do so instead through a motion under Rule 54(d)(2) at
the end of the case. 614
The court acknowledged but did not decide the issue of whether fees
under the statutes are part of the substantive law that must be proved as an
element of damages at trial. 615 Regardless, the court held that a counterclaim
607.
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.
614.
615.

Id. at 983-94.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
344 P.3d 1036, 1053 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014).
Id.
No. 18-CV-522-JD, 2019 WL 2106390, at *5 (D.N.H. May 14, 2019).
Id.
Id. at *3, *5.
See id. at *5.
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"for attorneys' fees and expenses puts the parties on notice that [the
beneficiary] is claiming them and does not preclude [the beneficiary] from
later filing a motion under Rule 54(d)(2), if appropriate" and, therefore, the
trustee in Gray "ha[d] not shown that the counterclaim [should] be dismissed
in favor of a later motion under Rule 54(d)(2)." 616
B.

Fee Question is In the Province of the Court

The decision involving whether to award attorney's fees under a statute
patterned on UTC § 1004 belongs to the court; no party is entitled to a jury
trial.617 In Ralph Anderson Family Trust v. Anderson, the jury returned a

verdict finding that a co-trustee breached her fiduciary duties and wrongfully
distributed trust assets. 618 The jury's special verdict form indicated that the
co-trustee's actions caused damages to the trust in the total amount of
"$305,000.00 and no other damages." 61 9 Based on this verdict form, the co-

trustee argued that the jury concluded the attorney's fees and costs were
unwarranted. 620 In rejecting this argument and holding it "will not consider

the jury's restriction or whether the jury intended to limit any award of
attorney fees," the court observed that "[w]hether to award attorney fees is
within the province of the Court, not the jury."
C.

62

1

Needfor EvidentiaryHearing

Courts have ruled that at least some form of a hearing is necessary prior
to an award of attorney's fees in contested cases under the statute, although a
full blown evidentiary hearing with live testimony may not be required,

particularly where the award of fees is being considered by the judge who
presided over the trial on the merits. 622 In Klinkerfuss v. Cronin, the Missouri
616. Id.
617. See Ralph Anderson Fam. Tr. v. Anderson, No. BDV 2017-29, 2018 WL 6721944, at
*1 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Sept. 28, 2018).
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. Id.
621. Id.
622. In re Est. of King, 920 N.E.2d 820, 828 (Mass. 2010); see also In re Alice Stedman
1989 Tr. 2013 Restatement, No. 2017-0288, 2018 WL 3862925, at *3 (N.H. Aug. 15, 2018)
(affirming trial court's denial of party's request for evidentiary hearing involving award of
attorney's fees); In re Rayola A. Banfield Irrevocable Tr., No. 321204, 2016 WL 3020798, at
*16 (Mich. Ct. App. May 24, 2016) (suggesting that submission of attorney's itemized billing
statements, which included description of services rendered, may have been sufficient to
establish reasonableness of attorney's fees when opponent was given an opportunity to crossexamine the attorney regarding the entries and failed to so); cf Seabrook Island Prop. Owners'

Published by Scholar Commons,

93

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 8
238

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 72: 145]

Court of Appeals held the trial court was correct to determine the reasonable
amount of attorney's fees by way of affidavit and documentary evidence
rather than oral testimony at a hearing. 623
D. Appellate Review of Fee Awards andRecovery ofAppellate Fees

The trial judge is typically in the best position to evaluate the nature of
the case, the conduct of the litigation, the amount of time reasonably required
to litigate it, and the fair value of the attorney's services. 624 As a result,
appellate courts are generally deferential to trial court awards of attorney's
fees and costs. 625 Because a trial judge possesses a broad degree of discretion
in such matters, the judge's decision "may be presumed to be right and
ordinarily ought not to be disturbed."6 2 6 The appellate court will not simply
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.627 Rather, "[t]here are many
variables a trial court may consider when determining an award of attorney's
fees and even a significantly lower award than the amount of the fees
requested will not constitute an abuse of discretion."6 28
Despite this deference to the trial court, South Carolina cases make clear
that when a statute authorizes an award of attorney's fees, the trial court must
make specific findings of fact on the record for each of the required factors to
Ass'n v. Berger, 365 S.C. 234, 244, 616 S.E.2d 431, 436 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a trial
judge, in the exercise of discretion in an award of attorney's fees under a contract between the
parties, is not required to take live testimony, provided the adverse party is allowed to present a
full and complete presentation against the award of attorney's fees by affidavits). But see Ralph
Anderson Fam. Tr., 2018 WL 6721944, at *2 ("[P]riorto making any award, the Court will hold
an evidentiary hearing where the parties may present testimony and argument as to the proper
amount of attorney fees to be awarded.").
623. 289 S.W.3d 607, 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
624. E.g., Brady v. Citizens Union Sav. Bank, 71 N.E.3d 925, 927 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017).
625. Stmnd v. Hubbard, 576 N.E.2d 688, 690 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); see Young v. Young,
No. CA 08-212, 2008 WL 5176763, at *8 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2008) (citing Meyer v. CDI
Contractors, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 530, 536 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008)); Winstonv. Winston, 449 S.W.3d
1, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Rosehill Gardens, Inc. v. Luttrell, 67 S.W.3d 641, 648 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2002)).
626. King, 920 N.E.2d at 827 (quoting Smithv. Smith, 282 N.E.2d 412, 415 (Mass. 1972));
see Alves v. Snow, 40 N.E.3d 1056, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) ("This court generally defers
to a judge's setting of counsel fees and therefore presumes an award under § 45 is proper unless
the record reflects otherwise."); In re Gene Wild Revocable Tr., 299 S.W.3d 767, 782 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2009) ("An award of attorney's fees is presumed to be correct, with the burden on the
complaining party to prove otherwise." (citing Scott v. Blue Springs Ford Sales, Inc., 215
S.W.3d 145, 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006))).
627. Morrow v. SunTrust Bank, No. W2010-01547-COA-R3CV, 2011 WL 334507, at
*8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2011).
628. In re Henry B. Wilson, Jr., Revocable Tr. Dated June 27, 2002, Nos. A-15-1014, A15-1015, 2017 WL 5608085, at *14 (Neb. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2017), aff'd on othergrounds sub
nom. In re Wilson, 915 N.W.2d 50 (Neb. 2018).
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be considered.6 29 Upon appeal, "[i]f . . there is inadequate evidentiary
support for each of the factors supporting the [trial] court's decision, the
appellate court should reverse and remand so the trial court may make specific
findings of fact." 630 As a result, appellate courts have reversed lower court
rulings involving awards of attorney's fees when the lower courts did not
attempt to analyze the relevant factors in making the awards. 631
The fees recoverable under the statutes based on UTC § 1004 include
appellate attorney's fees. 632 However, parties intending to appeal an order

must first be sure that the order is final and appealable. South Carolina law
generally holds that a judgment or order must be final before it can be
appealed.633 If there is some further act that must be done by the court before
a determination of the rights of the parties is made, then the order is
interlocutory and not immediately appealable. 634
The Iowa Court of Appeals in In re BarbaraMills Trust DatedApril 16,
2015 dismissed a trustee's appeal from an order requiring her to personally
pay the beneficiaries' attorney's fees and costs. 635 An Iowa statute derived

from UTC § 1004 controlled the dismissal on the grounds that the trial court's
order was not final.636 The order maintained that an award of attorney's fees
and costs was "appropriate," directed the attorneys for the beneficiaries to
629. McKinney v. Pedery, 413 S.C. 475, 490, 776 S.E.2d 566, 574 (2015) (first quoting
Griffith v. Griffith, 332 S.C. 630, 646, 506 S.E.2d 534-535 (Ct. App. 1998); then citing
Blumberg v. Nealco, Inc., 310 S.C. 492, 494, 427 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1993); and then citing
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 279 S.C. 454, 457-58, 309 S.E.2d 14, 16 (Ct. App. 1983)); see also
Vander Boeghv. Bank of Okla., No. 2016-CA-001307-MR, 2019 WL 1495712, at *12 (Ky. Ct.
App. Apr. 5, 2019). In Regions Bank v. Lowrey, the Alabama Supreme Court construed that
state's version of § 709(a)(1) and held that "a trial court's order regarding an attorney fee must
allow for meaningful appellate review by articulating the decisions made, the reasons supporting
those decisions, and how it calculated the attorney fee." 154 So. 3 d 101, 109 (Ala. 2014) (citing
of Birmingham v. Hom, 810 So. 2d 667, 682 (Ala. 2001)).
630. McKinney, 413 S.C. at 489-90, 776 S.E.2d at 574 (citing Griffith, 332 S.C. at 646,
506 S.E.2d at 535).
631. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 889 N.E.2d 374, 387-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing
trial court's reduction of attorney's fees awarded to trust beneficiary from $29,628.69 to
$4,000.00 when trial court provided an insufficient explanation to justify the significant
reduction).
632. See Duvalv. Fox, No. 13-0542, 2013 WL 6700352, at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 18,
2013); O'Riley v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 412 S.W.3d 400, 419-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); In re
Boenker, No. ED 106929, 2019 WL 2590963, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. June 25, 2019); Goza v.
SunTrust Bank, No. W2014-00635-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 4481267, at *6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App.
July 22, 2015); Andertonv. Boren, 414 P.3d 508, 516-517 (Utah Ct. App. 2017).
633. Culbertson v. Clemens, 322 S.C. 20, 23, 471 S.E.2d 163, 164 (1996) (citing Bolding
v. Bolding, 283 S.C. 501, 502, 323 S.E.2d 535, 536 (Ct. App. 1984)).
634. Mid-State Distribs., Inc. v. Century Imps., Inc., 310 S.C. 330, 335, 426 S.E.2d 777,
780 (1993) (citing Adickes v. Allison, 21 S.C. 245, 259 (1884)).
635. No. 17-0610, 2017 WL 3525311, at *1-2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2017).
636. Id. at *1.
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submit fee affidavits, and stated that "[u]pon receipt of the affidavits, the
Court will enter a judgment for fees against [the trustee] personally." 637
However, the trustee appealed the order before the trial court determined the
amount of attorney's fees or entered a judgment. 638 The appellate court

dismissed the appeal because the order did not fully resolve the attorney's fees
issue.6 39
XI. CONCLUSION
Patterned after UTC

§ 1004, the SCTC and SCPC grant trial courts

sweeping authority and discretion to award attorney's fees and costs to any
party "as justice and equity may require" in judicial proceedings involving the

administration of a trust and in formal proceedings commenced in the probate
court. 640 Although the statutes themselves provide no guideposts to trial
judges in applying and interpreting the "justice and equity" standard and there
is scant interpretative case law in South Carolina, case law from other
jurisdictions with similar enactments of the uniform statute provide useful
guidance and should be especially persuasive. 641 These decisions elucidate a
flexible standard to arrive at what is just and equitable on a case by case basis.
The statutes are permissive rather than mandatory. 642 Courts should not
simply rubber-stamp requests for fees and costs or grant them as a matter of
course. By requiring a reason, grounded in equity, as to why an award of fees

and costs should be made, the standard contemplates a principled basis for the
decision.
In deciding the question of entitlement to fees and costs, the commonly
expressed considerations draw attention to (1) the respective reasonableness
of the parties' positions and their conduct in the litigation, (2) the parties'
relative ability to bear the financial burden, (3) the results or outcome of the
litigation, and (4) the punitive or deterrent effect of the award. No single factor
is dispositive. 643 Moreover, courts may also consider additional factors
attuned to the particular facts and circumstances presented to them. 644 The
standard is capacious, and courts are not immured by rigid criteria or
formulaic analysis. 645

637. Id.
638. Id.
639. Id.
640. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-111, -5-105, -7-1004 (2009).
641. See id. §§ 62-1-111, -7-1004; see, e.g., Atwood v. Atwood, 25 P.3d 936, 947 (Okla.
Ct. App. 2001); Shurtleff v. United Effort Plan Trust, 289 P.3d 408, 415-16 (Utah 2012).
642. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-111, -5-105, -7-1004.
643. See Atwood, 25 P.3d at 947.
644. See, e.g., id
645. See, e.g., id
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Although a showing of egregious conduct, such as bad faith, fraud, or
intentional misconduct, is not a prerequisite to recovery of fees and costs, the
presence of such conduct is among the factors to be considered and
weighed. 646 Additionally, punishment of past misbehavior or deterrence of
future misconduct may, but need not, animate an award of fees and costs. 647
Entitlement to fees and costs is not dependent on prevailing party concepts,

though who prevailed on the merits of the case is an important
consideration. 648

Vast disparities in resources available to pay legal costs may inhibit
enforcement of rights relating to a trust or estate. Thus, interim awards of fees
and costs during the proceedings, as well as final awards at the conclusion of
the proceedings, can level the playing field. 649 On one hand, courts risk
hindering access to the judicial system for all individuals by awarding fees
and costs against parties with reasonable grounds or probable cause for
exercising their right to litigate a dispute in good faith, even if ultimately not
meritorious. 65 0 On the other hand, denying awards of fees and costs to those
who necessarily had to prevail in arduous litigation to vindicate a right
involving a trust or estate may discourage other wronged parties from

enforcing their rights due to prohibitive legal costs. Thus, a failure to award
fees and costs can have a deterrent effect. Moreover, a victory in trust or estate
litigation may be a hollow achievement if the legal fees and costs are allowed
to deplete the estate or trust, thereby thwarting the estate plan or trustpurposes
altogether.
Trustees, personal representatives, and other fiduciaries should have less
difficulty than beneficiaries or other persons in obtaining payment or
reimbursement of their attorney's fees from the trust or estate because they
have different obligations and interests. Unlike a beneficiary, the trustee or
personal representative has no personal stake in the trust or estate assets;
rather, the trustee has a fiduciary duty to protect and defend the trust or estate
for the benefit of others. 651

When deciding

a trustee's or personal

646. See id.
647. See id. at 948; Klinkerfuss v. Cronin, 289 S.W.3d 607, 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
648. See Atwood, 25 P.3d at 947.
649. See, e.g., Counsell v Colfack, No. 040400326, 2007 WL 3237069 (UtahDist. Ct. June
22, 2007) (In awarding attorney's fees and costs to trustbeneficiary to be paid by the trustee, the
court found "that [the beneficiary] has financial need and cannot afford to pay all of the
attorney's fees required to bring this matter to trial, while [the trustee] is gainfully employed and
is capable of assisting [the beneficiary] in this matter.").
650. Cf Est. of Clark v. Foster & Good Funeral Home, Inc., 568 N.E.2d 1098, 1100-01
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that one of the purposes of a fee shifting statute is to allow
litigation in good faith without the associated expense); Hill v. Cox, 424 S.E.2d 201, 205 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the trial court has discretion to allow attorney fees even for
unsuccessful parties where a proceeding has "substantial merit").
651. See Trustee, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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representative's entitlement to payment or reimbursement of fees and
expenses from the trust or estate, the more lenient standard of the common
law, as codified in UTC § 709(a)(1), should govern over the fee-shifting
standard of UTC § 1004.
The trustee or personal representative should also be entitled to payment
or reimbursement from the trust or estate for attorney's fees and expenses

which the trustee or personal representative, acting reasonably and in good
faith, incurred in defending their administration of the trust or estate. The
payment or reimbursement of these fees and expenses should not be
dependent on whether the trustee or personal representative was successful in
the proceeding. Rather, their good faith in prosecuting or defending the action
and the reasonableness of the fees and costs should be the determinative
considerations. However, when deciding a trustee's or personal
representative's request for payment or reimbursement of fees and expenses
from another party to the proceeding (such as a beneficiary or fellow

fiduciary) or when calculating a beneficiary's entitlement to payment of fees
or costs, UTC § 1004's justice and equity analysis should control.
Parties to judicial proceedings must be conscientious of any choice of law
provisions that may alter the rules involving entitlement to attorney's fees and
costs. If this occurs, state public policy may render such provisions
unenforceable.
In calculating the specific amount of fees and costs to award, the critical
inquiry involves evaluating the reasonable time expended in litigating the case
and multiplying that number by a reasonable hourly rate, with adjustments to
be made depending on any exceptional circumstances.65

2

Courts must be

mindful of the size of the estate or trust and vigilant that their award does not
upset or defeat the estate plan or the purposes of the trust; they must carefully
scrutinize the requested fees and costs, especially when they will be borne by
a losing party or the trust or estate. 653 Unreasonable hourly rates will be
rejected. 654 Redundant or excessive billings, time spent unnecessarily, or time
expended on unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones should be
excised. 655 It remains to be seen whether courts will judicially engraft upon
the SCTC and SCPC the same "strictly conservative principles" adopted by
Massachusetts's courts in applying § 45 of the General Laws of
Massachusetts, which is the statutory forerunner to the uniform provision.

652. Layman v. State, 376 S.C. 434, 457, 658 S.E.2d 320, 332 (2008).
653. Cf O'Riley v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 412 S.W.3d 400, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (stating
that justice and equity required that trustee recover the expenses it incurred in defending against
beneficiaries' claims because by defending its conduct, it defends the settlor's intent).
654. See Layman, 376 S.C. at 457, 658 S.E.2d at 332 (rejecting the circuit court's award
of attorney's fees that resulted in an hourly rate of $6,000).
655. Atwood v. Atwood, 25 P.3d 936, 952 (Okla. Ct. App. 2001).
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The statutes also give courts great latitude in deciding who is responsible
for paying or bearing the fees and costs-whether one or more of the parties,
the trust or estate itself, or some combination of them. 65 6 This allows courts
to fairly allocate the burden among the parties and, when appropriate, to the
trust or estate as well.
Above all else, the "justice and equity" standard connotes fundamental
fairness, not only to the parties directly involved but also to the beneficiaries
of the trust or estate to be affected by the ruling. The court must judiciously
balance and weigh all of the competing considerations to arrive at what is just
and equitable under the particular facts of each case.

656. S.C. CODE ANN.
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